

# PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Journal of the National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines, the Association of Schools of Public Administration in the Philippines, and the Philippine Society for Public Administration

*Brillantes and Tiusongco* Institutional Responses to Armed Conflicts

*Tanggol* Democratization, Governance  
and Poverty Alleviation in ARMM

*Muslim* Poverty Alleviation and Peace Building  
in Multiethnic Societies

*Mangahas* Strengthening the P.A. Curriculum  
for the MDGs

*Ferrer* Community Organizing and Governance

*Cariño, Briones, Florano  
and Follosco* Reinventing Philippine Governance  
for Globalization

PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

JANUARY-APRIL 2005

VOL. XLIX NOS. 1 & 2

# PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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The *Philippine Journal of Public Administration* is the official journal of the National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines Diliman. It is published quarterly during the months of January, April, July, and October. The opinions expressed in the Journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National College of Public Administration and Governance nor of the University of the Philippines Diliman.

	<i>Local</i>	<i>Foreign</i>
Subscription: Per Year:	P 500.00	US\$ 50.00
Single Issue:	P 140.00	US\$ 14.00

Manuscripts and communications should be addressed to the Managing Editor; orders for subscription should be sent to the Business Manager, *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines Diliman, 1101 Quezon City, PO Box 198, UP Campus.

Articles in the Journal are indexed in the *Index to Philippine Periodicals* (University of the Philippines), *Publication Affairs Information Service* (P.A.I.S., Inc., New York), *Selected Philippine Periodicals Index* (Silliman University), *Ulrich's International Periodicals Directory* (R.R. Bowker Co., New York, N.Y.), *International Bibliography of Periodical Literature Covering All Fields of Knowledge* (IBZ, Zeller Verlag GmbH & Co., Osnabrück) and *International Bibliography of Book Reviews* (IBR, Zeller Verlag GmbH & Co., Osnabrück).

Entered as second-class mail at the Manila Central Post Office on 15 February 1957.

ISSN 0031-7675

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## ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT

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Payment enclosed  
(payable to U.P. National College of Public Administration and Governance)

**PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

**Volume XLIX**

**January-April 2005**

**Numbers 1 & 2**

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## Editor's Notes

Peace-building, poverty alleviation, globalization, community organizing, and the Millennium Development Goals are the themes and topics discussed in this issue of the *Journal*.

In their paper "Institutional and Politico-Administrative Responses to Armed Conflicts," Alex B. Brillantes, Jr. and Jose O. Tiusongco discuss the general character of the government's response to the armed conflict in southern Philippines. Brillantes and Tiusongco argue that the government's response to the situation of "unpeace" in the island of Mindanao has always been twofold. Peace talks are conducted in tandem with various development programs designed and implemented in key areas. The authors present a historical review and analysis of the government's policies and programs and consequently emphasize that military action is untenable. The authors then present indicative recommendations and areas for actions that can be adopted by the government.

Sukarno D. Tanggol and Macapado A. Muslim also focus on the situation in Mindanao. Tanggol underscores the failure of governance and democratization process in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Tanggol establishes that RA 6734, better known as "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the ARMM," and the Tripoli Agreement, a peace accord signed by the GRP and the Moro National Liberation Front, are important landmarks. These milestones, however, fail to fulfill their promise(s). Tanggol cites, among others, the increased incidence of poverty and fraudulent elections as the clear signs that suggest that, fifteen years after its establishment, governance in ARMM is anything but good.

Muslim, likewise, suggests that the current efforts of the government as regards the situation in the ARMM are insufficient. Muslim highlights the multiethnic character of Philippine society and recommends the adoption of "multiculturalist" governance. Muslim articulates that ethnocultural differences will render "reductionist theories" in public administration as limited. To create structures, processes and policies that will suit the needs of a multiethnic society, Muslim recommends that there be a shift from policy assimilation or homogenization towards multiculturalism.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the worldwide battlecry for human development, are given special attention in the article of Joel V. Mangahas. That public administration education must play a key role

to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the Philippines is the central argument in the article "Strengthening the Academic Curriculum for Teaching Public Administration in the Philippines: Building Institutional Capacities to Attain the MDGs." Taking the point of view of an educator, Mangahas argues that since the general program of action articulated in the MDGs is grounded on the successful implementation of administration and governance reforms, it is only necessary for the MDGs to be formally introduced to the teaching and learning processes of schools of public administration in the country.

The *Local Government Code* (LGC) of 1991 is cited and reflected on in the article of Oscar P. Ferrer entitled "Community Organizing and Governance." Ferrer emphasizes that one of the most important features of the LGC is providing broader people's participation in governance. The article intensively illustrates the strengths of community governance. To support his claim, Ferrer chronicles the best practices and triumphs of four localities in the country which variably practice community governance.

"Reinventing Philippine Governance for Globalization" by Ledivina V. Cariño, Leonor M. Briones, Ebinezzer R. Florano and Kristine C. Folloso examines the Philippines' position in a globalized world. In particular, the article explores the prospects for reinventing Philippine governance to suit the needs of the times. The individual roles of the public sector, private sector and civil society are assessed to identify reforms that will make the Philippines competitive in a new political and economic environment.



# **Institutional and Politico-Administrative Responses to Armed Conflicts**

ALEX B. BRILLANTES, JR. AND JOSE O. TIUSONGCO\*

*The conflict between the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has been a long-time crisis. It encompasses the vague delineation of the policies imposed on ARMM by the government, indictment by the Mindanao people especially the Muslims of the government's failure to deliver human development in general and social services in particular and the unsuccessful series of peace settlements. As a result, different groups waged secessionist wars with the government; hostility in the region; underdevelopment, poverty, economic isolation, poor quality of education and emotional turmoil continue to prevail. This study discusses the institutional and politico-administrative responses to the armed conflicts in ARMM. Institutional responses should be accompanied by comprehensive and integrated capacity building efforts, continued capacity building of young Muslims leaders, training for Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), careful examination of the continuity and discontinuity of certain policies that have negative effects, and considering Federalism as an option.*

## **Introduction**

One of the greatest challenges that confronted the Philippine politico-administrative system over the past century was the so-called "Mindanao problem." This problem was characterized mostly by the lack of or absence of peace in the area as manifested by the continuous armed struggle of what has been collectively (though not always correctly) referred to as the "Muslim secessionist movement." This so-called "secessionist movement" represented the disenchantment of the Muslim minorities with the national government, accused of neglecting the needs of the Filipino Muslims in Mindanao. This neglect was especially true in the area of human development in general, and delivery of social services, in particular.

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Indeed, human development statistics and figures bear them out. Human development outcomes in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)<sup>1</sup> are the lowest in the country.

Table 1 from the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB) shows the poverty incidence<sup>2</sup> by region for the years 1997 and 2000. It shows that the ARMM region had the highest poverty incidence in the country at 50 percent in 1997 which worsened further at 57 percent in 2000 (more than double the national average of 28.4 percent). These are also true in related areas, such as child mortality, life expectancy, literacy rate, and education cohort survival. Among the causes of poor human development outcomes were economic, social, political, and cultural factors.

**Table 1. Poverty Incidence (in percent) by Region, 1997 and 2000**

<i>Region</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>2000</i>
Philippines	28.1	28.4
NCR – National Capital Region	4.8	5.7
Region I	31.4	29.6
Region II	27.1	24.8
Region III	13.9	17.0
Region IV	22.8	20.8
Region V	46.9	49.0
Region VI	37.2	37.8
Region VII	29.8	32.3
Region VIII	39.9	37.8
Region IX	31.9	38.3
Region X	37.8	32.9
Region XI	31.1	31.5
Region XII	45.3	48.4
CAR	35.9	31.1
ARMM	50.0	57.0
Caraga	44.7	42.9

Source: NSCB 2002.

ARMM also had the lowest literacy rate in Mindanao at 61 percent; and the lowest net enrolment rate at 82 percent compared to the national average of 94.4 percent. Its secondary level indicated the lowest participation rate at 39.19 percent, way below the 75.25 percent national average.

The state of unpeace<sup>3</sup> in Muslim Mindanao has been seen as an exacerbating factor that resulted in poor living conditions in ARMM. The ongoing conflict between the government and armed citizens has disrupted the delivery of public services—health, education, and social protection. Conversely, the inability of the government to provide access to social services and the poor human development outcomes have led mostly the poorer sectors to resort to violence thus aggravating the state of unpeace. Additionally, the cycles of conflict have resulted in psychosocial and economic stress and trauma for ARMM citizens. To address the crisis, scarce human and financial resources allocated for social services are instead diverted.

It is within the context of poor delivery of resources, the state of unpeace, and negligence of the region by the national government over the past decades that the secessionist movements have arisen in Mindanao, in general, and in the ARMM areas, in particular. The move for secession reached a high point in the sixties and the seventies with the emergence of the Mindanao Independence Movement and the “Muslim rebellion” that was a major reason for the imposition of martial law in 1972.

Over the years, history has shown that the national government has tried to respond to the situation and bring about peace in two major fronts: the military and institutional and politico-administrative. This study focuses on the latter. It includes a discussion of historical and contemporary institutional and politico-administrative responses to unpeace (Section II). Section III focuses on specific policy initiatives including the Tripoli Agreement, Presidential Decree (PD) 1618 and the Organic Act, while Section IV discusses an assessment of government’s institutional response in Muslim Mindanao. Where appropriate, the study includes discussions of the institutional responses to the conflict between the government and the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). After all, in the general discussion of the state of unpeace in the country, references are always made not only to rebellion in “Muslim Mindanao” but also to the rebellion being waged by the CPP-NPA and the National Democratic Front (NDF). Section V discusses some indicative recommendations and areas of action at the policy and politico-administrative levels.

### **Institutional and Politico-Administrative Responses to Unpeace**

In most general terms, the Government’s general politico-administrative response to the insurgency waged by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao, and the CPP-NPA in other parts of the country has always been twofold: (1) the conduct of a peace process that included negotiations with the representatives of the

insurgents, including peace talks in third countries, and (2) the design and implementation of development programs and projects for the areas.<sup>4</sup>

It is within this context that the legislature, being the primary policymaking body of the Philippine politico-administrative system, provides the enabling policy environment by crafting the appropriate laws. The executive branch is mandated to ensure the effective implementation of such laws and policies through appropriate and specific program, projects and activities.<sup>5</sup>

Through the years, the politico-administrative response to the state of unpeace in Mindanao took on various dimensions; for instance, the Marcos administration, while deploying military troops to address the Muslim rebellion also had its version of a "peace process" by designating his wife as his special emissary to negotiate peace with the Muslim rebels through a third party, Libya, resulting in the Tripoli Agreement. The Aquino administration tried to negotiate peace with the rebels by directly arriving at a peace agreement with their leaders: it obtained an agreement with Jose Maria Sison of the NDF and the CPP-NPA, and with Nur Misuari of the MNLF; however, it was only during the administration of President Ramos that a comprehensive institutional approach to peace was integrated into the politico-administrative system.

President Ramos created the National Unification Commission (NUC) mandated to formulate and recommend to the President a viable peace process that will lead to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace. Through the conduct of nationwide multisectoral consultations, NUC recommended that the Government's comprehensive peace efforts should pursue "Six Paths to Peace." The Government adopted its road map to peace by virtue of Executive Order (EO) 125 series of 1993. These are further discussed in the next section.

### **Resolving Armed Conflict in ARMM**

Conflict resolution in ARMM is not a new effort of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Since 1972, considerable policies have been adopted and institutional bodies created to end the armed confrontation between the national government and Muslim insurgents; then, the Philippine Congress created the Commission on National Integration and the Mindanao Development Authority. GRP also created a Presidential Task Force for the Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao, which became Southern Philippines Development Administration. In 1989, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao was created.

Peace agreements can be traced back to 1976 when the GRP and Muslim insurgents signed the Tripoli Agreement. The MNLF has served as the main

organization representing the armed Muslim groups. The general clause of the various policies and agreements pertains to putting an end to the armed conflict and pursuing talks between the parties to agree on a peaceful resolution of the hostilities in Muslim Mindanao; however, due to disagreements in the peace talks, the MILF was formed in 1977, a breakaway group from the MNLF. The group further complicated the issue of making peace negotiations work. Since then the government has had to deal with both the MNLF and the MILF.

The Philippine government under various administrations—Ferdinand Marcos, Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and the current President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo—has adopted and/or endeavored different policies to address the conflict issues in Southern Philippines. Presidents Marcos and Aquino tried to address the autonomy issue by creating different political setups. President Ramos put forward a comprehensive policy—the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, implementing the Tripoli Agreement consummated in 1976. The Declaration of General Cessation of Hostilities was signed by the GRP and the MILF in 1997. President Joseph Estrada issued the Memorandum of Instructions in 1998; however, the exploratory talks between the GRP and MILF collapsed. In 2000, the government pursued an all-out war policy against the MILF, which led to the takeover of Camp Abubakar and 47 other MILF camps. In 2001, President Arroyo shifted the war policy back to the negotiating table. The GRP and MILF signed a Tripoli Agreement on Peace anchored on the previous agreements between GRP and MNLF. Conversely, in the same year, she pursued an all-out war policy against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a group of Muslim terrorists and bandits, which had engaged in violence, bombings, kidnappings, and other human rights violations.

The Ramos administration, upon recommendation of the NUC, crafted the “The Six Paths to Peace,” namely, (1) reforms, (2) consensus-building and empowerment, (3) negotiations, (4) reconciliation and reconstruction, (5) conflict reduction and transformation, and (6) building a climate for peace through education and advocacy. This policy perhaps indicates a genuine effort to resolve the conflict in Mindanao. Interestingly, military operations were not among the options to achieve peace.

EO 125 issued on 15 September 1993 defined the administrative structure for government peace efforts. It embodied the major recommendations of the NUC, which provided the official policy framework of the Ramos government’s peace efforts, including the principles, components and administrative structure.

It likewise organized the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process (OPAPP) to continue the work of the NUC. Its head, a Presidential

Adviser, is a cabinet level position tasked to advise and assist the President in managing the peace efforts. To date, several negotiating panels under the OPPAP structure work on exploratory and formal talks between the GRP and the armed groups, such as the NDF, MNLF, and MILF.

The peace process efforts of the different administrations have remained unsuccessful. Agrasada (2003) identified several factors that contributed to the erosion of the peace process, among others: (1) unresolved issues concerning land; (2) ceasefire violations; (3) conversion of MILF camps to military headquarters; (4) political opposition to the negotiations; (5) heightened MILF attacks against military forces; (6) the government's counterforce and punitive action against the MILF; and, (7) probable MILF involvement in terrorist activities.

There have been observations that regional autonomy and peace agreements have not really resulted in a better peace situation in Muslim Mindanao. Ownership and preparedness of the peace process are key factors to its success; for instance, the World Bank noted that the MNLF did not participate in the efforts toward regional autonomy during the administration of Marcos and Aquino. Moreover, there has been little or no direct assistance for capacity building for regional autonomy. Preparedness to govern the regional government is imperative if regional autonomy is to work for ARMM.<sup>6</sup>

### **Historical Perspective of Key Policies**

This section discusses the evolution of key policies and institutions and politico-administrative structures initiated by the national government within the context of diverse sociopolitical and economic conditions in Muslim Mindanao. Towards the end, these policies and institutional structures are indicative of possible resolutions of the continuing conflict between Muslim secessionists and the government. More importantly, they show the institutional response of both the Executive and the Legislature in providing political stability and managing conflict.

Generally, the institutional response focuses on two areas: (1) regional governance as a tool for local development, and (2) peace process to resolve conflict between the GRP and Muslim insurgents. Regional autonomy was seen as the immediate response to the issues on local governance, to improve the management of resources, delivery of services, and development outcomes. Peace agreements are the key strategic interventions to resolve conflict, geared towards collective action for human development.

Parenthetically, it might be mentioned that the use of military force may be considered as another institutional response in dealing with the Mindanao

problem. Another research tackles the GRP's institutional response to resolve armed conflicts using military force.

Annex 1 presents the genesis of policy and institutional responses in Muslim Mindanao since the American occupation. Southern Philippines especially the Muslim dominated areas was (rightly or wrongly) always considered different from the rest of the country because of its ethnic composition. It was within this context that unique politico-administrative and institutional approaches and strategies were employed since the American occupation up to today to address the situation.

This attempts to summarize the chronological context of the government's institutional responses pertaining to the armed conflict in Muslim Mindanao.

### **Summary of Institutional Responses**

The following were among the major institutional responses aimed at addressing the unique situation in southern Philippines.

- *Defining the area geographically and targeting it as a separate territorial jurisdiction for assistance and intervention.* As early as 1899, during the American occupation, the Military District of Mindanao and Jolo was created. In 1903, the Moro Province was created. In the seventies, with the regionalization of the Philippines, the Muslim-dominated provinces were designated as regions IX and XII. These regions essentially were also constituted by the same 13 provinces and nine cities in Mindanao that were designated as part of the autonomous region defined under the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. The 1987 Constitution likewise geographically defined the autonomous regions in the Cordilleras and in Muslim Mindanao; then in 1989, the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao geographically defined the provinces that constituted the area of autonomy.
- *Setting up mechanisms that would integrate the area into the mainstream body politic at least at the conceptual and politico-administrative levels.* This is illustrated by the setting up of the Commission on National Integration in 1957, the Presidential Assistance on National Authorities (PANAMIN) in the sixties and the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) in 1978. These bodies' main task was essentially to integrate into mainstream society certain ethnic groups which sought full

integration into the larger community while at the same time preserving their original way of life.

- *Marginalizing the local minority population in their own land by encouraging migration of non-Muslims to the region and land investments by local and foreign businesses.* This essentially meant attempts by the dominant body politic to further marginalize the minorities by bringing in outsiders into the area and further making them minorities in their own native land. This was what the homestead policy in the sixties essentially did.
- *Adoption of traditional and formal democratic means, such as plebiscites, referenda and special elections in the area, to determine the sentiments of the affected citizens.* This modality was popularly used by the Marcos dictatorship to legitimize its hegemonic policies in the region. For instance, Marcos called for a referendum/plebiscite through PD 1092 in 1977. A plebiscite was again called in 1989 where the people were supposed to have voted favorably for RA 6734 also known as the Organic Act for the ARMM.
- *Setting up of special politico-administrative structures in the area.* Thus, the office of regional commissioners for Regions IX and XII was established in 1975; a regional executive and legislative assembly was established pursuant to the results of the 1977 referendum in the area; and the establishment of the politico-administrative structures that would operationalize the ARMM government including the election of the regional governor, the appointment of regional cabinet secretaries defined sectorally by the Governor.
- *The signing of peace agreements and covenants between and among the conflicting parties as another contemporary "standard" institutional response to address the conflict in Muslim Mindanao.* This was particularly true during the Marcos administration when the peace agreement reached was within the context of the Tripoli Agreement. The Ramos administration created a presidential adviser on the Peace Process with the objective of bringing the conflicting parties, i.e., the Muslim rebels and the government, to the negotiation table to hammer out a peace agreement. A peace agreement between the government and the MILF was likewise arrived at during the Estrada administration. Similarly, the Arroyo administration continued to negotiate with the Muslim rebels to arrive at a peace agreement.



- *Elevation of the situation to international attention and bringing in international actors to help settle the problem.* This was essentially what the Tripoli agreement did in 1976, and what subsequent government attempts did, such as getting the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and Malaysia and Indonesia to participate in the dialogue and address the unique needs of the Muslim Filipinos in Mindanao.

Indeed, the institutional and politico-administrative response of the government, particularly, the executive and legislative branches, ranged from attempts to implement the constitutional provision of regional autonomy as provided for in the Constitution, to the implementation of applicable provisions of general laws (i.e., the Local Government Code), from the crafting of specific laws for the area (i.e., the Organic Act), to the conduct of consultations, plebiscites and elections to determine and gauge the people's sentiments and will, and peace agreements.

### **Government's Responses to the CPP-NPA/NDF**

The OPAPP indicates that the government's institutional response stems from its recognition that peace is not just the absence of armed conflict but enabling an environment for sustainable human development.

Soon after the EDSA People Power in 1986, then President Corazon Aquino opened the peace negotiations with the NDF, Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA), and other armed groups.

During Ramos' presidency, exploratory talks between the government and the NDF began. The government initiated informal talks to convince the latter to engage in peace talks with the end in view of attaining a just and lasting peace in the country. Exploratory/informal talks between the representatives of the government and the NDF were the medium of achieving peace agreements.

Annex 2 indicates the four results or agreements signed after rounds of exploratory talks, while Annex 3 provides the agreements as a result of formal talks between the GRP and NDF.

On 30 May 1999, during the term of President Estrada, the NDF terminated the peace agreements when the GRP ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States. This also led to the GRP's termination of the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) on 1 June 1999.

The Macapagal-Arroyo Administration, weeks after EDSA II, reaffirmed the six Paths to Peace as the guiding principle towards the attainment of peace

in the country by issuing Executive Order No. 3. It also issued the Joint Statement on 9 March 2001 providing for the resumption of the formal peace talks after two years since its termination. Since then, there have been continued talks and formal negotiations between the GRP panel and NDF representatives.

### **Government Plan on Peace Process: Contemporary Developments, 2004- 2010**

This section specifically focuses on executive and legislative responses to the problem within the context of the contemporary peace process. The *Medium Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) 2004-2010* provides the overall framework for making the government response work towards the attainment of peace and development in the country.

The national government emphasizes the continuity of its policies in achieving peace and development, particularly in conflict-ridden areas such as ARMM. Obviously, there have been efforts undertaken and resources utilized to put in place peace in these areas; however, the results have been unable to effect better human development conditions.

Chapter 14 of the *MTPDP* presents the government's goals, strategies and action plans to promote national harmony through peace process. The goals of the peace process are as follows:

- a. Completion of comprehensive peace agreements with rebel groups resulting in the permanent cessation of armed hostilities by 2010;
- b. Completion of implementation of all final peace agreements signed since 1986;
- c. Mainstreaming the rebel groups through an enhanced amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation program;
- d. Rehabilitation, development, and healing of conflict-affected areas; and
- e. Strengthening the peace constituency and citizens' participation in the peace process on the ground.

To achieve the above goals, the administration adopts and implements a peace plan comprising two components, namely: (1) peacemaking and peacekeeping; and (2) peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

Peacemaking and peacekeeping aims to reduce the level of violence and permanently end the internal armed conflict with all insurgent/secessionist groups. On the other hand, peacebuilding and conflict prevention aims to rehabilitate and develop conflict-affected areas, remove major sources of grievance, and heal the wounds of internal armed conflict. Essentially, the two components relate key tasks to complete peace negotiations and bring about people-led peace initiatives, as means to end violence in conflict areas.

There are seven key elements to be pursued: (1) continuation of peace talks and conclusion of final peace agreements with major rebel groups; (2) complementary measures to reduce the level of violence arising from internal armed conflict; (3) completion of implementation of existing final peace agreements; (4) enhanced amnesty/reconciliation program for rebel returnees, establishment of Amnesty and Reconciliation Commission (ARC) in lieu of Amnesty Commission; (5) rehabilitation and development of conflict-affected areas; (6) catch-up development program for ARMM and affirmative action agenda for Muslims; and (7) community based interfaith/tri-people's dialogue, healing, and reconciliation (NEDA 2003).

#### **The Tripoli Agreement, the 1987 Constitution, PD 1618 and the Organic Act**

To further provide a deeper perspective on specific policy initiatives to respond to the situation of unpeace in Mindanao, this section discusses the major policies and institutional mechanisms adopted to resolve conflict in ARMM. Specifically, it discusses the following: (1) the Tripoli Agreement of 1976; (2) the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines; (3) PD 1816; (4) Republic Act (RA) 6734; and (5) RA 9054 or the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. The section includes a discussion of the role of the United States (US), unofficially or officially, in conflict management and resolution.

The Tripoli Agreement of 1976 was signed by the GRP and the MNLF with the aid of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Among the items agreed upon was the establishment of autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The areas of autonomy included Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and Palawan.

Notably, it was also agreed that foreign policy shall be the competence of the Central Government of the Philippines and that the authorities of the autonomous region shall have their own economic and financial systems. The formation of a Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council by direct

election and through appointments, respectively, was also stipulated upon in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement.

Immediately upon the signing of the agreement, a provisional government was to be created in the areas of autonomy and a declaration of a ceasefire was to take effect.

The significance of the Tripoli Agreement cannot be discounted, because this agreement served as the basic skeletal framework of the Executive branch in the implementation of future agreements and other policies regarding the resolution of the armed conflict in Muslim Mindanao and the achievement of lasting peace in the region.

The Tripoli Agreement was followed by various presidential proclamations, decrees and the enactment of *Batasang Pambansa Blg.* (National Assembly Law No.) 20, all consistent with and operating within the framework of the Tripoli Agreement. A significant development in this phase of the evolution of the policies adopted by the government was the conduct of a plebiscite where the people affected voted down the proposal to merge the thirteen provinces into one autonomous region. Instead, on the basis of the said plebiscite, two autonomous regions were formed by then President Marcos (Regions IX and XII).

Article X, Sections 15 to 21 of the 1987 Constitution deal with regional autonomy. More specifically, Section 15 of the charter provides that "there shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."

The quoted provision of the fundamental law is of utmost significance as the government, both the legislative and the executive, has to contend with various constitutional and statutory limitations in its dealing with secessionist groups such as the MNLF or the MILF. The government has to work within the catch phrases "national sovereignty" and "territorial integrity" in entering into peace accords or even in the matter of legislation with respect to the implementation of these agreements. It will take no less than a constitutional amendment if the government has to work outside of these constitutional limitations, i.e., establishing a separate federal state for the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.

PD 1681 provided for the implementation of the organization of *Sangguniang Pampook* (Regional Assembly) and *Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng*

*Pook* (Regional Executive Council) in the Autonomous Regions IX and XII; thus, establishing the final political setup and framework of autonomous governance in the two regions.

The Sangguniang Pampook exercises local legislative powers over regional affairs in each region within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals in the following areas: (1) organization of regional administrative system; (2) economic, social and cultural development; (3) agricultural, commercial and industrial program; (4) infrastructure development; (5) urban and rural planning; (6) taxation and revenue-raising measures; (7) maintenance, operation and administration of schools; (8) establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs and facilities; (9) preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and (10) other matters necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region. It is composed of 21 members, including 17 representatives, elected from the different provinces and component cities in each region.

The Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook, on the other hand, serves as the executive unit of the region. It implements or, where appropriate, causes and supervises the implementation of the policies, programs and legislations by the Sangguniang Pampook. It is composed of a Chairman and four members. The Lupon Chairman has the power to approve or veto every legislative enactment of the Sangguniang Pampook.

Table 2 indicates the provinces covered in each autonomous region as well as the composition of the Sangguniang Pampook.

The establishment of the Autonomous Regions aims to enhance the attainment of peace and order, the acceleration of socioeconomic development, and the resettlement of displaced persons and families in Regions IX and XII. It tends to affect the turnover of responsibility for undertaking development activities particularly at the community level to the Autonomous Regions.

The Autonomous Regions are granted powers and authority that would enable them to adopt and implement regional policies and legislations that are germane to their particular needs and social and cultural values.

RA 6734 (1989), also known as the "Organic Act," established the ARMM to provide its basic structure of government within the framework of the Constitution and national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines, and to ensure the peace and equality before the law of all people in the Autonomous Region. It provides the basis for autonomy and governance in the region giving wide-ranging powers and functions to the ARMM regional government.

**Table 2. Territorial Coverage of Autonomous Region IX and Region XII**

<i>Autonomous Region</i>	<i>Provinces Covered</i>	<i>Sangguniang Pamook Composition</i>
Region IX	▪ Basilan	1
	▪ Sulu	3
	▪ Tawi-Tawi	1
	▪ Zamboanga del Norte including cities of Dipolog and Dapitan	4
	▪ Zamboanga del Sur including cities of Pagadian and Zamboanga	8
Region XII	▪ Lanao del Norte including the city of Iligan	3
	▪ Lanao del Sur including the city of Marawi	4
	▪ Maguindanao including the city of Cotabato	4
	▪ North Cotabato	4
	▪ Sultan Kudarat	2

Source: OPAPP 2004.


Under President Aquino, RA 6734 was submitted to the people of the thirteen provinces and nine cities for a plebiscite as stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement.<sup>7</sup> Out of thirteen provinces and nine cities, only four agreed to be part of ARMM. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi. Figure 1 shows the administrative structure of ARMM.

Among the key bodies created are the: (1) Regional Legislative Assembly; (2) Regional Economic and Development Planning Board; and (3) Regional Economic Development Planning Office.

*Regional Legislative Assembly (RLA).* RLA has the legislative power for the application and enforcement of Autonomy—local and regional—except those pertaining to foreign affairs, national security and defense, among others. It is composed of 23 elected representatives from eight legislative districts.

*Regional Economic and Development Planning Board (REDPB).* The Board approves the development plans, programs, and projects for the ARMM regional government. The Regional Governor serves as the chairperson. Its membership consists of all provincial governors and city mayors in the region, the speaker of the Regional Assembly, two other assembly persons, and five private sector representatives.

**Figure 1. The Administrative Structure of ARMM**



**LEGEND:**

- ARMM - Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
- RLA - Regional Legislative Assembly
- LGUs - Local Government Units
- RLAs - Regional Line Agencies
- CABINET MEMBER - All heads of Regional Agencies/Departments
- RPDB - Regional Planning Development Board
- RPDO - Regional Planning Development Office
- ORG - Office of the Regional Director
- RSDC - Regional Social Development Sector
- RMIC - Regional Micro-Intersectoral Committee
- RIDC - Regional Infrastructure Development Committee
- REDC - Regional Economic Development Committee
- RDAC - Regional Development Administration Committee
- RSCC - Regional Statistical Coordination Committee
- LRMC - LGUSP Regional Management Committee

*Regional Economic Development Planning Office (REDPO)*. It serves as the technical staff of the REDP Board.

On 2 September 1996, the Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the GRP and MNLF, considered as the most comprehensive attempt to solve the Mindanao problem, was signed. The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Ministerial Committee of Six and the Secretary General of the OIC participated in this undertaking, as in the case of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, upon the request of the parties (GRP and MNLF). The salient stipulations in the agreement were divided into two phases. Annex 3 details the implementing structure and mechanism of the 1996 Final Agreement.

Phase 1 covers a three-year period that started after the signing of the peace agreement with the issuance of Executive Order (EO) establishing the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and the Consultative Assembly (CA).

During the Transitional Period (Phase 1), the following shall be implemented:

- (1) Establishment of the Special Zone of Peace and Development in the Southern Philippines (SZOPAD) covering the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Sarangani and Palawan and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Zamboanga and Puerto Princesa. Within the next three years, these areas shall be the focus of intensive peace and development efforts. Public and private investments shall be channeled to these areas to spur economic activities and uplift the conditions of the people therein.
- (2) Establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), composed of one Chairman, one ViceChairman and three Deputies, one each representing the Muslims, the Christians, and the Cultural Communities. They are appointed by the President.
- (3) The SPCPD shall be assisted by the Darul Iftah (Advisory Council) which shall be created by the Chairman of the SPCPD.
- (4) The local government units in the area, including the ARMM, shall continue to exist and exercise their functions in accordance with existing laws.



- (5) Appropriate agencies of the government that are engaged in peace and development activities in the area, such as, but not limited to the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA), shall be placed under the control and/or supervision of the Council as its implementing agencies to ensure that peace and development projects and programs are effectively accomplished.

During this phase, the process of the joining in of MNLF elements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines will start. The joining in of MNLF elements with the PNP as part of the regular police recruitment program will also take place in this phase.

Phase 2 involves an amendment to or repeal of the Organic Act (RA 6734) of the ARMM through Congressional action, after which the amendatory law shall be submitted to the people of the concerned areas in a plebiscite to determine the establishment of a new autonomous government and the specific area of autonomy thereof.

- (1) While peace and development programs are being implemented in the SZOPAD, a bill to amend or repeal RA 6734 shall be initiated within Phase 1 (1996-1997). The bill shall include the pertinent provisions of the final Peace Agreement and the expansion of the present ARMM area of autonomy. After a law shall have been passed by Congress and approved by the President, it shall be submitted to the people for approval in a plebiscite in the affected areas, within two years from the establishment of the SPCPD (1998).
- (2) The new area of autonomy shall then be determined by the provinces and cities that will vote/choose to join the said autonomy (1998). It may be provided by the Congress in a law that clusters of contiguous Muslim-dominated municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged and constituted into a new province(s) which shall become part of the new autonomous region.

The funds for the operations of the Council and the Assembly were initially sourced from the funds of the Office of the President while those for development programs and projects came from the appropriations of Congress as may be provided in the General Appropriations Act.

In line with the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, the agreement in 1996 also contained a provision that legislative power for the application in the area of autonomy shall be vested in a Regional Legislative Assembly (RLA) except those pertaining to foreign affairs, national security and defense, among others.

The Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process reports that the governments collectively pursued the implementation of the political aspect of Phase 1 and the regional autonomous government of Phase 2 of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement.

Annex 4 presents the executive and legislative responses to concretize the (1) establishment of SZOPAD, the SPCPD, and the CA; and (2) new autonomy law and elections in the new ARMM, as provided in the 1996 Final Peace Agreement.

According to Mercado (1998) the transitional mechanism that the SPCPD offered was said to be a failure for the following reasons:

- (1) Ambiguous and unclear powers of the SPCPD and its relations to existing governmental structures including the local government units (LGUs)
- (2) Lack of enthusiasm of LGUs to participate in the SPCPD and the CA
- (3) Lack of logistical and administrative support to the operations of the SPCPD

Macapado Muslim (1999) points out other areas that still remain unaddressed and need to be tackled within the framework of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. These include the following:

- (1) representation and rights of *Lumads* (indigenous people) and Christians in a Muslim-led autonomous region
- (2) the balance between religion and secularism, reparations, economic redistribution, conflicting land claims, affirmative action policies
- (3) the redefinition of relations with the central government based in Manila.

The U.S. government has been involved in combating the armed conflict in Muslim Mindanao based on the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. It has particular interest in Abu Sayyaf—classified as an official terrorist organization—which has been reported to have ties with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network.

The Philippine government had received military aid from the U.S. military until 1992, when the two U.S. bases in the country were not renewed. In 1999, the signing of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) resumed the

military ties between the U.S. and Philippine governments. The gains that the Philippine government has received include: (1) joint military training exercises; (2) economic support funds; and (3) financing for weapons purchases (Gershman 2001).

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through its Office of Transition Initiatives provided \$3.5 million in September 1997-March 2001. Specifically, it provided support to the implementation of the 1996 peace agreement for MNLF combatant reintegration and community development in MNLF-controlled areas of Mindanao. It also supported community-based reconciliation efforts in 2000 after the resumption of hostilities between the MILF and the Philippine military. USAID also participated as a principal donor in the Mindanao Working Group, through the United Nations Development Program (Gershman 2001).

### **Assessment of Government's Institutional Response in Muslim Mindanao**

This section presents the results of an indicative survey conducted on young Muslim leaders aged 21 to 30 years, both from the ARMM and outside ARMM. The survey provides qualitative information about the outcomes of the government's policies to achieve poverty alleviation and peacebuilding initiatives in ARMM.

The survey aimed to obtain their views and insights about (1) the effect of the ongoing armed conflict between the government and Muslim insurgents, (2) the state of peace or unpeace in ARMM; (3) the problems/issues that confront ARMM; and (4) the possible solutions to these problems/issues as well as other recommendation/s that would improve institutional response to the conflict.

#### *Overall Effect or Impact of Armed Conflict in Mindanao*

The first question focuses on the effects/impacts of the armed conflict or hostilities in the ARMM to human development outcomes or the overall well-being or quality of life of the people living in the area.

The common replies to this question are underdevelopment and poverty, lack of access to and poor quality of education, mistrust and fear between the civilians and the military, displacement, economic isolation, inaccessibility of basic social services, hostile attitude towards the military, and public misperception due to the media's portrayal of the peace and order situation in the ARMM.

One respondent noted that the people are confused as to which group is troubling whom, i.e., rebels or the Muslim leaders. The others noted the widening gap of understanding between Muslims and Christians, the inclusion of violence as part of the culture, and the passive attitude of the people towards the problems being faced in the region.

Additional replies include the destruction of property by militant groups, the unwillingness of young students to attend school out of fear, and the loss of life.

#### *General Assessment of the State of Peace or Unpeace in ARMM*

The second question concerns the state of peace or unpeace in the ARMM following the signing of the Tripoli Act, PD 1618, the Organic Law of ARMM, the Local Government Code of 1991, and the 1996 Peace Treaty. How have they affected the poverty reduction efforts and service delivery in the area?

All of the respondents agree that these agreements have done very little to improve the peace and order situation in the region; some even say that the region has become more unpeaceful following the signing of these agreements. Several respondents noted that these agreements had provisions which were not agreed upon by both parties and were unilaterally implemented, specifically the Tripoli Act and PD 1618. This indicates the government's lack of sincerity towards the resolution of the peace problem.

One respondent said that more rebel groups rose into action following the 1996 Peace Treaty, while another stated that the Local Government Code was a failure because the ARMM is not yet ready for autonomy as there is lack of support from the national government.

The misconception of the state of peace in Mindanao and ARMM is a hindrance to the delivery of basic services. It was also noted that the poor quality of leadership in the region hinders the development initiatives and poverty reduction efforts.

The respondents also pointed out that their politicians are corrupt, and even help proliferate illegal activities; as such, the region lacks political maturity. One asserted that separation is never the solution to the Mindanao problem, but there exists an immediate need for intelligent and good leaders

#### *Major Problems Confronting ARMM*

The third question focuses on the major challenges/problems/issues confronting the ARMM at the policy, institutional and individual levels.

At the policy level, among the challenges are the separatist movement, incompatibility of policies, fundamentalism and devolution.

At the institutional level, the most prevalent issues were corruption among politicians; political dynasties and nepotism; limited access to basic services particularly health and education; financial constraints; and dependence on external sources of funds, including the Internal Revenue Allotment. The respondents also wrote that the ARMM suffers from weak leadership, bureaucratic practices and the lack of transparency, i.e., some civilians are accused of being terrorists when they actually are not. Significantly, a respondent stated that the interference of the national government in the institution of the ARMM and its elections is a major issue, and some provisions in PD 1083 are unconstitutional.

At the individual level, the respondents consider "crab mentality," ignorance and poor education as the most pressing challenges. Other responses include hunger for power and vainglory, discrimination, lack of empowerment, cultural differences, and complacent attitude.

#### *Proposed Solutions to Problems*

The fourth question solicits solutions given the issues and concerns identified earlier.

At the policy level, the respondents emphasized that military operations in the ARMM must be stopped, and there is a great need for integration of the "Muslim minority" into the system to help put a stop to discrimination. A respondent emphasized that autonomy is not the answer as the ARMM is still politically immature to govern itself. Another respondent, however, said that the Muslims should be granted self-rule. They also wrote that the government should increase its sensitivity to all its constituents in Mindanao, and should conduct transparent consultation and research to refine its policies concerning the ARMM. The establishment of cooperatives, recognition of Muslim tribalism, and integration of Islamic studies into the national educational curriculum were also considered solutions to the issues at the policy level.

At the institutional level, the most prevalent answer was capacity-building for Muslims, to include training for leaders and school teachers, more exposure for the youth outside the ARMM, and opportunities for Muslims in the government service. Other solutions were identified, including the reduction of armed forces intervention in the area and the related decrease of resource allocation for the defense budget, the creation of more *shariah* (Islamic sacred law) courts and the stricter implementation of the *Halal* (in accordance with Islamic law) system. Lastly, they said that strengthening

revenue generation efforts and the use of cost-sharing scheme in local projects would help augment the economic situation.

At the individual level, they cited education and advocacy, training, values education, and good leadership as imperative for greater service delivery. Also included were open-mindedness, and acceptance of the strengths and weaknesses of fellow Mindanao leaders in the ARMM. Interestingly, one participant noted that marriage celebration in accordance with Islamic laws merits some consideration as well.

Apart from the solutions suggested at the policy, institutional, and individual levels, the respondents shared their other recommendations, such as the total dissolution of the ARMM and the demilitarization of the region. There are also suggestions that the Muslims be given the right to self-government so that Muslims and Christians can both live in peace. There are also calls for sincerity on both sides in their peace efforts, transparent consultations, and encouragement to elect competent, spiritual and moral leaders.


### **Indicative Recommendations and Areas for Action**

This section discusses some recommendations and proposes some indicative action points for reform to improve human security in the area.

It has been argued at the outset that the major cause for the poor, or lack of, or outright absence of basic social services in the ARMM is the armed conflict in the area between the Muslim secessionist movement and the government. The following are some areas that might be considered as institutional and politico-administrative responses to restore peace in the area and thereby lay the foundation for effective human development.

#### *Comprehensive and Integrated Capacity Building Efforts*

Institutional responses should be accompanied by comprehensive and integrated capacity-building efforts; for instance, it is not sufficient to set up the regional government. This should be accompanied by capacity-building efforts that will include the following: conduct of basic skills training for the officials and staff of the ARMM ranging from basic office management to financial accounting to revenue generation and mobilization; intergovernmental relations especially in clarifying the relationship between regional executive and legislative branches, and also in defining and refining the relationships between the regional government and the component local governments and with the national government as well. Figure 2 presents a framework for capacity-building and its critical components.

**Figure 2. Critical Components for Capacity Building**

Source: Adopted from Astillera and Mangahas 2003.

The diagram shows the interrelatedness and interdependency of the critical components to carry out government policies effectively. Simplistically, policies require the appropriate institutional mechanisms and individual competencies to implement them. There has to be matching or balance between the three levels of institutional capacity. The institutional response of the government to resolve armed conflicts could be effectively laid by ensuring that the above components have been put in place.

### *Continue Capability Building of Young Muslim Leaders*

There are current efforts by international donor organizations to focus efforts on the so-called successor generation or young and emerging leaders in the ARMM. These efforts should be continued if only to lay the groundwork for young leaders in the ARMM who are to take over the leadership of the Region. A quick survey was conducted involving young Muslim leaders, and the results revealed that poor governance and inability of the Autonomous Region in delivering the basic services are seen as a government failure.

### *Training for AFP Personnel*

In this connection, capacity building efforts should likewise be focused on elements of Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) if only to create and strengthen a mindset that the military option in addressing the Muslim and the communist rebellions is untenable and that peace can only come if efforts to win the "hearts and minds" of the people are carried out through institution building accompanied by reforms in the politico-administrative system.<sup>5</sup>

### *Carefully Examine the "Continuity" and "Discontinuity" of Certain Policies that Have Negative Effects*

The negative effects of discontinuities in the implementation of general policy initiatives in response to the situation of unpeace in Mindanao should be examined and avoided. For instance, changes in leadership at the national and regional levels have also brought about changes in policies and approaches to the situation. This policy of discontinuity was most dramatically illustrated after the change in administration from the Ramos to the Estrada administrations. Policy interventions should indeed be incremental and should, as much as possible, after serious reexamination, build on earlier hard earned gains. Policy discontinuities lead to a confused bureaucracy and waste of precious time and resources and social capital.

### *Federalism as an Option*

Finally, federalism as an option to restore peace and strengthen institutions in the ARMM should indeed be seriously considered; however, it must be mentioned that the federalist option cannot, and should not, be fast tracked. Efforts to strengthen the local governments and the regional government through a comprehensive and integrated capacity-building program should lay the foundation for the establishment of the federal state in ARMM also known as the Bangsa Moro state.

Perhaps, federalism "is a significant step in the efforts to make governance in the Philippines genuinely multiculturalist." According to Chancellor Macapado Muslim of the Mindanao State University,

a genuinely multiculturalist governance will make secession and armed struggle baseless and unnecessary, and transform the Philippines as a vibrant multicultural society that will provide authentic peace and holistic development for all of its constituent cultural communities, including the ethnic minorities (Muslim 2004: 17).



### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>ARMM consists of five provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi) and one city (Marawi City).

<sup>2</sup>"Poverty incidence" refers to the "proportion of families (or population) with per capita income less than the per capita poverty threshold to the total number of families (population)."

<sup>3</sup>The author coined the term "unpeace" to denote "absence of peace."

<sup>4</sup>As mentioned earlier, the other major response apart from working within the context of the politico-administrative system is the military response.

<sup>5</sup>During the dictatorship of Marcos, policymaking and implementation were fused in the dictator under a martial law regime

<sup>6</sup>In the conduct of this study, an indicative survey was also made among some young Muslim leaders who were then attending a one semester training course at the UP National College of Public Administration and Governance. As indicated in Section IV, there continues to be general cynicism among them about the various attempts at the institutional and politico-administrative levels to address the needs of the Muslims in Mindanao.

<sup>7</sup>The plebiscite was conducted in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, and Zamboanga.

<sup>8</sup>It is imperative that military operations be stopped and alternative mechanisms to restore peace be seriously considered. The experience in Muslim Mindanao has shown that it is impossible to successfully restore peace when military operations are conducted in tandem with politico-administrative solutions. The gains attained through institutional and politico-administrative interventions are more often than not negated by military operations.

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**Executive and Legislative Response to the Conflict in Muslim Mindanao:  
A Historical Perspective**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Policy/ Institutional Setup</i>	<i>Regime</i>	<i>Key Features</i>
30 October 1899	Military District of Mindanao and Jolo	US Army Department of the Pacific and the Eighth Army Corps	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Created from the provinces of Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Misamis, Surigao, Sulu and Zamboanga.</li> </ul>
October 1901	Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes	American Occupation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Created by the Philippine Commission assigned to make a systematic investigation of the non-Christians in the Philippines: identify their tribes, territories, social organization, language, beliefs, manners and customs.</li> </ul>
15 July 1903	Establishment of Moro Province	American Occupation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Moro and pagan inhabitants in the province were subjected to Moro laws and tribal customary laws. The province was ruled by a civilian governor.</li> </ul>
23 July 1914	Organic Act for the Department of Mindanao and Sulu	Philippine Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extended to the inhabitants of Mindanao and Sulu the general laws of the country and the general forms and procedures of government followed in other provinces.</li> </ul>
5 February 1920	Abolition of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ended the effective period of American administration over Moro land. The Secretary of the Interior, through the Bureau of Non-Christian tribes, exercised its powers to govern the seven provinces of the region.</li> </ul>
12 February 1935	Act No. 4197 or Quirino-Recto Colonization Act	President Quirino	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Launched a vigorous campaign to solve the Mindanao situation through land settlement, under sponsorship by the government.</li> </ul>
1957	Commission on National Integration	President Magsaysay	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tasked to bring about moral, material, economic, social, and political advancement of the Non-Christian Filipinos, and making permanent their integration into the body politic, i.e., through scholarships in government schools and universities.</li> </ul>

1960s	Homestead policy	President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Encouraged the migration of non-Muslims to the Mindanao region, and land investments for local and foreign big businesses.</li> </ul>
7 July 1975	PD 742 and Letter of Instruction (LOI) 290	President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Established the Office of the Regional Commissioner for Region IX and Region XII. Rear Admiral Romulo Espaldon and Atty. Simeon Datumanong were appointed as commissioners for the two regions, respectively.</li> </ul>
23 December 1976	Tripoli Agreement	President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Signed by the Philippine government and the MNLF under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) through its Quadripartite Commission in Tripoli, Libya. Granted autonomy to 13 of the 23 provinces and 9 cities in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan islands, with their respective executive, legislative and judicial branches, and a regional security force independent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.</li> </ul>
14 February 1977	PD 1092	President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Called for a referendum-plebiscite on 17 April 1977 in the 13 provinces.</li> </ul>
16 February 1977	Resolution No. 11	President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Batasang Bayan issued a resolution recommending the promulgation of a decree which provides the functions, powers and composition of the Sangguniang Pampook (Regional Assembly)</li> </ul>
25 March 1977	Proclamation 1628	President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Established a provisional government in the 13 provinces stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement.</li> </ul>
17 April 1977	The 1977 Plebiscite	President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The people—through the qualified voters in the Southern Philippines—approved the creation of Sangguniang pampook and Lupong Tagapagtanggap with an overwhelming 2,499,375 affirmative votes; 65,612 negative votes; and 21,176 abstentions.</li> <li>The people rejected the merger of the 13 provinces into one autonomous region. They proposed two autonomous regional governments— Regions IX and XII.</li> </ul>
7 May 1977	Proclamation 1628-A	President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This proclamation was issued ordering the adoption and implementation of the results of the referendum-plebiscite on 17 April 1977.</li> </ul>

## Annex 1 (continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Policy/ Institutional Setup</i>	<i>Regime</i>	<i>Key Features</i>
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Based on the results of the 1977 Plebiscite, President Marcos defined the composition (provinces) of the Autonomous Regions</li> </ul>
1978	Southern Philippine Development Authority	President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Undertook the government programs for the Muslims and later became the Ministry of Muslim Affairs and the Presidential Assistance on National Minorities (PANAMIN). PANAMIN was tasked to integrate into the mainstream of society certain ethnic groups which sought full integration into the larger community and at the same time protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their original way of life beside the larger community.</li> </ul>
23 March 1979	<i>Batas Pambansa</i> (National Law) Bilang 20	President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Batasan Pambansa (National Assembly) passed <i>Batas Pambansa</i> Blg. 20 providing for the organization of Sangguniang Pampook and Lupong Tagapagpaganap (Regional Executive Council) in each autonomous region</li> </ul>
7 May 1979		President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Under <i>Batas Pambansa</i> Blg. 20, the election of representative to the Sangguniang Pampook in each autonomous regions was held and the successful candidates have been proclaimed and duly qualified.</li> </ul>
25 July 1979	PD 1618	President Marcos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provided for the implementation of the organization of Sangguniang Pampook and Lupong Tagapagpaganap in the Autonomous Regions IX and XII; thus, establishing the final political setup and framework of autonomous governance in two regions.</li> </ul>
2 February 1987	1987 Constitution	President Aquino	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provided for the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras by and Act of Congress with the assistance of a regional consultative commission.</li> </ul>
24 July 1987	Mindanao Regional Consultative Commission	President Aquino	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Drafted the Organic Act for Muslim Autonomy for submission to Congress.</li> </ul>

1 August 1989	Republic Act 6734 or the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao	President Aquino	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite.</li> </ul>
6 November 1989	The 1989 Plebiscite	President Aquino	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement, Republic Act 6734 was submitted to the people of the 13 provinces and nine cities. Only four out of 13 provinces and nine cities ratified the Organic Act. These were the Provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi</li> </ul>
9 July 1990	The First ARMM Elections	President Aquino	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Regional governor, Vice Governor and regional assembly were elected. The ARMM elections regularized and completed the 1987 constitutional steps in creating the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao</li> </ul>
10 October 1991	RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)	President Aquino	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mandates the devolution of key functions and responsibilities of the national government to the local government units – provinces, cities/municipalities, and <i>barangays</i> – which include, among others: health, education, environmental protection, and social protection.</li> </ul>
1 September 1992	Executive Order 19 constituted the National Unification Commission (NUC)	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Tasked to formulate an amnesty program and negotiation process, based on public consultations, with the aim of creating a comprehensive and permanent solution to the war in Mindanao.</li> </ul>
	Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Created to continue the work of the NUC.</li> </ul>
15 September 1993	Executive Order 125	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Defined the approach and administrative structure for government peace efforts. It embodied the major recommendation of the NUC, which provided the official policy framework of the Ramos government's peace efforts, including the principles, components and administrative structure.</li> </ul>
1995	Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 25	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A region-specific local government code for ARMM. It provides for the preservation of education, health and social protection services as basic services delivered by the Regional government.</li> </ul>

## Annex 1 (continued)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Policy/ Institutional Setup</i>	<i>Regime</i>	<i>Key Features</i>
2 September 1996	Republic Act 9054 (1996 Final Peace Agreement)	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Amended the 1989 Organic Law, which reconstituted the new ARMM composed of the five provinces and one city. The first phase entailed a three-year transition period of confidence building under a new leadership and clear mandate. The second phase provided for substantial autonomy, following a plebiscite that would determine which areas would join a new autonomous region with greater powers than the ARMM.</li> </ul>
16 March 1997	Interim Ceasefire Monitoring Committee	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Created to ensure the commitment of the government and MILF forces to a general cessation of hostilities, direct their respective subcommittees on the cessation of hostilities to draw and finalize the guidelines and ground rules for the implementation of the agreement, and resumption of their formal talks in a venue to be mutually agreed upon between their panels.</li> </ul>
21 July 1997	Agreement on the General Cessation of Hostilities	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>General agreement to stop the hostilities.</li> </ul>
27 August 1998	General Framework of Agreement of Intent	President Estrada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Salient points include the pursuit of peace negotiations until the parties reach a negotiated political settlement, and the non-use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are ongoing.</li> </ul>
21 June 2001	Agreement on Peace between the GRP and the MILF	President Estrada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Covered four aspects, namely, security, rehabilitation, ancestral domain, and activation of committees. Sought to facilitate negotiation and peaceful resolution of the conflict through consultations with the Bangsa Moro people, and granted the MILF the lead role to determine and manage rehabilitation and development projects in conflict-affected areas.</li> </ul>



7 May 2002	Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development aspects of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001	President Arroyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identified conflict-affected areas, relief and rehabilitation of evacuees, rehabilitation and development projects, MILF designated agency and government agencies, mobilized the implementation of projects and monitoring mechanisms. Secured the full support of concerned communities, agencies and forces, of the relief and rehabilitation and development efforts in conflict-affected areas.</li> </ul>
20 February 2004	Joint Statement during the 5th Exploratory Talks	President Arroyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consolidated the Terms of Reference for the International Monitoring Team and formalized the agreement for the joint GRP-MILF Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) to extend capacity building programs through the Bangsamoro Development Authority and work closely with the donor community in implementing the joint needs assessment phase of the Multidonor Trust Fund intended for the rehabilitation and development of the conflict-affected areas.</li> </ul>

Sources: Mercado n.d., Agrasada 2003 and WB 2003.

**Agreement from Exploratory/Informal Talks between the Government and NDF/NPA/CPLA**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Policy</i>	<i>Regime</i>	<i>Features</i>
1 September 1992	The Hague Joint Declaration	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The declaration provides, among others, that: i) the GRP and NDF representatives agreed to recommend to their respective principals that formal peace negotiations shall be held to resolve armed conflict; (ii) the common goal of the negotiations shall be the attainment of just and lasting peace; and (iii) the holding peace negotiations must be in accordance with mutually acceptable principles of national sovereignty, democracy and social justice.</li> <li>• Human rights and international humanitarian law (HR/IHL)</li> <li>• Social and economic relations (SER)</li> <li>• Political and Constitutional Reforms (PCR)</li> <li>• End of hostilities and disposition of forces (EOH/DOF)</li> </ul>
14 June 1994	Breukelen Joint Statement	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contains clarifications of issues and perspectives</li> <li>• Indicates the areas of agreements and disagreements on various issues and concerns</li> <li>• Affirms the mutual commitment of both parties to enter into formal negotiations to achieve peace</li> </ul>
24 February 1995	Joint Agreement between the GRP and the NDF on JASIG	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides safety and immunity guarantees to protect the rights of negotiators, consultants, staff, security and other personnel who participated in the GRP-NDF negotiations</li> </ul>
26 February 1995	Joint Agreement on the Ground Rules and Formal Meetings Between the GRP and the NDF Panel	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides for the guidelines governing the conduct of negotiations between the two panels, which include: venue, schedule and meeting agenda, quorum, participants and procedure of formal meetings, etc.</li> </ul>

Source: OPPAP 2004.

### Agreements from Formal Talks between the Government and NDF/NPA/CPLA

<i>Year</i>	<i>Policy</i>	<i>Regime</i>	<i>Features</i>
26 June 1995	Joint Agreements on the Formation Sequence and operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees or RWC Agreement	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defines the negotiation process</li> <li>• Provides that the (i) composition, authority and conduct of work of the RWCs; (ii) formation sequence and operationalization of the RWCs; (iii) two panels hold formal meetings at mutually acceptable sites; and (iv) negotiating panels may from time to time mutually agree to amend, modify or supplement the Joint agreement</li> </ul>
26 June 1996	Additional Implementing Rules pertaining to the documents of the identification	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supplements the JASIG</li> <li>• Provides the rules for the issuance of documents of identification (DI)</li> <li>• Provides the setting up of a verification mechanism that will validate NDF DI holders</li> </ul>
18 March 1997	Supplemental RWC Agreement	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides for an accelerated negotiations process and timetable for the completion of tasks. The move to speed up was because the Presidential term of Ramos was about to end.</li> </ul>
16 March 1998	Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CAR-HR/IHL)	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guarantees the protection of human rights to all Filipinos; affirms and applies the principles of international humanitarian law; establishes mechanism for monitoring and ensuring compliance with the provision of the agreement; and other comprehensive agreements to ensure the attainment of a just and lasting peace.</li> </ul>
16 March 1998	Additional Implementing Rules and the JASIG Pertaining to the Security of Personnel and Consultation in the Furtherance of the Peace Negotiations	President Ramos	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For security purposes, they provide that: (i) duly accredited persons of NDF may carry one sidearm during peace negotiations; (ii) Security Committees and security Forces be created, and (iii) agree on the guidelines on the Implementing Rules, which are not specifically covered by the Agreement.</li> </ul>

**Annex 3 (continued)**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Policy</i>	<i>Regime</i>	<i>Features</i>
7 August 1998	Memorandum Order No. 9 Approving the implementation of the CAR-HR/IHL	President Estrada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Approves the implementation of CAR-HR/IHL</li> </ul>
24 February 1999	Suspension of JASIG	President Estrada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Suspended the JASIG due to violation by NDF</li> </ul>
April 1999	Lifted the suspension of the JASIG	President Estrada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JASIG was put back in effect</li> </ul>
1 June 1999	Terminated the JASIG	President Estrada	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The termination of the JASIG followed after the NDF terminated the peace talks. They accused the government of violating the principle of national sovereignty cited in the Hague agreement when it ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement in May 1999.</li> </ul>
28 February 2001	Executive Order No. 3 Affirming the Six Paths to Peace as the Guiding Principle for the Peace Process	President Macapagal-Arroyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It reaffirmed the GRP's policy on Peace Process based on the Six Paths to Peace during the Ramos administration.</li> </ul>
9 March 2001	Joint Statement	President Macapagal - Arroyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It provides for the resumption of the formal peace talks after two years since its termination.</li> </ul>
30 April 2001	Oslo Joint Communique	President Macapagal - Arroyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Both parties formally announced that peace negotiations between GRP and NDFP have resumed, and working sessions have been conducted in Oslo, Norway from 27 to 30 April 2001.</li> </ul>
13 January 2004	Joint Statement to Resume Formal Talks in the GRP-NDF Peace Negotiations	President Macapagal - Arroyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Both parties reaffirmed the Hague Joint Declaration, JASIG, RWC Agreement, and subsequent agreements as the framework of the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations. The resumption of peace talks was set in February 2004.</li> </ul>

14 February 2004	Oslo Joint Statement	President Macapagal - Arroyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The formal talks resumed from 10 to 14 February in Oslo, Norway. The two parties agreed on the: (i) framework of the negotiations; (ii) role of the third party facilitator; (iii) effective measures regarding the "Terrorist" listing; (iv) NDFP Proposal for accelerated work/GRP proposal of an enhanced process; (v) formation of the joint monitoring committee (JMC); (vi) indemnification of the victims of human rights violations under the Marcos regime; (vii) work of the RWC-SER reforms; (viii) confidence building measure; and ix) exchange of information and complaints.</li> </ul>
3 April 2004	Second Oslo Joint Statements	President Macapagal-Arroyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The two panels agree on the: (i) effective measures undertaken to resolve the issue of "Terrorist" listing; (ii) joint monitoring committee (JMC); (iii) work of the RWC-SER; (iv) release of prisoners and detainees; (v) indemnification of the victims of the human rights violations under the Marcos regime; and (vi) other issues pertaining to violations of human rights.</li> </ul>
15 April 2004	Joint Statement of the Joint Monitoring Committee Re: Convening of the Joint Secretariat	President Macapagal-Arroyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formally convened the Joint Secretariat of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC). JMC was formed to monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreements on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CAR-HR/IHL)</li> </ul>
4 June 2004	Statement of the Joint Monitoring Committee during the Launching of the Joint Secretariat	President Macapagal-Arroyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Formally opened the offices of the Joint Secretariat (JS) of the JMC.</li> </ul>
25 June 2004	GRP Panel Communique	President Macapagal-Arroyo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Negotiating parties gave an update on the issues/concerns discussed during the second Oslo Joint Statements on 3 April 2004. The parties also conducted separate consultations with the third Party Facilitator, His Excellency Ambassador Paul Moe of the Royal Norwegian Government.</li> </ul>

Source: OPPAP 2004.

### Institutional Response on the Political Aspect of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement

<i>Key Provision</i>	<i>Executive and Legislative Responses</i>
<p>1. Establishment of SZOPAD, the SPCPD, and the CA</p>	<p>1.1 EO 371 was issued on 2 October 1996 providing for the establishment of the SZOPAD and the SPCPD and its Constituent Assembly (CA). Appointments were extended to 81 SPCPD and CA officials and members. All cabinet positions in ARMM, key posts in SPCPD and membership of the 44-person CA were filled from the MNLF ranks as appointed or recommended by former Governor Nur Misuari.</p> <p>1.2 This EO provides that the SPCPD shall directly supervise offices and projects located in SZOPAD particularly the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA), Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA), Office of the Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), the National Commission for Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). Task Forces were created through Administrative Orders (AOs) such as the Basilan Development Task Force (AO 287, 3 September 1996), the Central Mindanao Task Force (AO 286, 3 September 1996), and Sulu Development Task Force (AO 288, 3 September 1996) These were created to set up Project Management Groups that would play a more active role in monitoring development projects under th guidance of SPCPD.</p> <p>1.3 Presidential Memorandum Order was issued on 17 June 1999 which reiterates that offices and projects located in the SZOPAD of the abovementioned agencies are placed under direct supervision of SPCPD.</p> <p>1.4 EO 161 was issued on 30 September 1999, which extends the term of EO 371 for another year corresponding to the period covered by RA 8753.</p> <p>1.5 EO 288 was issued on 22 September 2000 by President Estrada, which extends the term of office of SPCPD and the CA, in view of the postponement of the regular ARMM elections to May 2001.</p> <p>1.6 EO 29 was issued on 3 August 2001 by President Arroyo, which reconstitutes the SPCPD and the CA and further extends the term of office of the said bodies until the approval of the</p>

	<p>amended law to enhance autonomy. MNLF Secretary General and Cotabato City Mayor Muslimin Semá was appointed Chairperson of the SPCPD. All officials of the ARMM, SPCPD and CA were placed on holdover capacity until the officials of the new ARMM were elected and sworn to office.</p> <p>1.7 SZOPAD, SPCPD and the CA were deemed abolished pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 16 of RA 9054. EO 80 issued on 11 March 2002 declares the effectivity of the abolition of SPCPD.</p>
<p>2. New autonomy law and elections in the new ARMM</p>	<p>2.1 RA 9054 "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" was passed on 7 February 2001 and became a law on 31 March 2001, which amends RA 6734 entitled "An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" or the Organic Act of 1989, in accordance with Article VI, Section 27 (1) of the Philippine Constitution.</p> <p>2.2 A plebiscite was conducted in 15 provinces and 14 cities in Mindanao on 14 August 2001. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 4561 declaring the results of the plebiscite. Accordingly, ARMM is now composed of the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan and the City of Marawi.</p> <p>2.3 On 26 November 2001, elections in the new ARMM pushed through. The Macapagal-Arroyo administration supported the candidacy of Parouk Hussin (Foreign Affairs Minister of the MNLF) for Regional Governor and Dr. Mahid M. Mutilan (President of the Ulama League of the Philippines) Regional Vice-Governor along with a number of MNLF members for Regional Assemblymen.</p> <p>2.4 On 4 December 2001, the COMELEC proclaimed the new leaders of the ARMM, with Dr. Hussin as the Regional Governor and Dr. Mutilan as the Regional Vice-Governor, along with 24 members of the RLA.</p>

Sources: Adopted from OPAPP 2004; JICA 2003.

# **Democratization, Governance and Poverty Alleviation in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao**

SUKARNO D. TANGGOL\*

*The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in 1989 along with the eventual laying down of arms of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996 suggested that a peaceful and developed Mindanao was in the offing. However, the rebellion of former MNLF head, turned-ARMM Governor Nur Misuari against the Philippine government, and the continuous armed struggle of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front illustrate the discontentment with the governance of the Autonomous Region. This study evaluates the 15 years of ARMM by going through the ideals of democratization, governance and poverty alleviation in the region, and judging its success or failure.*

## **Introduction**

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created through Republic Act (RA) 6734 or "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," signed by then President Corazon Aquino on 1 August 1989. Originally proposed for 13 provinces and nine cities on the basis of the Tripoli Agreement signed between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) on 23 December 1976 in Tripoli, Libya, the plebiscite held on 19 November 1989 resulted in the severe constriction of the areas of autonomy as only four provinces, namely, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, were declared part of the autonomous region.<sup>1</sup> On 17 February 1990, the first regional elections were held that formally started the operation of the Regional Government.

RA 6734 created the Offices of the Regional Governor and Regional Vice Governor, the top executive offices of the Region. A Regional

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Legislative Assembly (RLA) was also created as the policymaking arm of the Region. To complete the three-branch system akin to that of the National Government's, a *Shari'ah* (Muslim sacred law) Appellate Court was designed to oversee shariah courts in the Region whose jurisdiction covers personal and family relations among Muslim residents of ARMM.

Because of the unresolved issues in the content and process of autonomy whose integrity the MNLF questioned, a new autonomy law, Republic Act (RA) 9054 or "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act 6734," was passed by Congress on 7 February 2001 and lapsed into law on 31 March 2001 after President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo failed to either sign or *veto* this Act. This new law is supposed to be part of the implementation of an agreement signed also by the MNLF headed by Professor Nur Misuari, and the GRP in Jakarta, Indonesia on 2 September 1996.

Since its inception, three sets of regional officials have served and the term of the fourth set is about to end. Yet people wonder whether this politico-administrative rearrangement has pursued the ideals of democracy, governance and poverty alleviation for the people of ARMM. This study, therefore, highlights the nature of and dynamics between democratization, governance and poverty alleviation in the ARMM.

### *Some Theoretical Considerations*

Rummel defines "democratization" as a "process through which a political system becomes democratic" (<http://www.mega.nu:8080/ampp/rummel/democ.htm>), while Sorensen posits that the "process of democratization" means "movement from authoritarian to democratic forms of rule" (Sorensen 1993: 16). However it is defined, democratization implies a qualitative improvement in the political institutions of society towards what is perceived to be a democracy. It is a movement from less democracy to more democracy or a change from whatever towards the ideals of democracy.

Since Aristotle defined "democracy" as a "rule by the people," from the Greek words "*demos*" (people) and "*kratos*" or "*kratia*" (rule), some ideas became central to its meaning. The conduct of regular elections, the exercise of certain rights (including the right to vote) and the rule of law are common themes attached to the meaning of "democracy." "Democracy," according to Rummel, "now generally means that a people

rule themselves through periodic elections of their highest leaders in which nearly all adults can participate, for which offices they are eligible, and under the rule of law (Rummel 1996)." Aside from this core meaning, Rummel said that "there is wide agreement on the empirical conditions that either give substance to what democracy means or must be present for democracy to exist (Rummel 1996)." These conditions include: a free mass media; open competition among political parties; regularly and popularly elected legislature and head of government; presence of religious freedom and the right to express unpopular ideas; and a basic document "which structure[s] government, elaborate[s] the reciprocal rights and duties of government and people, and which all governing officials and their policies must obey," like a constitution (<http://www.mega.nu:8080/ampp/rummel/democ.htm>).

"Governance" has been defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as "the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation's affairs. It is the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate their differences" (UNDP 1997: 33). Bertucci also describes "governance" as "a method of managing public affairs in a participatory manner, so that people may have a direct and ongoing voice in the making of the decisions that affect them, as well as in the process of implementation of the same. By its participatory nature, governance fosters continuous relationships and partnerships among all members of society. Although government is one of the mechanisms of governance, a multiplicity of mechanisms and processes are part and parcel of a healthy and sophisticated governance system" (Bertucci 1999: 1).

These definitions support Bertucci's claim that "partnerships are a key to good governance" (Bertucci 1999: 5) in contrast to the old concept of "government" or "governing" which the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) describes as "characterized by unilateral, monopolistic exercise of authority by governing elites within a specific (national) boundary" (UN DESA 1999: 3). These partnerships can take different forms from among different stakeholders groups and individuals, including government, business, and civil society.

The UNDP lists certain characteristics of "good governance," namely: participatory; sustainable; legitimate and acceptable to the people; transparent; promotes equity and equality; able to develop the resource and methods of governance; promotes gender balance; tolerates and accepts diverse perspectives; able to mobilize resources for social purposes; strengthens indigenous mechanisms; operates by rule of law; efficient and effective in the use of resources; engenders and commands

respect and trust; accountable; able to define and take ownership of national solutions; enabling and facilitative; regulatory rather than controlling; able to deal with temporal issues; and service oriented (UNDP 1997: 1-11).

Quoting from an Asian Development Bank (ADB) paper, a Philippine Governance Assessment Team presented four "basic elements" of good governance. These are accountability, participation, predictability, and transparency. "Accountability" means "making public officials answerable for government behavior and responsive to the entity from which they derive authority." "Participation" refers to "enhancing peoples' access to and influence on public policy processes." "Predictability" refers to the "existence of laws, regulations, and policies to regulate society and their fair and consistent application;" and "transparency" refers to the "availability of information to the general public and clarity about government rules, regulations, and decisions" (Philippine Governance Assessment Team 2003).

Since democratization implies the improvement of the people's access to policymaking, a logical outcome of this process is to improve the poverty situation in a given society. Decisions on the kind of goods and services being delivered is a function of public administration's political envelope. Improving the political system towards the ideals of democracy (i.e., people ruling or making decisions for themselves) can therefore be expected to reduce the poverty incidence in society.

Since empirical evidence suggests the process of democratization and the institutions of democracy could be hijacked by the elites, good governance can provide additional safeguards to protect the interest of the masses. Genuine partnerships among all sectors in society can translate into responsive policies and programs. If the mechanisms and processes of governance observe transparency, accountability, predictability, participation, rule of law, and other principles, social concerns like poverty have a better chance of being taken seriously in decisionmaking and program planning.

### **Democratization in ARMM**

The birth of ARMM and its structures of regional governance came at a crucial and difficult phase in the democratization process in the Philippines, a few years after Corazon Aquino assumed the presidency from the sudden demise of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986. The hesitant President succeeded in reviving the old institutions of democracy, albeit her rule would be threatened by several failed coups by segments of the

highly politicized military. But not only was the Aquino government threatened by these military adventurers, the upsurge of re-democratization was in the midst of a leftist insurgency, partly nurtured and fattened by the excesses of martial law; then, too, there was a cry from Northerners—the Cordillerans—for self-determination through autonomy so they can preserve their unique cultural identity and pursue their own views on development. In addition, the struggle of the MNLF and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) for self-rule in Mindanao, or parts of it, was on a high pitch as the autonomy formula of Marcos did not attract the cooperation of both Muslim groups and, thus, proved to be a failure in solving the so-called “Muslim problem.” In the meantime, Marcos left the country in the throes of political and socioeconomic ruin.

Against this backdrop of a bumpy national redemocratization scene, ARMM was born. Since elections mirror the kind of democracy a society enjoys, the four regional elections so far held in ARMM are an interesting study. All winners for the top two positions, regional governor and regional vice-governor, were always the choice candidates of Malacañang. It was always perceived by the majority of residents of ARMM that they won because of the open support of the powers-that-be in Manila. That these officials were “elected” by the incumbent president, speaks of the immaturity of the electoral system in ARMM and, to some extent, its national counterpart.

Elections in ARMM, whether for national, regional, or local officials, were always marred with all sorts of electoral fraud and the use of gun-goon-gold politics. Vote-buying and selling, coercion, padding of voters' list, disenfranchisement of voters, tampering with official results, and ballot snatching are common complaints every election time in ARMM. Elections in Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and some parts of Tawi-Tawi are rarely seen as democratic exercises due to the considerable stake attached to the elective positions. The power-seekers are unstoppable and aggressively contesting these elective positions (Tumbaga 2000). An experimental computerization of ARMM elections only added an automated giggle to the circus.<sup>2</sup>

If the recent national elections conducted in ARMM were to be used as a gauge, it can be said democratization must have moved backwards. It is widely believed that results were tampered. People from different sectors interviewed admitted that the majority of the voters chose someone other than the one officially proclaimed.<sup>3</sup>

What is alarming is the unanimous resignation and apathy of the people to this kind of situation.

Homegrown mass media in ARMM are almost zero, save for a few radio stations with very limited scope. The populace of ARMM, except those living in the city, have limited access, if at all, to television, print media and radio networks which are controlled by forces outside ARMM; hence, they are deprived of a critical social infrastructure through which they can articulate their interests and influence government decisions and programs. The effect, as always, is the reinforcement of authoritarian tendencies among those who wield power either through the legal Philippine structure or through the traditional, yet still influential political systems controlled by local chieftains (*sultans* and *datos*).

Theoretically, there is open competition among political parties in ARMM, but a few local parties that fielded regional and local candidates in the past were either co-opted by dominant national parties or silently marched into oblivion. The trend among regional and local candidates in ARMM is to woo the endorsement of the President or the party in power in Manila. In many cases, opposing candidates all declare their affiliation with the administration party. Many who run as independent candidates and win almost always join the ruling party after the election.

The law creating ARMM calls for the regular and popular election of the regional governor, vice regional governor and members of the RLA; however, there is some irregularity and unpopularity of these "regular" and "popular" elections. While RA 6734 mandates the conduct of regional elections every three years, Manila often found reasons to move election dates. What is more popular before, during and after elections, especially in the case of regional and vice regional governors, is the selection of the latter by Manila and the perceived trampling of the popular will. Not so for members of the RLA who are elected by district and local officials because opposing candidates can have effective networks and supporters to guard and procure their votes and, whenever necessary, "democratize" cheating and violence.

The gun-goon-gold approach to ARMM elections has attracted another shady actor—the narco-politician. Illegal drugs being a national problem, ARMM has a fair share of it. There is popular knowledge that illegal drug money has funded, with increasing volume, several politicians' bid for elective positions. In the province where this author comes from, almost everyone asked will admit that several town heads are drug lords who used money from their illicit activities to fund their candidacy for a congressional seat, but lost. Now, some people are predicting these drug lords may march to the provincial capitol come next local elections more than a year from now.<sup>4</sup>

A serious obstacle to the democratization in ARMM is the fact that the state does not have sole control over the coercive machinery in ARMM society. Rebels, criminals, local warlords, government officials, and ordinary families have their respective shares in the arsenal of death (and defense) available in ARMM areas, notwithstanding the presence of the Philippine military and police. The situation helps explain why the ordinary citizen in ARMM feels helpless and seemingly uninterested or resigned to the undemocratic character of the electoral process.

While democracy depends on the rule of law to mature, the judicial infrastructure in ARMM is somewhat confusing. The creation of Shari'ah courts for Muslim inhabitants does not dissolve other legal options, including the Philippine legal system and pre-Islamic modes. While Shari'ah courts are designed for Muslims only, with jurisdiction over personal and family relations, the Philippine Supreme Court still retains its final appellate jurisdiction over Shari'ah court cases. While criminal cases are supposed to be decided by the regular Philippine courts, parties often resort to Islamic or traditional modes of setting cases. The presence of these three competing legal and extra-legal arrangements clouds the overall judicial infrastructure and cripples ARMM society's ability to serve justice and prevents sustainable resolution of cases.

The lack of mass media, a culture that nurtures hierarchical relations, and the availability of loose firearms do not create the ripe conditions for unpopular ideas to germinate, much more for serious and objective public discussions of social issues. The extent of this problem is matched by the prevalence of violence as a means to resolve issues and a mode of public discourse.

### **Governance in ARMM**

The preceding section gives a glimpse of how authority, especially political authority, is being exercised in ARMM.

Since participatory decisionmaking is a critical aspect of governance that fosters healthy partnerships among members of society, one should look at the state of policymaking in ARMM. In 1996, a study entitled "Policy and Technical Review on the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," funded by the Canadian International Development Agency-Local Government Support Program, was undertaken by this author upon the invitation of the Regional Government of ARMM through its Regional Planning and Development Office. Among others, it looked at the capability of the members of the RLA to craft the necessary policies for regional governance, administration and development.

A perusal of the biodata of the members of the RLA revealed an interesting fact—most of them did not possess the necessary credentials for serious legislative work. They were either members of big political families in ARMM or have political alliances with them (Tanggol 1993). This situation has hardly improved since then. This partly explains why policymaking in the Region is sorely wanting. Another factor relates to the limited authority granted by the Philippine Congress to the RLA under RA 6734 and RA 9054. Powers devolved from the national to the regional government are so limited one can entertain the notion that the Regional Government was structured for failure. As concluded in a paper, "It (The Regional Government) is seriously ill and structurally handicapped at birth" (Tanggol 1990: 24; 1998: 660). While this observation refers to RA 6734 of 1989, not much has improved under RA 9054 of 2001, except to increase the number of constituent local units from four provinces to five plus one city.

What the regional government lacks in quality, Congress has paid with quantity. While the people of ARMM elect one representative to the more powerful lower house of Congress, they elect three representatives to the almost powerless RLA from the same district.

A worse situation is in policymaking of the constituent local government units, especially on the level of municipalities. Aside from inadequate technical know-how, municipal and *barangay* (smallest political unit) councils hardly hold formal sessions. Executive and legislative power is normally in the hands of mayors with a little help from traditional and influential people in the localities. When resolutions are needed to support a program, they are first passed around for signature. On the provincial level, minimal sessions are conducted and the governor is still the most influential "legislator" in the province.

The ordinary citizens are normally left out of the actual decisionmaking in the local units. Since they have no access to decisionmaking, decisions hardly address their immediate and long-term concerns. This situation explains why the state of public service is extremely poor and basic services are hardly noticeable.

While the existing law mandates the representation of non-government sectors to local policymaking bodies (i.e., provincial boards and municipal councils), this is hardly made operational especially in rural areas. Basic rural sectors are relatively unorganized and lack the awareness and technical knowledge to do so. Many residents fall prey to enterprising individuals who enlist their names for bogus cooperatives just to access funding sources for vested interest.

There are civil society groups that have been operating in ARMM and a number of them formed a consortium to collectively address concerns like women issues, human rights, peace and development. These "Moro development organizations" are, however, "relatively organizationally less developed." Most member organizations are relatively "young" and "have little experience in project management." Among their other weaknesses are "lack of an articulated vision and mission, low skills and knowledge in their chosen field of work, unclear strategies and (lack) of funding sources." "Moro participation in project planning is almost nil" (Al Mudjadilah Development Foundation n.d: 1-2).

Governance in ARMM is anything but responsive. Peace and development remain elusive. Criminality and lawlessness remain high, many of them unreported by media. Family feuds continue to tie much of Moro time and energy, away from development concerns. While the Mindanao State University, with four of its campuses within ARMM, has tried its best in responding to the educational needs of *Moros* (Muslim Filipinos), the level of education remains poor and inconsistent.

Accountability is another pressing issue in ARMM governance. Graft and corruption continue to plague all levels of government in the Region; yet no one seems to be answerable for any misdeed. The Regional Government and the constituent local units depend on the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of the National Government but people wonder how funds are legally accounted for. Infrastructure programs, like roads, bridges and school buildings, are the favorite objects of expenditure in ARMM. In fact, official documents give ARMM some advantage in terms of roads constructed. This was partly due to the P615M subsidy granted to ARMM for its first five years of operation under RA 6734, on top of regular allotments to government agencies in the Region. But in reality, road networks, bridges and other infrastructure in ARMM are not what they appear in official documents. Ghost projects are common complaints among beneficiary communities. Roads are poorly built that crack and holes develop as soon as projects are "completed." Yet, despite these anomalies, officials are hardly investigated, much less sent to jail for obvious graft and corruption.

Transparency is yet another issue in government operations within ARMM. This is not surprising in view of the lack of effective mass media, hierarchical social structures, flawed electoral system, presence of armed groups and social apathy. Local budgets are not openly discussed and the people are generally not privy to how budgets are prepared and uninformed about how they are spent. In municipalities, as a matter of example, the chief executive has the sweeping control of fund allotments,



in partnership with the treasurers appointed by the national government. Transparency, while an accepted official policy, is the exception rather than the rule.

Governance in ARMM remains wanting on the element of predictability. Laws, policies and regulations are hardly disseminated to the people. The lack of mass media and effective information channels makes the rural masses practically ignorant of the laws, policies and regulations that are supposed to govern them. Worse, they are not fairly and consistently applied. Civil service rules and regulations are minimally observed, "leaders hiring people based on loyalty and kinship" (Rasul 2003: 160). The presence of competing and inconsistent laws adds to the confusion. While there exist Shari'ah courts with jurisdiction over personal and family relations, Muslims may still avail of Philippine laws in setting their family and interpersonal problems. While a Shari'ah Appellate Court is established for Muslims, disputes may still end up with the Philippine Supreme Court composed of non-Muslims and whose competence on Islamic jurisprudence may be doubted. The resolution of criminal cases is one for the books. Three competing mechanisms are available: the Philippine legal system, the Islamic system, and the pre-Islamic traditional mode of settling conflicts. While the Philippine legal system is supposed to provide the legal framework, many Muslims hardly resort to it, preferring instead the traditional or Islamic system. This confusing arrangement largely contributes to the breakdown of law and order in ARMM communities.

### Poverty Alleviation in ARMM

Almost 15 years of ARMM governance have not improved the socioeconomic condition of the people in the region. ARMM provinces continue to be among the poorest in the country, as Table 1 indicates, based on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) introduced at the United Nations Millennium Summit, 2000.

Available data show that ARMM has the highest incidence of poverty among all regions of the country. Medical facilities are severely inadequate and existing district hospitals and local clinics need "hospitalization," with their meager funding, inadequate human resources, lack of equipment, as well as the behavioral lapses of their officials and personnel. It is not uncommon to see medical officials assigned to rural areas but mostly visible in the cities partly because their areas do not have medical facilities; hence, many residents die of their illnesses without even seeing a doctor.

**Table 1. MDG and Other Indicators of Human Development in ARMM**

<i>MDG and Other Indicators</i>	<i>ARMM</i>	<i>Whole Region</i>	<i>Rank among 16 Regions*</i>
Incidence of Poverty by population in 2000 (%)	62.9	34.0	16
Average household income in 2000 (Php)	81,519	144,03	15
Life expectancy among women in 2000 (years)	59.3	71.6	15**
Infant mortality in 1995 (per 1,000 live births)	63	49	14**
Maternal mortality in 1995 (per 100,000 live births)	320	180	15**
Net enrollment rate in primary education in 2001 (%)	82	96.4	15**
Net enrollment rate in secondary education in 2001 (%)	39.2	72.2	15**

\* A rank of 1 indicates the most desirable outcome.  
 \*\* Shows rank among 15 regions, no data available for Region XIII

Source: WB 2003.

The peace and order situation and other factors have prevented investors, both foreign and local, from pouring their money into ARMM. Many residents have preferred to stay away from ARMM. A number of them are now successful entrepreneurs in Metro Manila and other parts of the country.

The establishment of Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines-East-ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) has not resulted in considerable investments and benefits for ARMM residents. Internal causes include the unstable peace and order condition, poor infrastructure, land tenure problems, and unresponsive government bureaucracy (Tanggol 1995).

The regional government and its constituent local governments are practically dependent on the national government for funding. The taxing powers of provinces, municipalities and barangays are rarely utilized, while the regional government has very little room to flex its taxing authority—the major objects of taxation are reserved for the national government (Tanggol 1993). This state of mendicancy not only negates autonomy but also cripples the capability of ARMM to deliver the basic goods and services to its people.

ARMM officials have been complaining about the low budget their regional government gets. The Region has been getting only about 0.8 percent from the national budget (see Table 2). From the total national budget of 2003 of more than P825 billion, ARMM was allotted over P5.6 billion only. In spite of an increase in the national budget in 2004, the Region's appropriation got even smaller than the previous year's. For the

**Table 2. National ARMM Budgets, 2003–2005**

<i>In Thousand Pesos</i>	2003 <i>(Actual)</i>	2004 <i>(Adjusted)</i>	2005 <i>(Proposed)</i>
Total Obligations (National Budget)	825,113,313	861,628,593	907,589,726
ARMM Budget	5,625,117	5,488,759	7,092,963

Source: RP 2005.

proposed 2005 national budget of P907 billion, ARMM is being allotted P7 billion, again, less than 0.8 percent! This budget already includes the infrastructure support of P650 million and foreign-assisted projects of more than P514 million. According to the World Bank (2003), more than 70 percent of the Region's budget goes to salaries, while about 14 percent goes to maintenance and operating expenses (MOOE), leaving no significant amount for the development requirements of the Region.

With this financial state, how can the regional government respond to the growing incidence of poverty in ARMM? As ARMM Governor Parouk Hussin said: "The growing incidence of poverty is putting intense pressure on the limited resources of the regional government and this situation is exacerbated by the lack of capacity of the regional government to generate its own resources..." (cited in Coe 2004: 40).

While the regional government is short of financial resources, it maintains 25 agencies and 30 cabinet members headed by an executive secretary, despite RA 9054 mandating "a cabinet not exceeding ten members." As the World Bank observes: "the Regional Government is made up of 25 agencies that include a counterpart office for virtually every national government agency" (2003: 25). This oversized cabinet only adds strain to the scarce financial resources of the region, and lacking the commensurate powers and functions enjoyed by its national counterpart, may end up serving red tape and inefficiency.

Poverty being a complex phenomenon, its prevalence in ARMM may also be related to factors outside the region. The national government is supposed to be an effective partner of the regional government in addressing socioeconomic problems in the region. In fact, the former has an equal if not a bigger responsibility considering the resources at its disposal and its powers over and within ARMM. It is responsible for creating the policy environment wherein ARMM agencies can exercise their authority.

Obviously, the policy and institutional response of the national government to address the so-called "Muslim problem" has not created a coherent and effective framework and environment wherein the regional government can address the growing needs of ARMM residents.

For one, war or the military option has only exacerbated the sufferings and displacement of the people and diverted already-scarce resources from substantive development concerns, further crippling whatever poverty-alleviation measures existing in the region. Crisis management and conflict resolution have eaten away much of the time, energy and resources available in ARMM.

The long existing Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) has only succeeded in providing employment to around 800 potential rebels and acted as "exhibit X" to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) whenever the government needs to prove its concern for its Muslim residents. Otherwise, its limited contribution to the Muslim cause is the sponsorship of Quran-reading contests and the management of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. OMA has a lot of development management officers in its roster of officers throughout the country but has no funds for development purposes. As its current head laments, "limited resources are a major stumbling block, but there is a lack of commitment to really make it work in the way they were designed" (Coo 2004: 4).

An Islamic bank, Amanah Islamic Development Bank, was created in 1974 with the hope that it could provide financial aid to Muslims along Islamic lines; but a mere P50 million capital and acute government neglect have made it another insignificant institution, notwithstanding its big sounding name. Two bank managers interviewed complained that even ARMM or the regional government has not designated the bank as its official depository.

ARMM has been enjoying foreign support for its development administration needs. This support includes those agencies coming from Japan, United States (US), Canada, Australia, European Union members, and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), as well as multilateral institutions, like the WB.

The signing of the Peace Agreement on 2 September 1996 between the GRP and the MNLF has invited renewed interest from donor countries and institutions. The Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) that included the provinces and cities covered by the Tripoli Agreement became a special target for foreign assistance. The SZOPAD Social Fund was established in 1998 and later transformed into the ARMM Social Fund, this time focusing on the ARMM areas.

The ARMM Social Fund for Peace and Development (ASFPD), created through Executive Order 124 signed by the President in 2002, "funds the construction of socioeconomic infrastructures, livelihood opportunities and provides technical assistance in selected disadvantaged and conflict-affected communities in ARMM," all geared towards the pursuit of peace and development in ARMM. This fund is principally supported by the WB.

On 4 December 2002, Japan announced its "Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao" with ¥44 billion (around \$400 million). This package targets areas such as "policy formulation and implementation of ARMM government, improvement of basic human needs, and peacebuilding and antiterrorism measures." In line with this, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) started its capability building program for the ARMM government (JICA 2003: 3).

Since its early years, ARMM has been supported by Canada through its Canadian International Development Agency-Local Government Support Program (CIDA-LGSP), with funds being coursed through the regional government. This program has been helping ARMM since 1992, including the conduct of studies and training activities geared towards improving the capacity of the regional and local governments in the region.

The impact of some of these foreign-funded programs needs more time for objective assessment, but these observations are worth noting. First, data on the worsening poverty situation in ARMM imply a failure on the overall antipoverty mechanisms available in the Region. Second, while foreign assistance may be helpful and even necessary at this time, the region has to generate its own resources and develop its own capacity to address its problems on a sustainable basis. And third, the national government has not provided the ideal policy environment wherein the region can respond to its own needs.

### Conclusion

The poverty situation in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao has worsened since its creation almost 15 years ago through RA 6734. ARMM has the worst human development indicators in the country and the region's constituent local units are among the poorest in the country.

This situation puts in doubt the effectiveness of the structures of regional governance and the policies contrived by the national government to respond to the needs of Filipino Muslims, particularly those living in the ARMM.

There is no evidence that the democratization process in ARMM has progressed. What can be seen are disturbing signs of undemocratic tendencies. Elections in ARMM, whether for national, regional or local officials continue to be marred by all sorts of electoral fraud, including vote-buying and selling, coercion, padding of voters' list, disenfranchisement of voters, tampering with official results, and ballot snatching. The usual gun-goon-gold politics continues to characterize elections in ARMM and worse, illegal drug money (i.e., narcopolitics) has increasingly influenced election outcomes in some parts of the region. There are no credible and sustainable regional or local political parties that would push for the genuine interest of the masses. Representative democracy has not reflected the will of the majority of the people of the region.

That democracy does not thrive in ARMM can be understood when one looks at the other conditions or elements obtaining in the region relative to the political situation in the region. Home-grown mass media are almost non-existent save for a few radio stations in population centers. Cable television companies, newspapers, and radio networks that reach some areas of ARMM are controlled by interests based outside the region. Rule of law is hardly noticeable—with the presence of loose firearms and armed groups beyond the control of the state.

In almost fifteen years of being pursued as an aspiration, governance in ARMM is anything but good. Despite the increasing voice of civil society groups, the people are generally left out of the decisionmaking process, as well as the implementation of programs and projects. Partnerships between government and other sectors in society are not nurtured as the culture of authoritarianism still pervades government and society. Governance in ARMM is very much wanting in the areas of accountability, predictability and transparency.

Poverty-alleviation measures are a failure in ARMM. In the first place, the regional government has little financial resources to deal with the challenge. Its constituent local governments are worse, having to rely on the internal revenue allotment from the national government. Whatever good plans and relevant projects conceived could be stalled by factors including: the on-and-off war between the military and Muslim insurgents; criminality and terrorism, both real and imagined; family feuds; and graft and corruption.

The worsening poverty situation in ARMM is a failure of the democratization process. Subverting the electoral process is tantamount to subverting the will of the residents of ARMM. By denying the people

genuine access to decisionmaking, they are also denied responsive programs to address their poverty and other socioeconomic concerns.

The increasing poverty incidence in ARMM is a failure of governance, since good governance is supposed to be directed towards the needs of the public, not just a segment of it; but this is not probable without accountability, transparency, predictability, rule of law, and the participation of the people in decisionmaking, policy formulation and implementation.

The alarming poverty problem in ARMM is also a failure of the national government, for it has contrived a regional government with big responsibilities but minimal powers and resources. It has not created a coherent and clear policy direction and environment to deal with the bigger Muslim problem.

If poverty alleviation in ARMM is to succeed, it has to be within the context of an improved national situation with determined and focused leadership and a clear, coherent and comprehensive policy package for Filipino Muslims.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> It was widely believed that even in these four provinces, the will of the majority of the people was subverted. (See Tanggol 1993.)

<sup>2</sup> In 1996, a team of experts from the Mindanao State University, Marawi City, conducted a study on the regional elections in ARMM. To date, the results of this study have not been released. A member of the team narrated the "devastating" implications of their findings for those officially proclaimed as winners. It was apparent the computers only hastened the cheating process.

<sup>3</sup> This writer asked his students in three graduate subjects in Marawi City, which is part of ARMM, on their observations and perceptions about the May 2004 national elections as held in their respective localities. Not one objected to the majority opinion that there was indeed cheating in favor of one candidate who would have lost the election if it was conducted fairly. Some of them witnessed the manipulation of the electoral process while others just heard and believed so.

<sup>4</sup> There is popular perception that these drug lords-turned-politicians have good connections with high government and military officials. This probably explains why they continue their illegal trade with alarming impunity. One of them recently lost to another narco-politician, partly because the challenger used bigger sums to procure votes. A friend who is a registered voter in their municipality disclosed that representatives of one of these politicians visited him one day and attempted to give him one hundred thousand (100,000) pesos to secure the eleven votes of his family. The prevailing talk then was that willing voters were given eight thousand pesos each as "deposit" fee, with more to be expected immediately before election day.

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# **Poverty Alleviation and Peace Building in Multiethnic Societies: The Need for Multiculturalist Governance in the Philippines**

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*No different from most of the countries in the world, the Philippines is culturally diverse with its people differing in ethnicity, religion and language. Similarly, it also shares the problems of effectively managing the challenges of cultural diversity. The Philippine government's approach of assimilation of ethnocultural minorities to mainstream society has proven unsuccessful, as evidenced by the long and ongoing Moro secessionist struggle. And without peace, there is no development—the four provinces in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) where armed struggle continues are the country's poorest provinces. This study identifies the efforts of the government in managing cultural diversity; however it also stresses that current efforts are not enough and significant steps should be taken by the Philippines towards a multiculturalist governance, a cultural diversity-friendly political formula whose ends are peace and development.*

## **Introduction**

Presently, the United Nations (UN) has three top priorities: eradicating poverty, preventing conflict, and promoting democracy. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stressed:

Only in a world that is rid of poverty can all men and women make the most of their abilities. Only where individual rights are respected can differences be channeled politically and resolved peacefully. Only in a democratic environment, based on respect for diversity and dialogue, can individual self-expression and self-government be secured and freedom of association is upheld (Jackson 2005: 159).

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Reflective of UN's concern for preventing conflict is the special focus on cultural liberty and ethnocultural conflict of the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) *Human Development Report 2004*. Its main emphasis is the global imperative of "accommodating people's growing demands for their inclusion in society, for respect of their ethnicity, religion, and language" (UNDP 2004: cover).

Ethnocultural conflict or ethnonationalism confronts countries of varied circumstances, big and small, developed and less developed, old and new, authoritarian and democratic, and socialist and capitalist. It afflicts even the advanced industrialized countries of the West like the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Canada.<sup>1</sup>

Most of today's armed conflicts are internal, not inter-state as in the past, and the great majority are in states with two or more component nations or cultural communities. Considering that almost all of the world's nearly 200 countries are multicultural or multiethnic, with two-thirds having one substantive minority group (ethnic or religious) and the likelihood of ethnic challenges to grow, effective management of the challenges of cultural diversity becomes an urgent imperative of survival at both national and international levels.

It should be stressed that addressing the phenomenon of ethnocultural conflict is indispensable not only to the promotion of democracy but also to poverty alleviation. There is a strong link between poverty alleviation and cultural diversity management. The said UNDP report emphasizes the primacy of cultural diversity management to poverty alleviation, viewing the former as a precondition to the latter. The report states:

If the world is to reach the Millennium Development Goals and ultimately eradicate poverty, it must first successfully confront the challenge of how to build inclusive, culturally diverse societies. Not just because doing so successfully is a precondition for countries to focus properly on other priorities of economic growth, health and education for all citizens. But because allowing people full cultural expression is an important development end in itself (UNDP 2004: foreword).

Addressing cultural diversity should be given top priority in contemporary reform initiatives in public administration. Effective management of cultural diversity is a first order governance necessity affecting the nature, content, quality and implementation of public policies and programs; hence, public administration scholars in multiethnic societies need to reexamine some of their ideas, views and assumptions, like those pertaining to the societal context of public

bureaucracies. In particular, they need to rethink their views about the ecological or culture-bound nature of public administration. While it is true that, "public administration is embedded in the surrounding society" (Peters and Pierre 2003: 2), scholars in the field have neglected or trivialized the cultural heterogeneity of the society wherein public administration is embedded. Even scholars who are strong advocates of the cultural perspective in public administration (i.e., that emphasizes fitting management or administrative ideas to the cultural context) have ignored the cultural heterogeneity of the societal context of public administration.<sup>2</sup>

For multiethnic countries, the said neglect or trivialization of the cultural heterogeneity of the societal context is a fundamental flaw. This erroneous view is disastrous to multiethnic societies for spawning political structures, processes and policies which are more parts of the problems of peace and development than reforms therein. In particular, we refer to assimilationist or monoculturalist states, which are hostile to cultural diversity, many of which function as "ethnic democracies," with the virulent version of ethnonationalism.

This article is about the twin challenges of poverty alleviation and peacebuilding in multiethnic countries. It argues that alleviating poverty and achieving peace therein require the transformation of their politics and governance to become multiculturalist. This means making their governance responsive to the challenges and requirements of cultural diversity. Moreover, focusing on the Philippine situation, the study stresses the urgency of evolving a cultural diversity-friendly political formula, for the government to achieve the twin goals of peace and development, particularly in relation to its ethnocultural minorities like the Bangsa Moro.

### **Peace and Development Nexus**

Peace is not just the absence of direct physical violence as in a military confrontation between armed groups. Peace of this kind is short-term, fragile and unstable. Some scholars refer to it as "negative peace;" but strictly speaking, this kind of peace is a mere break or interruption in violence or military confrontation.

In the context of the contemporary world characterized by the increasing number and intensity of violent conflicts, the peace in this research aspires to bring about one that is authentic or enduring, or what many scholars refer to as "positive peace." It is peace characterized by the absence of the three types of violence in Jacobsen's "violence triangle,"

namely: direct/personal violence, structural violence and cultural violence (Galtung et al. 2002: 16-24).

The first, "direct violence," refers to "physical acts of violence such as those in actual military confrontations." The second, "structural violence," refers to "violence built into the very social, political and economic structures and processes governing societies, states and the world." This type of violence is far more difficult to recognize and understand, but is far more destructive than the other two forms of violence. The third form, "cultural violence," refers to "violence associated with Manicheism, i.e., the presentation of one party (an individual or group) as evil and the other as good, denying the evil a voice, resulting [in] the demonization or dehumanization of the other, making them somehow 'less,' unworthy, and ascribing to them entirely negative, self-serving or evil motives."<sup>3</sup> This concept is similar to what Bikhu Parekh calls "moral monism" of much of traditional moral philosophy, including contemporary liberalism—its tendency to assert that only one way of life or set of values is worthwhile and to dismiss the rest as misguided or false (Parekh 2000).

What constitutes development or the good life? To address this question would require describing each of the major dimensions of development.<sup>4</sup> First, development has an economic component that includes the creation of wealth and improved conditions of material life, equitably distributed. Second, development has a social ingredient measured as well being in health, education, housing and employment. Third, it has a political dimension that includes such values as human rights political freedom, enfranchisement, and some form of democracy. Fourth, it has a cultural aspect that embraces respect for cultural and religious differences and recognition of the fact that cultures (including religion) confer identity and self-worth to people.

What is the relationship between peace and development? "Peace is the first desideratum in every society, particularly multicultural whose tendency to provoke acute conflicts is further compounded by its inability to rely on a shared body of values to moderate and regulate them" (Parekh 2000: 207) and "to work for peace is to work against violence" (Galtung 2002: 11). And if one adopts a more comprehensive view of violence that embraces Jacobsen's three types of violence (direct, structural, and cultural), then a responsive and holistic development administration is indispensable to the achievement of peace in multicultural societies. Addressing the asymmetrical, unequal and exploitative economic, social and political structures and processes (structural violence) and respecting cultural and religious differences (cultural violence), in addition to initiatives directed to physical acts of violence (direct violence), are indeed

significant in the achievement of an enduring or authentic peace in multicultural societies.

The integral link between peace and development is best captured in the following statement by Pope John Paul II:

It must not be forgotten that at the root of war there are usually real and serious grievances: injustices suffered, legitimate aspirations frustrated, poverty, and the exploitation of multitudes of desperate people who see no real possibility of improving their lot by peaceful means (cited by Wilber in Powers et al. 1994: 134).

### **Determinants of Ethnic Conflict**

The multicultural character of a society per se does not automatically lead to some form of intercultural animosity or violent conflict. There are many countries in the world that are multicultural or multiethnic, but they do not have ethnicity-based political mobilization or ethnonationalist movements like the case of the Moros in the Philippines, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Chechens in Russia, the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the Acehnese in Indonesia, and the Catholics in Northern Ireland. There are also countries that have experienced violent forms of ethnic mobilization in the past, but succeeded in resolving them after making some appropriate adjustments in their policies, governance and other aspects of society.

Ethnic conflicts, like the Moro armed struggle in the Philippines, are attributable to several causes or determinants. These factors may be classified into political, socioeconomic, cultural and security.

#### *Political*

One major political determinant of violent conflicts in multicultural societies is the nature and character of the state. The unitary state, with its assimilationist and monoculturalist features, is obviously unresponsive to the cultural diversity of said societies. In the words of Galtung, "the state in societies with two or more component nations functions as a 'prison' for the nations other than the dominant one" (Galtung 2002: 136-137). Another factor is the concept of "vertical ethnic differentiation" which is defined as "the near perfect ethnic stratification in which different ethnic groups occupy different social classes" (Luhman and Gilman 1980: 323). In such a vertical system, members of a minority ethnic community are consigned to menial or lower level positions, while those from a dominant ethnic group monopolize the important political posts.

According to Reid Luhman and Stuart Gilman, "ethnic stratification is not an inevitable occurrence when two or more ethnic groups share the same society. It occurs only at the instigation of a particularly powerful ethnic group in that society" (Luhman and Gilman 1980: 205). Echoing the significant relationship of the ethnic-based differentiating role of the state and ethnic mobilization, Bhikhu Parekh argues:

When a majority community defines itself as a nation and seeks to monopolize the state, it provokes its minorities to define themselves as nations or ethnic groups. Minority ethnicity is often a defensive reaction against majority nationalism (Parekh 2000: 235).

It is the dominance or monopoly of political power by one group (the dominant one) and the relative political inferiorization or peripheralization of a minority group (as perceived by its members) that leads to political organization and mobilization. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out, "unequal access to political power forecloses paths to peaceful change" (cited in Strauss 2002: 11).

The importance of the above points is indicated by ethnic minorities' political grievances, like lack of control over local affairs, lack of participation or representation in the central government, and discrimination in the access to political and administrative positions. These grievances are the bases of demands for secession or other self-determination formulas like federalism, regional autonomy, power sharing, and proportional representation.

### *Socioeconomic*

The problem of poverty or socioeconomic marginalization is a central issue in most ethnic conflicts. The Center for War and Peace Research in Sweden reported that poverty was the major cause of about 80 percent of today's wars (cited in Strauss 2002: 10). Poorer countries tend to be three times at greater risk of war than richer countries. A big number of violent ethnic conflicts occur in highly backward or underdeveloped regions of multiethnic states. As pointed out in the Human Development Report 2004:

Ethnic minorities are often the poorest groups in most parts of the world. [T]hey have shorter life expectancy and lower education attainments and other social indicators. They also are most likely to suffer socioeconomic exclusion (UNDP 2004: 65).



Another economic driver of conflict is the perception of relative deprivation by members of an ethnic group. Poverty acquires an additional politicizing force when members of an ethnic group perceive themselves or their communities to be relatively deprived vis-à-vis the dominant ethnic group. Moreover, their propensity to mobilize is heightened when they perceive their socioeconomic marginalization as a by-product of government neglect and discrimination in access to basic services (e.g., health, education, credit assistance, and livelihood opportunities).

In many conflict areas, the issue is about the asymmetrical and exploitative relations between the rich/imperial center and the backward ethnic communities in the periphery. Many ethnic minorities resent the use of their areas as "milking cow" of the center and the whole country. Moreover, awareness by members of an ethnic group of the adequacy of their region's natural resources for their own (ethnic group or regional) survival and development is another known cause of ethnic advocacy for secession in some cases.

Another major economic driver of ethnic conflict is rivalry over control of certain strategic resources, like oil and natural gas. Many ethnic conflicts involve areas or regions with vast deposits of important minerals. The involvement of domestic and foreign capitalist interest in the efforts to exploit these important resources is certainly a major conflict factor.

Capitalist globalization is another major cause of ethnic conflict. Although it is undeniable that globalization "succeeded in producing unprecedented amounts of goods and services, it is equally clear that capitalist growth proceeded unevenly between countries and within regions, creating great disparities of wealth and income, and that it has always proceeded cyclically, through euphoric booms and painful busts in every country and region" (Wilber 1994: 136). The positive/negative or boom/bust consequence of capitalist globalization was demonstrated in the spectacular economic growth in identified economic growth centers within capitalist countries while those in the periphery are falling far behind. Given the weak political and economic power of ethnic minorities, it is likely that they will be among the big losers, not among the winners that globalization creates. This means that ethnic minorities in general will be at the receiving end of the predatory or destructive aspects of capitalist globalization; hence the socioeconomic disparities between ethnic minorities and dominant ethnic communities will most likely widen further.

According to Robertson, globalizing or universalizing pressures trigger particularistic responses that include "the current upsurge in

various forms of religious fundamentalism and ethnonationalism which, to him, is part of what he calls "globalization syndrome" (cited in Randall and Theobald 1998: 250). To Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, "the upsurge in religious fundamentalism and ethnonationalism, may highlight the state as the potential focus for resistance to globalizing trends" (Randall and Theobald 1998: 255).

Another important socioeconomic underpinning of ethnic conflict is the competitive relationship between militarization and development (Jameson and Wilber 1986: 568-574). The strong emphasis on the military-oriented national security paradigm by many poor Third World countries is certainly limiting their performance in development administration, particularly in the delivery of basic social services like health and education. Many Third World governments, including those facing severe scarcity of resources with no external security threats, are preoccupied with military reputation building and modernization, instead of waging a serious war against poverty that continued to cripple many of their citizens and communities.

### *Cultural*

By definition, a "multicultural society" "consists of several cultures or cultural communities with their own distinct systems of meaning and significance and views on man and the world" (Parekh 2000: 13). This organizational character suggests that the principal dilemma of governance in multicultural societies is the need to reconcile the legitimate demands of unity and diversity. Effective governance in multicultural societies requires addressing the need for unity and giving due recognition to cultural diversity or differences. In other words, the demands of unity and diversity are not mutually exclusive.

If one looks at the situation in multicultural societies, impressionistically the demands of cultural diversity are substantially neglected in many of them. This neglect explains the upsurge or resurgence therein of agitational or revolutionary movements based on ethnicity, culture, religion or identity. Parekh posits:

A multicultural society cannot ignore the demands of diversity. By definition, diversity is an inescapable fact of its collective life and can neither be wished out of existence nor suppressed without an acceptable degree of coercion and often not even then. Furthermore, since human beings are attached to and shaped by their culture, and their self-respect is closely bound up with respect for it, the basic respect we owe our fellow-humans extends to their culture and cultural community as well (Parekh 2000:196).

The importance of recognizing cultural differences in preventing, regulating and resolving interethnic conflict is a major theme of numerous scholarly works in the social sciences, including the new discipline of peace studies. It is the view of this research that the continuing neglect of the legitimate demands of diversity or the non-recognition of cultural differences in many multicultural societies is the major cause of the seeming intractability of conflicts therein which, according to Gianni, involve "non-negotiable" items like identity (Wicker 1997: 131). According to Parekh, "minorities have a right to maintain and transmit their ways of life, and denying it to them is both indefensible and likely to provoke resistance" (Parekh 2000: 197). Similarly, Taylor argued that multicultural societies "can break up, in large part because of lack of (perceived) recognition of the equal worth of one group by another" (cited by Gianni in Wicker 1997: 127). And if one is looking for a legal basis of the demand for recognition of cultural differences, the following argument of Hannum is instructive:

A fundamental state obligation under international human rights norms is to eliminate discrimination, not to destroy all differences. Recognition of the right to personal autonomy and group identity is essential to ensure that the principles of self-determination, participation and tolerance are allowed to flourish (Hannum 1996: 476).

Among the major cultural demands of ethnic or cultural communities are the use of own local language, the grant of government support for local schools (including religious schools), the adoption of separate judicial/legal system (e.g., Islamic Law), the designation of a traditional homeland, the recognition of local practices and other cultural identity related items. Moreover, discriminatory practices and prejudicial relations of members of a dominant group against ethnic minorities are indeed among the cultural precipitants of ethnonationalism.

### *Security*

For purposes of emphasis, the issue of security, which is a subject under human rights, is treated separately in this section. Security is a fundamental human need, like physiological, identity, control and participation needs. When members of an ethnic group perceive their individual and collective security to be threatened, or not assured by the government's military and police forces, which are usually headed and manned mostly by members of the dominant ethnic community, mobilization to address the resulting insecurities ensues.

Security acquires importance as a conflict factor in conflicts that went through violent or large-scale military confrontation. As

demonstrated in some armed ethnic conflicts, the issue of security is of the second-order problem category. It emerges as a problem largely when a particular conflict graduates to the violent phase. When this happens in combination with some of the other conflict factors discussed under the other categories, like government failure to redress basic minority complaints about discrimination, then the formation revival of minority security forces is likely.<sup>5</sup> And as the state emphasizes the repression of ethnic insurgents ("freedom fighters" to the ethnic community, and "terrorists" to the government), then the state-ethnic group interface gets more and more militarized, often times brutal. As John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary observed, "repression sidelines moderates, bolsters extremists and obstructs prospects for future accommodation" (cited in Hutchinson 1996: 333-341).

The physical insecurities that stem from the militarization of the relations between the state and an ethnic group account for the importance given to the establishment of local/regional security forces and other related arrangements in many of the peace negotiations in the contemporary period.

### **Governance in Multicultural Societies**

There are two broad approaches by which multiethnic societies deal with their cultural diversity. One is to recognize and accept the fact of their cultural diversity or ethnic heterogeneity and evolve appropriate political and economic structures, processes and policies. This is the multiculturalist response of contemporary multiethnic countries like Switzerland, Belgium, Canada and Australia. Even the United States started moving in this direction, indicating its abandonment of the "melting pot" concept. The second approach adhered to by majority of multiethnic countries is to assimilate their diverse constituent cultural communities into the mainstream culture. This approach entails forcible subordination or inferiorization of minority ethnic communities to the dominant group not only culturally but also politically and economically. This is the monoculturalist response.

The increasing number and intensity of ethnocultural conflict in the contemporary world can be taken to suggest that majority of multiethnic countries are factually of the assimilationist mold. This also suggests their adherence to the liberal view that the ethnic or cultural attributes of minority ethnic communities would disappear as they gradually integrate to more "advanced" dominant cultural groups. Southeast Asian societies are among the strong adherents of this flawed approach by adopting a

monoculturalist reading of their glaring multicultural character. Related to this, David Brown states:

Despite their cultural pluralism, each of the Southeast Asian societies can derive from their pre-colonial history, an image of a set of dominant cultural attributes and values which form the core for the definition of contemporary nationhood. They therefore seek to portray the culturally plural society as one which is potentially culturally homogeneous, and which already has a cultural core around which nationhood can develop (cited in Hutchinson 1996: 308).

Assimilation as a mode of political integration is inherently unsuited to multicultural societies. Defined as an association of individuals, the assimilationist modern state abstracts away the class, ethnicity, religion and social status of its citizens, and unites them in terms of their subscription to a common system of authority, which is similarly abstracted from the wider structure of social relations (Parekh 2000: 181). Parekh pointed out:

The modern state makes good sense in a society that is culturally homogenous or willing to become so. In multiethnic and multicultural societies whose constituent communities entertain different views on its nature, powers and goals, have different histories, and needs, and cannot therefore be treated in an identical manner, the modern state can easily become an instrument of injustice and oppression and even precipitate the very instability and secession it seeks to prevent (Parekh 2000: 185).

In view of the need to ensure that ethnic minorities assimilate or integrate to the mononational state, control-oriented measures of political incorporation are warranted. These measures are collectively referred to as "hegemonic control," considered as the most common system of managing ethnic conflict. Hegemonic control is viewed by its supporters as "the only alternative to continuous war." Since its purpose is to make unthinkable or unworkable any ethnic challenge to the monoethnic or mononational state, hegemonic control entails coercive dominion and elite cooption. It emphasizes control of coercive instruments like the security and police forces. Moreover, it involves the support of the largest or most powerful ethnic community (Hutchinson 1996: 338-341). This makes the multiethnic state an "ethnic democracy," which to Sammy Smooha and Theodor Hanf:

[D]iffers from other types of democracy in according a structured superior status to a particular segment of the population and in regarding the non-dominant groups as having a relatively lesser claim to the state and also as being not fully loyal. The

manifestations of superior status are various but the most important ones relate to entry to the highest offices in the land and to the character of the state (its symbols, official language, religion, immigration policy). They may expressly be written into the constitution and other laws, or incorporated into the unwritten but clear rules of the game (cited in Hutchinson 1996: 331).

One unmistakable feature of the contemporary world order is the obstinate refusal of the leadership in many multiethnic states to recognize and accept their cultural diversity and the unresponsiveness of assimilation. Many of them are engaged in the ruthless suppression of ethnonationalism. Stressing this point, Kymlicka (2002) pointed out that states employed measures like banning the use of minority languages in schools or publications, suppression of political associations to promote minority nationalism, redrawing of political boundaries to prevent a group from forming a majority in a region or locality, imposing literacy test to make it difficult for the members to vote, and encouraging massive immigration so that the target group would become overwhelmed or outnumbered. He added:

All of these measures were intended to disempower national minorities, and to eliminate any sense of possessing a distinct national identity. This was justified on the grounds that minorities that view themselves as distinct "nations" would be disloyal and potentially secessionist. And it was often claimed that minorities particularly indigenous peoples—were backward and uncivilized and that it was in their own interest to be incorporated (even against their will) into more civilized and progressive nations (Kymlicka 2002: 351).

The growing number and intensity of violent ethnocultural conflict suggests the bankruptcy of the assimilation policy and its derivative technique of hegemonic control. There is now a global trend indicating that states are veering away from the said approach and moving in the direction of multiculturalism. Aside from Switzerland, Canada, Australia, and Belgium, which are known for embracing multiculturalism, a growing number of countries has started implementing cultural diversity-friendly initiatives.

For a society to be multiculturalist, it is not enough that it is multicultural, i.e., it consists of several ethnic or cultural groups. As clearly argued by Parekh, the term "multicultural" refers to the "fact of cultural diversity while multiculturalism points to the normative response of the society to its multicultural character" (Parekh 2000: 6); hence, many of contemporary multiethnic societies can be aptly described as "multicultural but not multiculturalist."

A multiculturalist society is one that cherishes its cultural diversity and makes appropriate adjustments or responses thereto. In particular, it respects the cultural demands of its constituent communities. It was argued that "no multicultural society can be stable and vibrant unless it ensures that all its constituent communities receive both a just recognition and a just share of economic and political power. It requires a robust form of social, economic and political democracy to underpin its commitment to multiculturalism" (Parekh 2000: 345).

The task of making multiethnic societies multiculturalist is indeed colossal. The inherent challenges are obviously daunting; but being an urgent survival imperative in contemporary multiethnic societies, it must be done and the best way to do this would be to start with the basic aspects. A focus on the political dimension of multiculturalism is in order particularly the need to evolve a governance formula that is suited to the cultural diversity of multiethnic societies.

It should be stressed that there is no available full-blown formula that multiethnic societies can borrow, experiment with, and adopt. Multicultural societies have to go back to the drawing board and reinvent or reconceptualize their political systems. They have to explore new kinds of political structures, processes and policies which are compatible with their respective circumstances. As pointed out by Parekh:

The task of exploring new modes of constituting the modern state and even perhaps altogether new types of political formation is particularly acute in multicultural societies. They need to find ways of pluralizing the state without undermining its unity and the ability to act decisively in the collective interest. Every multicultural society needs to devise its own appropriate political structure to suit its history, cultural traditions, and range and depth of diversity (Parekh 2000: 195).

Parekh added that the political task for multicultural societies is:

To find ways of reconciling the legitimate demands of unity and diversity, achieving political unity without cultural uniformity, being inclusive without being assimilationist, cultivating among their citizens a common sense of belonging while respecting their legitimate cultural differences, and cherishing plural cultural identities without weakening the shared and precious identity of shared citizenship (Parekh 2000: 343).

Given the points or ideas discussed in this article, the following should be among the features necessary to make politics and governance in multiethnic societies multiculturalist:

1. Inclusive or pluralized political system that ensures the equality and participation of all constituent communities, and decentralized localized governance (federalism, consociational democracy, or balanced pluralism);
2. Management of the economy to ensure that all constituent communities or groups receive a just share of economic resources;
3. Constitutional/legal system that recognizes cultural and religious differences and provides for some collective rights (protection for cultural/legal autonomy);
4. Political decisionmaking that provides ample protection for the voice of ethnic minorities; and
5. Affirmative action policies and programs for minorities.

The operationalization of the above features would greatly help in addressing the principal underpinnings of conflicts in multicultural societies, particularly government neglect and discrimination in the allocation of resources, lack of participation and control over local or community affairs, lack of or inadequate representation in the central government, and lack of respect for the right of minorities to be different. The latter includes demands for separate legal system, separate educational system and the power to come up with local policies warranted by the cultural groups' otherness or peculiarities. In other words, the above features have bearings on issues associated with politics of redistribution or social justice and identity politics or politics of recognition which are at the core of many violent ethnic conflicts.

### **Philippine Situation**

Given the above features in the context of Mindanao, is the governance in the Philippines multiculturalist? Regrettably, it is relatively far from being multiculturalist, although it may be aptly considered "on the road to multiculturalism," given the recent cultural recognition-oriented initiatives of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her major socioeconomic development programs in the southern Philippines (including the depressed Moro communities) under the 2004-2006 Mindanao Investment Program. Although these recent cultural diversity-friendly initiatives of the Arroyo Administration are indeed encouraging political developments in the context of multiculturalism, generally, the Philippine state, like many other modern states, remains



preoccupied with enduring national political and cultural hegemony. Despite some initiatives in regional and local autonomy and decentralization, governance in the Philippines remains substantially assimilationist and continues to emphasize hegemonic control and the derivative techniques of coercive domination and elite cooption.

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) has been in existence since 1989. Territorially, the present ARMM based on the new autonomy law (RA 9054) is slightly bigger, with the addition of Basilan to the original four provinces (Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi) and Marawi City.

The ARMM has its legislative, executive and judicial branches. It has its own administrative system and some degree of fiscal autonomy. The Arroyo administration has started implementing the provisions of RA 9054 on Moro representation in the central government by appointing Muslim leaders and professionals to certain positions in some national agencies. Moreover, the Philippine government has completed the integration of 7,500 qualified MNLF combatants into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). Some socioeconomic development programs were implemented in the region by foreign donors and the national government, while others are presently being implemented.

There are many other gains or accomplishments made under the present regional autonomy experiment in Muslim Mindanao; however, the continued persistence of the Moro armed struggle can be taken to suggest that the existing governance system for the region (i.e., Muslim Mindanao) has not been responsive. Despite the reported grandiose socioeconomic development programs for the Southern Philippines, the five predominantly Muslim provinces have remained as the country's poorest. The region has the worst poverty index in 2000, four years after the signing of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement.

Reflective of the government's continuing assimilationist thrust and a heavy slant towards hegemonic control technique are some cultural diversity or identity-related issues. One is the too limited jurisdiction of the *Shari'ah* (sacred law) court, i.e., only persons and family relations. The establishment of the *Shari'ah* Appellate Court, which was mandated by the old and new autonomy laws, has remained unimplemented. Another one is that despite the completion of the integration of 7,500 qualified MNLF combatants into the AFP and PNP, the Special Regional Security Force of the PNP, and regional command of the AFP for the ARMM which are expected to have substantial Moro elements mandated

under the old and new autonomy laws have remained unimplemented until today. The taxing powers of the region are hollow because aside from the widespread poverty in the region, no significant national taxing powers were transferred to the ARMM. The control-oriented governance of the region is indicated by the emphasis on the limitations of the powers of the ARMM in the old and new autonomy laws (RA 6734 and RA 9054 respectively). Like RA 6734, many of the provisions of RA 9054 have to do with what the ARMM cannot do, instead of what it can do.

As pointed out earlier, despite the gains and accomplishments made with the current unitary regional autonomy experiment in Muslim Mindanao, governance in the Philippines cannot be classified as multiculturalist. What have been achieved so far are largely in the nature of formalistic compliance, not substantive compliance with the requirements of multiculturalist governance. The gains are largely with those aspects with significant cooption functions (e.g., appointment of *mujahideen* [Moro warriors] leaders to some government positions, integration of MNLF combatants into the AFP and PNP). It should be noted that the core issue of autonomy as a policy response to ethnic conflict is the right of the minorities to be different.

The gains and accomplishments discussed earlier, while largely formalistic, can be made to lead to the desired multiculturalization of the country's governance. This study stresses that autonomy as a policy response to ethnic conflict is a significant phase of the cultural diversity-friendly interventions continuum. Being in the initial phase of the road towards multiculturalist governance, the task at hand is how to make the current autonomy experiment in the Southern Philippines succeed and lead to more responsive, nonviolent and nonsecessionist politico-administrative alternatives (with federalism as a more promising option). In other words, the present ARMM may be operated as an effective transitory structure towards that goal.

The autonomy option is a significant initial policy response. In other words, despite its inadequacies, the autonomy formula embodied in RA 9054 can be taken as a good beginning of a work-in-progress, i.e., evolving to a more responsive and durable formula that ensures the territorial integrity of the country and addresses the principal Moro grievances underpinning the conflict. It is a must to fully utilize what are available, like the new autonomy law (RA 9054), the new ARMM, and other autonomy-related institutions and resources at all levels of government. All doable and deliverable aspects of this law must be fully implemented. As to the items not addressed in RA 9054, like those matters associated with the cultural diversity of the country (such as the clamor for the

broadening of the jurisdiction of Shari'ah courts, the provision of financial support for the madaris), they should be part of the potential reform thrusts in the future, as part of the autonomy experience. The current peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) provides a good opportunity to address these neglected but significant items. Moreover, initiatives to enrich the existing autonomy law or evolve to a more responsive politico-administrative setup like federalism can be done simultaneously with efforts to fully implement the many doable and deliverable aspects of RA 9054.

The current nationwide advocacy for federalism, which has been gaining momentum over the years, is a significant step in the efforts to make governance in the Philippines genuinely multiculturalist. A genuinely multiculturalist governance will make secession and armed struggle baseless and unnecessary, and transform the Philippines as a vibrant multicultural society that will provide authentic peace and holistic development for all of its constituent cultural communities, including its ethnic minorities.

### **Concluding Statements**

The increasing number and intensity of ethnocultural conflict in the contemporary world suggests not only the limitations of the "one size fits all" and reductionist theories. It also implies an acute deficit in academic theorizing about multiethnic societies. In particular, while there are theories of the liberal capitalist state or the Marxist state, there is no available coherent theory of politics and governance in multiethnic societies. Similarly, while there are theories or models of public administration in developing or transitional societies, there is no theory of public administration in multiethnic states.

Although the societal context of politics and governance is given considerable emphasis in political science and public administration literature, much of the related scholarly works are of the cultural homogenization model. The societal context in which governance or public administration is embedded is assumed to be homogeneous. The various cultural communities are governed through the prism of the dominant culture. In other words, the cultural heterogeneity of multiethnic states is ignored; thus, leading to unresponsive policies and programs. As explained in the foregoing sections, this flawed approach spawned not just the lack of development but also the lack of peace in multiethnic societies.

Given the above points, politics and governance in multiethnic societies need reconceptualizing, reinventing or reengineering to address the requirements of their ethnic heterogeneity. This means that the "customer-attuning" concept, one of the new ideas associated with New Public Management, has to be brought to a higher level, i.e., beyond the bureaucracy. There is a need for political structures, processes and policies which are suited to the needs and requirements of the various ethnic or cultural groups in multiethnic societies. This is public sector reengineering at the macro level.

This author recommends that a shift from the policy of assimilation or homogenization to multiculturalism has the potentials to make governance in multiethnic societies a "governance for all," including the ethnic minorities therein. It will also make governance in said societies as "governance for both development and peace." When this is operationalized, public administration becomes an enabling or capacitating instrument, not an apparatus of hegemonic control and coercive domination that provides neither development nor peace.

Helping hasten the required paradigm shift in theory and practice is, indeed, a significant task for scholars in political science and public administration in the Asia-Pacific region.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> For ethnocultural or cultural diversity challenges in the advanced industrialized countries in the West, see Kivesto 2002 and Wicker 1997.

<sup>2</sup> For illustration see Dwivedi 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Note that the second strand of the definition of cultural violence in Galtung's formulation focuses on those aspects of culture that legitimize or make violence seem an acceptable means of responding to conflict. See Galtung 2002: 16-24.

<sup>4</sup> The description of economic, political, social and cultural dimensions of development followed the model given in Turner and Hulme 1997: 11. The definition of the cultural dimension contained therein was slightly modified. Moreover, the last two dimensions of the said model were excluded in the definition provided herein.

<sup>5</sup> This pattern was demonstrated in the conflicts in Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland. See Hannum 1996: 476.

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# **Strengthening the Academic Curriculum for Teaching Public Administration in the Philippines: Building Institutional Capacities to Attain the Millennium Development Goals**

JOEL V. MANGAHAS\*

*That public administration education must play a key role to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the Philippines is the central argument of this article. It argues that since the general program of action articulated in MDGs is grounded on the successful implementation of administration and governance reforms, it is only necessary for the MDGs to be formally introduced to the teaching and learning processes of schools of public administration in the country. Consequently, the article seeks to suggest what Philippine public administration schools can and should do to support actions related to MDGs. It also aims to examine how the academic curricula for teaching public administration may be strengthened to develop competencies for institutional and organizational development towards the achievement of MDGs.*

## **Introduction**

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have established targets for reducing poverty, improving health and education, promoting economic growth, empowering women, and creating an enabling environment for sustainable development (UNDP 2003). The magnitude of the challenge for achieving MDGs is formidable. Unless drastic and concerted actions are undertaken at all levels—from the global to the local—it is unlikely that the desired results and outcomes will be significantly realized (DFID 2003). The attainment of the MDGs requires collective action and commitment of international and subnational institutions involving governments, civil society, and private sector.

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Paper presented during the National Conference on Public Administration and the Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Reforms for Effective Teaching and Capacity Building for Service Delivery held at the UP-NCPAG on 18-19 October 2004.

Addressing the enduring problems of poverty and environment degradation is predicated on the successful implementation of governance reforms to rectify the policy and institutional frameworks that discriminate against the historically disadvantaged and marginalized sectors. MDGs will expectedly be resisted since new concepts and paradigms must be introduced to the policy arena and administrative systems that challenge strongly held views and practices. Any effort to promote citizen-centered policies and pro-poor change will understandably be opposed by well organized and influential groups who benefit from the status quo.

Critical to the achievement of MDGs is the promotion of institutional and organizational development which requires the learning of new skills, strategies, approaches, and tools. Building capacities in identifying and responding to the citizens' needs, particularly the poor, is an imperative for most developing countries. Functional skills in cooperating with others, managing stakeholders, and establishing networks and partnerships should be improved. Measuring and reporting performance to enhance efficacy and promote accountability of public officials are also necessary.

In order to meet MDGs, public administration education must play a key role. Amidst the global interest on and broad support to work for the realization of MDGs, they are yet to be formally introduced to teaching and learning processes of many schools of public administration in the Philippines. This study seeks to suggest what Philippine public administration schools can and should do to support actions related to MDGs. It also aims to examine how the academic curricula for teaching public administration may be strengthened to develop competencies for institutional and organizational development towards MDGs.

This study begins with a brief discussion of what it will take to achieve MDGs. This is followed by describing the agenda for promoting good governance and its link to reaching MDGs. It then explains a framework for promoting institutional and organizational development. A discussion of perspectives in effective curriculum design follows. The study also provides some general observations on academic curricula in public administration and culminates with recommendations to strengthen programs of instruction and educative role for MDGs.

### **Providing an Enabling Environment for Achieving MDGs**

Targeting poverty reduction, women's empowerment, and environmental sustainability requires substantial changes in political, economic, and social systems (Brinkerhoff 2004). The enduring problems that MDGs seek to address are consequences of decades of policies and practices at international and national levels. As such, significant improvements of living conditions in



developing countries will be realized through specific reforms measures at the national and subnational levels, matched with focused interventions from the international community.

International and national instruments are keys to reaching MDGs. International instruments involve effective debt reduction, trade-related policies, reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World Trade Organization, and increased quantity and better quality of international aid (<http://www.dse.de/ef/mdg/rep.htm>). National instruments include improving the delivery of basic services particularly to the poor, more equitable and transparent taxation system, and guaranteeing peace and order (<http://www.dse.de/ef/mdg/rep.htm>). Public policies are too often insufficiently focused around issues related to poverty, health, education, gender, and environment. Likewise, administrative capacities are inadequately prepared and resources are scarce to promote change and pursue pro-poor development.

Although the attainment of MDGs is not its sole responsibility, government actually plays a critical role in making services work for the people and raising the quality of life. Government performs thousands of functions, but in essence, it performs four major types of activities that affect almost every aspect of living: (1) formulate and monitor policies; (2) raise revenues to implement policies; (3) implement policies, some through provision of goods and services; and (4) provide an enabling environment for private sector growth and social development (ADB 2002). The lack or absence of capacities for good governance has nonetheless weighed down government performance. Good governance or sound development management is therefore a *sine qua non* for reaching MDGs.

"Governance" is broadly defined as the "sound exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority to manage a country's resources for development." It involves the institutionalization of a system through which citizens, institutions, organizations, and groups in the society articulate their interests, exercise their rights, and mediate their differences in pursuit of the collective good (ADB 1995).

It embraces not only the affairs of the government, but also the proactive role of the private sector and civil society in national development. Governance is, thus, not the sole province of government. Instead, its functions are delegated to, or assumed by other institutions and organizations in the business sector and civil society (UNDP 1997). Its concern with the sound exercise of authority underscores its ethical moorings; thus, its basic elements are accountability, participation, predictability and transparency which are also the key principles of sound development management (ADB 1995). Table 1 shows the basic elements of governance, its key dimensions, and specific areas of action.

**Table 1. Basic Elements of Good Governance**


<i>Basic Elements of Good Governance</i>	<i>Key Dimensions</i>	<i>Specific Areas of Action</i>
1. Accountability means making public officials answerable for government behavior and responsive to the entity from which they derive authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishing criteria to measure performance of public officials</li> <li>• Institutionalizing mechanisms to ensure that standards are met</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public sector management</li> <li>• Public enterprise management</li> <li>• Public financial management</li> <li>• Civil service reform</li> </ul>
2. Participation refers to enhancing peoples' access to and influence on public policy processes.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Undertaking development for and by the people</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participation of beneficiaries and affected groups</li> <li>• Government-Private sector interface</li> <li>• Decentralization of public and service delivery functions (empowerment of local government)</li> <li>• Cooperation with nongovernment organizations</li> </ul>
3. Predictability refers to the existence of laws, regulations, and policies to regulate society and their fair and consistent application.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishing and sustaining appropriate legal and institutional arrangements</li> <li>• Observing and upholding the rule of law</li> <li>• Maintaining consistency of public policies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Law and development</li> <li>• Legal frameworks for private sector development</li> </ul>
4. Transparency refers to the availability of information to the general public and clarity about government rules, regulations, and decisions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensuring access to accurate and timely information about the economy and government policies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disclosure of information</li> </ul>

Source: ADB 1995.

Promoting good governance poses opportunities as well as challenges in bringing together the public sector, civil society, private sector and communities in the tasks of evolving policies, programs, organizational and operational mechanisms, and institutional arrangements that can effectively respond to the needs of the people, ensure the judicious and transparent use of public funds, encourage growth of the private sector, promote effective delivery of public service, and uphold the rule of law.

Mainstreaming good governance does not only require capacitating individuals and institutions, but also providing the appropriate policy environment to institutionalize reforms (Brillantes et al. 2003). At the individual level, capacity building for good governance focuses on the process of equipping civil servants and stakeholders with the understanding, skills and access to information, knowledge and training that enable them to work together and perform effectively. At the organizational level, governance reforms involve the elaboration and establishment of enabling management systems, structures, processes, and procedures, not only within organizations but also the management of relationships between and among the different organizations and sectors. At the institutional level, capacity building includes making legal and regulatory changes to enable organizations, institutions and agencies at all levels and in all sectors to enhance their capacities. Figure 1 presents the critical components of capacity development for good governance.

**Figure 1. Components of Capacity Development for Good Governance and Achievement of MDGs**



Source: Adapted from ADB 2003.

Sound development management identifies the roles of the state as: (1) creating a conducive economic environment; (2) protecting the vulnerable; (3) improving government efficiency and responsiveness; (4) empowering people and democratizing the political system; (5) decentralizing the administrative system; (6) reducing gaps between rich and poor; (7) encouraging cultural diversity and social integration; and (8) protecting the environment. Table 2 presents the key milestones in promoting effective governance for each of the aforementioned roles.

### **Strategic Areas of Institutional Reform in the Philippines**

Public sector reform has never been the fairy tale that ends in a “happily ever after” note for the Philippines, in spite of the fact that every political administration included civil service reform in its government agenda.<sup>1</sup> Since the birth of the Philippine Republic in 1946, civil service reform has been undertaken at least five times, but results fell short of expectations – which can be attributed to the failure of the civil society and private sector to actively engage in the change process.

Strategic institutional reforms to help realize MDGs should pursue program interventions that complement and build upon the gains of past and existing initiatives particularly in areas of: (1) improving planning and public policymaking; (2) strengthening the administrative structure; (3) rationalizing human resource management; (4) pursuing local autonomy and decentralization; (5) managing the fight against corruption; (6) institutionalizing performance-based management; (7) effectively utilizing information and communication technologies; (8) depoliticizing key public institutions; (9) procedural reforms; and (10) enhancing cooperation with the wider public, civil society organizations, and private sector.

Governance initiatives should involve developing an overall framework and a unifying philosophy that will not only provide direction to current reform efforts, but also to subsequent reforms. Interventions should focus on addressing institutional deficiencies caused by redundant structures, poor personnel management system, and the absence of a performance management culture. Measures should likewise be undertaken to address corruption and e-governance issues.

Of course, enduring reforms can only take root if the nation’s key players have the commitment to challenge the deeply entrenched spoils system in the bureaucracy and commit to implement changes while recognizing that good governance cannot be attained overnight. Reforms must be strategic, emphasizing sustained initiatives that yield small but progressive increments of net value added to overall performance of the public sector over the long term.

**Table 2. Roles of the State and Key Milestones in Governance**

<i>Sound Development Management Roles of the State</i>	<i>Key Milestones</i>
1. Creating a conducive economic environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enact and enforce laws that promote economic competition</li> <li>• Decentralize economic decisionmaking, stabilize inflation</li> <li>• Reduce public deficit and free market to set prices for privately produced goods and services</li> </ul>
2. Protecting the vulnerable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensure the survival of pension systems</li> <li>• Create or maintain reasonable unemployment benefits</li> <li>• Establish and maintain a system of private health and social insurance</li> <li>• Maintain social assistance programs for the disabled and disadvantaged</li> </ul>
3. Improving government efficiency and responsiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attract qualified, competent, honest, and realistically paid individuals into public service</li> <li>• Establish a civil service system that relies on merit-based recruitment and promotion, incentive-based compensation, and clearly defined reward-oriented career paths</li> <li>• Attract and retain a corps of professionals who are responsible for formulating and implementing economic policies and support them with good training, an appropriate degree of independence and professional reward structures</li> <li>• Protect professional civil servants from political interference in carrying out their responsibilities</li> <li>• Establish a civil service system that is flexible enough to facilitate communications between the public and private sectors</li> </ul>
4. Empowering people and democratizing the political system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish a conducive institutional environment comprising of properly functioning parliaments, legal and judicial systems and electoral processes</li> </ul>
5. Decentralizing the administrative system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Respond quickly to local needs and conditions</li> <li>• Redistribute authority, responsibility, and financial resources for public services among different levels of government</li> <li>• Strengthen subnational units of government</li> <li>• Respect traditional structures of authority as well as traditional mechanisms for resolving conflicts and managing common property in society</li> </ul>
6. Reducing gaps between rich and poor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduce social disparities</li> </ul>
7. Encouraging cultural diversity and social integration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maintain cultural identity and roots while promoting social cohesion</li> <li>• Ensure that political systems are accessible to all and that legal systems afford equal opportunities</li> </ul>
8. Protecting the environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrate economic and environmental accounting</li> <li>• Promote intergenerational equity</li> </ul>

Source: ADB 2003.

### *Developing a Holistic Framework for Good Governance*

There is an unequivocal need to formulate an overarching framework that can consolidate the various governance efforts, guide diagnosis of governance issues, and identify reform directions while building on current reform initiatives. The overall design of governance reforms should focus on addressing bureaucracy-wide concerns in policy, structure, processes, personnel administration, fiscal management, and information technology (GOP and UNDP 2002). Parallel to the effort to strengthen the capacities of government should be efforts to engage civil society and the private sector in reform initiatives. These would enhance government accountability, citizen participation and oversight in governance processes (GOP and UNDP 2002).

The development of a governance reform program may entail amendments to existing laws and policies as well as the formulation of new ones. This would provide the requisite policy environment for the successful implementation of proposed reform strategies and interventions. Hence, legal and institutional implications of the governance reform program should be carefully considered.

A comprehensive and strategic national policy and framework for governance will be very helpful in planning, establishing standards and protocols, and managing development programs and initiatives. Such a master plan should be able to identify program opportunities for both governments and development agencies, thus encouraging closer cooperation, coordination and complementation among the various initiatives of national and international institutions.

International development agencies operating in the Philippines have been providing different forms of assistance to local governments, as well as to national government agencies, in support of decentralization and governance. Development assistance must not only be sustained, but must also be well coordinated to achieve convergence of purpose, minimize overlaps, and optimize outcomes.

### *Restructuring the Bureaucracy*

Streamlining the bureaucracy is imperative. Redundant structures in the government should be abolished, subsumed or consolidated with other entities. Agency functions must be clearly delineated to minimize overlaps and duplications. Streamlining should also be pursued in line with decentralization objectives. The distribution of officials and employees should be such that the greater mass serves in regional and local postings where they are most needed.

The public sector has yet to benefit from a carefully prepared integrated blueprint for implementing civil service reforms. Efforts in the past have been influenced and tainted by politics. Planning and execution were haphazardly done and usually rushed. There has been minimal consultation with and participation from the bureaucracy and the affected public and organizations. Those who implement and are affected by reform initiatives have no sense of ownership of these initiatives, thereby compromising the processes and results of reforms. Knowledge on how to improve overall government performance remains fragmented, disorganized, and even contradictory.

A possible area for strategic intervention is the study and establishment of appropriate management structures, processes, procedures, and information systems within the civil service system including the necessary linkages and collaboration with the private sector, civil society, and international development agencies. Improving intergovernmental relations (i.e., vertical and horizontal linkages) should also be given priority.

#### *Professionalizing the Civil Service*

Recreating the civil service system necessitates a comprehensive, pragmatic, and workable program of action with the corresponding policy support that will upgrade all facets of personnel administration such as recruitment and selection, training and development, personnel relations, compensation, and employee security and safety. Although the proposed Civil Service Code promises a significant improvement in the quality of public service, it is uncertain as to when it will be passed. Meanwhile, the bureaucracy needs to put in place mechanisms to: (1) get qualified, competent, and honest individuals into public service and make them stay; (2) ensure and maintain high work performance among government employees; (3) develop and implement strong staff development program, (4) strengthen careerism and protect the civil service system from political patronage; (5) allow government-wide mobility among Career Executive Service Officers (CESOs); and (6) institutionalize performance-based security of tenure. Reform efforts in this area may include strengthening the staff development programs, enhancing the merit system, improving job evaluation and compensation administration, as well as pricing job values and the design of the salary structure.

The administrative justice system needs to be strengthened. The bureaucracy still finds it difficult to weed out incompetent and erring public employees due to the weaknesses in systems for the disposition of administrative cases. Possible areas for technical assistance include developing mechanisms to track cases, enhancing capabilities for dispute resolution such as conciliation and mediation, and strengthening competencies of legal counselors.

### *Managing for Results*

The civil service system must move towards a new work culture that emphasizes strong client orientation, excellence, integrity, and knowledge-based management. The bureaucracy must adopt an institutional behavior that values less paper work, minimum waiting time, simplest procedures for the transacting public and public participation in providing feedback on how to improve public policies and frontline services.

The institutionalization of a performance management system in the government presents an integrated and practical approach for effecting good governance. In order to enhance its overall efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness, public administration needs a shift of emphasis from the traditional concern with inputs and immediate outputs towards a more vigorous commitment to attaining long-term development benefits (i.e., outcomes and impacts) that effect authentic improvements in the quality of life of Filipinos. Results-based management is a significant public sector reform that requires clear articulation of and strong commitment to the core mission and priorities of the government, as well as to the imperatives of defining and realizing the principles of accountability, participation, transparency, and predictability.

Results-based management necessitates a results-and-service-oriented public sector that helps civil servants realize that they are accountable for results—not to their supervisors; not to the organization, but more importantly, to the clientele. The desired public sector management environment also requires an empowered civil service that accepts responsibility for and has the capacity to influence outcomes. Successful introduction and maintenance of a performance management system requires a holistic and comprehensive package of civil service reforms that involves three key dimensions: (1) promoting favorable implementation conditions; (2) developing performance measurement systems; and (3) utilizing performance information.

Results-based management in the Philippine bureaucracy is gaining attention. The most recent and welcome development is the introduction of the Public Expenditure Management and Investment Program (PEMIP) since it stresses public accountability by orienting government operations towards realizing the desired outcomes and impacts. Certain elements of the PEMIP nonetheless need to be reviewed and improved.

### *Managing the Fight against Corruption*

No administrative reform effort can ever move forward if the problem of corruption is inadequately addressed. Strategic reform initiatives should



include: (1) increasing social awareness and developing a culture of intolerance against corrupt activities; (2) strengthening the participation of citizens, private sector, and civil society in anticorruption efforts; (3) improving overall efficiency and effectiveness of anticorruption agencies of government; and (4) strengthening cooperation of government agencies, civil society organizations, business sector, and citizens in promoting transparency and accountability in the public sector. Efforts should likewise strengthen preventive programs, efforts to increase public awareness and support, and building broad-based coalitions against corruption. Citizens can make and should hold their governments accountable. They should also constantly demand more efficient and effective services.

### **Importance of Institutional/Organizational Development**


Institutions are often creations and instruments of the powerful elite, and usually discriminate against the poor (DFID 2003). Without institutional reform, policies and programs to support MDGs can be stymied. Poor development performance is rooted in institutional factors. Institutional causes of poverty can include:

1. Economic – inadequate funding for basic services, inefficient allocation and use of resources, debt burden; weak planning and budgeting link, lack of competitiveness, weak revenue generation capability, and poor access to credit.
2. Legal – poor regulatory framework, corrupt administration of justice and law enforcement, policy conflicts/gaps, and closed system of policymaking.
3. Political – political instability, strong patronage system, highly politicized civil service, and corrupt leaders.
4. Social – low labor productivity, unemployment, poor work ethic, high incidence of crime, insurgency (DFID 2003).

The 2002 *World Bank Development Report* emphasizes the importance of institution building for poverty alleviation (WB Report 2002). The Department for International Development (DFID) similarly points out the pressing need for governments to enhance its capabilities if they are to work better for poor people to achieve MDGs (DFID 2003). As such, building capabilities for good governance and MDGs is very much a matter of institutional development.<sup>2</sup> It is in this context wherein teaching and research in public administration can make a difference.

Promoting good governance and achieving MDGs are likely to succeed if they pursue improvements in wider institutional capacities as well as in technical competencies (See Figure 2). More efficient and responsive services for the poor require technical competencies (i.e., knowledge, skills, and attitude) for doing so; but these must be matched with institutional changes to allow the technical improvements to work. For example, Filipino civil servants need technical competence to identify and improve specific aspects of service delivery through application of benchmarking and continuous improvement techniques; and at the same time their superiors and work structures should allow them to perform better and make the necessary improvements. According to DFID, technical interventions (e.g., training or ICT applications) that leave unsatisfactory institutions intact achieve nothing (DFID 2003).

**Figure 2. Improving Technical Competency and Institutional Capacity**




Source: DFID 2003.

Institutional/organizational development must be directed at achieving a specific outcome. In the context of realizing the MDGs, the change intervention should clearly identify what is to be done and why. Once the purpose has been defined, timeframe is set for achieving the milestones and results. The context or starting point is then situated. Participants and allies in the change process are identified and managed. Accountability measures are likewise established. Table 3 lists the key principles for institutional and organizational change.

**Table 3. Key Principles Underlying Institutional and Organizational Development**

<i>Area of Concern</i>	<i>Key Question</i>	<i>Key Principles</i>
Outcome focus	What are we trying to do and why?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Change intervention must be driven by a focus on desired outcomes</li> </ul>
Timeframe	How long should it take?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Change process takes time</li> <li>• Unrealistic change processes and schedules will fail</li> <li>• Getting real stakeholder participation is vital and especially time-consuming</li> </ul>
Context	Where do we start?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutional development must start from and be constantly informed by current social, political, and cultural realities</li> <li>• The precise entry point will need to take into account the overlapping nature of institutions at different levels (local, national, and international)</li> </ul>
Participation	Whom do we work with?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identifying and managing stakeholders are critical</li> </ul>
Accountability	When will we know we have accomplished the task?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need to ensure that the reform process is meeting its objectives</li> <li>• Is the institutional change facilitating the achievement of desired outcomes?</li> <li>• Accountability is heavily dependent on regular flow of information</li> </ul>

The institutional development process consists of five stages (See Figure 3). The first phase involves analysis and diagnosis which examines the overall institutional framework. It seeks to answer questions like "What is to be achieved and why?" and "What are the main institutional strengths/weaknesses?" The second phase refers to the analysis and diagnosis of the concerned organization in its wider institutional context. This stage aims to identify the main organizational strengths/weaknesses. The third phase is designing the intervention, which identifies the best way to promote change. Next is implementation or managing the change intervention. Finally, monitoring and evaluation phase is concerned with establishing mechanisms

**Figure 3. The Institutional Development Process**

Source: DFID 2003.

for measuring performance. Table 4 lists the alternative methods that can be used for institutional and organizational development.

### **Perspectives in Curriculum Design and Development**

#### *Blueprint for Teaching and Learning Processes*

The academic curriculum is an essential component of any educational institution. The curriculum is the blueprint for instruction and student assessment. It sets out the learning objectives and the means for achieving them. The curriculum therefore sets out not only the content of each course, but also the interconnectedness and sequence of courses to systematically provide the learners with a rational process for acquiring and building upon their know-how and skills over a specified period of time. Being at the core of educational functions, resources must support the successful achievement of curriculum goals and objectives.

A carefully planned and well-structured curriculum provides a strong foundation for quality delivery of education, thus realizing the desired learning outcomes. Serious curriculum design involves a long and iterative

**Table 4. Summary List of Suggested Tools and Techniques**

<i>Stage</i>	<i>Suggested Tools and Techniques</i>
1. Analysis and diagnosis: Overall institutional framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessment of institutional capabilities</li> <li>• Impact analysis</li> <li>• Sponsor evaluation</li> <li>• Change forecasting</li> </ul>
2. Analysis and diagnosis: The organization and its institutional context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Open systems model</li> <li>• 7-S (shared value, strategy, structure, system, staff, style and skill)</li> <li>• SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats)</li> <li>• Organizational elements model</li> <li>• Problem tree analysis</li> </ul>
3. Review and design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Risk management matrix</li> <li>• Benchmarking</li> <li>• Business process reengineering</li> </ul>
4. Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Change management</li> <li>• Force field analysis</li> <li>• Burke Litwin Model</li> <li>• Stakeholder management</li> </ul>
5. Monitor/Evaluate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EFQM (European Foundation for Quality Management) Excellence Model</li> </ul>

Source: DFID 1003.

process. Curriculum development stresses the importance of identifying educational opportunities that are most critical to an organization or community. The learner groups and their learning needs are properly identified. Learning objectives are subsequently determined and ordered in relation to required competencies.

The appropriate number and mix of courses or modules are likewise specified. The content outline is developed for each course. Instructional strategies and media are selected. Lesson plans are also developed for each course including the timing and duration. Logistics of the total curriculum delivery system are planned and finalized. The design may be scaled down or expanded based on the resources that will be made available. The content and objectives of the curriculum design are validated and field tested prior to adoption and full scale implementation. Mechanisms must be further put in place to monitor and evaluate whether or not the curriculum is meeting its intended purpose. Moreover, the system of responsibilities and accountabilities for managing and implementing the curriculum must be established.


Poor curriculum designs achieve minimal educational benefits. They are often manifested by the lack of goal orientation and convergence in the program of instruction, unnecessary overlaps of courses, disjointed subjects, wasteful use of scarce resources, low completion rates, substandard teaching, and ineffective assessment of learning. At the end of the day, the curriculum should be able to effectively, efficiently, and economically provide the desired learning outcomes.

Curriculum development is a complex process. It requires interaction, dedication, perseverance, and, more importantly, the technical expertise to get it going. Pitfalls can be avoided by observing the principles and logical process of curriculum design, applying benchmarking and continuous improvement techniques, and enhancing learner participation in curriculum development. There is an increasing trend for curriculum designs to shift from the traditional subject-based, input-oriented, and teacher-centered learning to systems integrated, competency-based, community-oriented, and student-centered programs. The continuing challenge for educational institutions is how to make their academic curricula respond to the changing needs and demands, thus bringing about favorable results and outcomes.

The curriculum must be directed at providing students with the necessary competencies to make them productive members of society. The curriculum must not only respond to individual learning needs of students, but also to societal and/or organizational demands. Such needs and demands serve as the bases for developing a responsive and viable curriculum. The curriculum defines the scope and content of what should students learn and what must be taught. Teaching and learning methods are assembled around achieving curriculum goals and objectives. Formative and summative assessment techniques are likewise formulated and administered to measure/improve the curriculum and instruction. Figure 4 shows the needs-curriculum-teaching-assessment-outcomes continuum (Mangahas 2004).

Curriculum design encompasses the horizontal and vertical organization. The horizontal organization is concerned with the side by side arrangement of curriculum components. The vertical organization, on the other hand, is concerned with the longitudinal arrangement of curriculum elements – the placement of additional skills development. Under the horizontal organization are scope and sequence. Scope is the breadth and depth of the content of a curriculum – from simple to complex principles, required common content and elective or special content. Sequence is the order by which the curriculum content is presented. Under vertical organization are continuity and integration. “Continuity” refers to the “vertical reiteration of major curriculum elements.” “Integration” refers to the “horizontal relationships of curriculum activities.”

**Figure 4. The Role of the Academic Curriculum in Realizing the Desired Competencies and Learning Outcomes**



Source: Mangahas 2004.

Inasmuch as the academic curriculum is a very important element in ensuring quality delivery of educational services, it must be emphasized that learning outcomes are shaped by: (1) university/school factors, (2) system/supporting inputs, (3) student characteristics, and (4) contextual factors (Cortes 1993). Overall, the effectiveness of a university or school is conventionally measured in terms of learning achievement, completion rate, and competitiveness of graduates in the labor market.

University/School factors consist of (1) university/school vision/mission, (2) university climate/culture, (3) curriculum and instruction, (4) leadership and quality of staff, and (5) teaching/learning processes. Although the vision/mission statement expectedly sets high expectations, it needs to clearly state the expected outcomes. The educational institution must have strong commitment to excellence and the organization geared towards delivering better services and results.

The university/school must have a capable teaching force. It also requires competent leadership to manage school resources and, more importantly, provide effective instructional supervision. A system of responsibilities and accountabilities must also be established and operationalized. Rewards and incentives are likewise necessary. Teaching/Learning processes alongside assessment/testing techniques must be aligned with the curriculum. Both teachers and students must strive for academic excellence. Students have to assume learning responsibilities.

The university/school must have supporting inputs from the educational system as well as from the community and parents/families of students. The

concerned educational institution must have the legal mandate and resources to carry out its functions. Of course, the quality of students admitted into the degree programs is contributory to the success of the university/school. Institutional, political, economic, language, and cultural factors are also important in appreciating the capacity of the university/school to produce good graduates.

#### *What Makes a Good Curriculum?*

Quality curriculum must be very clear about what is to be covered, how it is delivered, and how to measure/assess learning. Learner objectives, activities, and assessments must be closely linked to each other. An effective curriculum requires the following:


1. A rationale which relates the goals and objectives of each subject area and course to the educational mission and philosophy;
2. A general description of the content of subject areas at the undergraduate and graduate levels;
3. Statement of general goals for students in each subject area;
4. Specific, measurable learner objectives for each subject;
5. Alignment of the measurable learner objectives for each subject to the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that students need to meet the curriculum goals and standards;
6. Instructional strategies (activities) and specific assessments (including performance-based assessments for a majority of the learner objectives);
7. Evidence that individual learner objectives have been *articulated* by subject and by course sequence; and
8. Review and approval for each curriculum guide (<http://www.dse.statemous/divimprove/curriculum/handouts/mathcurr.pdf>).

Another perspective of an effective curriculum identifies five critical components: (a) meaning, (b) coherence, (c) articulation, (d) high standards, and (e) alignment (see Figure 5) (Seif 1998). The first element, *meaning*, refers to "setting measurable objectives that focus on fundamental knowledge and processes." It includes a clear, defensible rationale and contains explicit course descriptions. In addition, *meaning* should articulate scope and sequence.



Furthermore, *meaning* should provide assessments and instructional activities to measure established objectives.

**Figure 5. The Effective Curriculum Model**



Source: Mangahas 2004.

*Coherence* pertains to the “provision of adequate opportunities at each level in the curriculum or certain points in the learning process to build on prior knowledge and learning experiences.” *Articulation* in the effective curriculum model focuses on the promotion of learning at different year levels that is appropriately sequenced and related. It also connects topics within year levels/courses by unifying themes/concepts.

*High standards* establish a core set of challenging benchmarks or yardsticks of performance for all students. *High standards* promote in-depth learning and help address student learning styles through a variety of instructional strategies. *High standards* in a curriculum also utilize a variety of assessments to evaluate levels of student understanding (and achievement).

*Alignment* is equally important in a curriculum. The curriculum must exhibit strong connections between the written, taught, and assessed curricula. The curriculum must likewise support the process and content that meet the established standards through appropriate objectives, instructional activities, teaching practices, and assessments.

Other characteristics of effective curricula, instructional strategies and activities, and assessment programs are listed in Table 5—which reemphasize alignment and integration of the curriculum content, pedagogical tasks and

**Table 5. Elements of a Good Program of Instruction**

<i>Characteristics of Effective Curricula</i>	<i>Characteristics of Effective Instructional Strategies and Activities</i>	<i>Characteristics of an Effective Assessment System</i>
1. Define what students should know and be able to do	1. Provide students with opportunities to connect and apply their learning to real-life experiences	1. Aligned with the curriculum and agreed standards
2. Focus around meeting high standards	2. Support the identified objectives and assessments	2. Scoring guides are clearly defined to evaluate student work
3. Demonstrate the connections within and among various content areas	3. Provide information to the teacher to adjust instruction and to meet the changing needs in order to improve student academic performance	3. Focuses on understanding and not just memorization
4. Demonstrate vertical alignment between year levels	4. Promote thinking dispositions, meta-cognition, higher order thinking skills, and transfer of knowledge	4. Given on a continuous basis to provide a variety of opportunities for teachers and students to measure learning
5. Demonstrate horizontal alignment within subject content or across different contents		5. Includes those that are authentic in nature and allow students to solve real-life problems
6. Provide experiences and applications that demonstrate current and emerging options and connect to life		6. Provides opportunities for students to demonstrate multiple ways of responding to a given situation
7. Consistently demand higher order thinking and problem solving for all students and provide opportunities for application of these skills		7. Specifically designed to provide meaningful feedback on student learning for instructional purposes
8. Consistently address the learning needs of all students while maintaining high expectations and performances		8. Specifically designed to provide feedback on student's degree of success in learning a particular objective
9. Systematically monitored and revised to reflect best practices and current research on student learning		9. Establishes procedures for administration of examination and use and dissemination of assessment data
10. Include learner objectives related to equity, technology, research, and workplace readiness		10. Assessment data system is used to improve curriculum, instructional practices, and student performance

Source: DFID 2003.

activities, and assessment. Formation of the curriculum content begins with defining and sequencing aims, goals, and objectives of instruction. Knowledge and skills to be taught are prioritized in the curriculum in terms of being mandatory (must know), essential (need to know), and worthy (nice to know). Themes and topics are included and prioritized in the curriculum as a result of a systematic, well-informed and highly consultative process. The vertical and horizontal linkages and interconnectedness of courses/subjects are likewise decided. It is also preferable that the philosophy or tone of curriculum is guided by specific and acceptable learning models.

Instructional delivery is another important aspect that can make or break a good curriculum. Apart from the curriculum, instruction is shaped by teaching quality, pedagogical approaches, and instructional materials. The teacher (or medium) need not only have mastery of the subject matter, but must also apply appropriate processes and methods. The organizational structure and mechanisms to govern curriculum implementation and improvement must likewise be put in place.

Assessment does not only relate to measuring if and how learning has taken place, but it is also concerned with evaluating whether the goals and objectives of the delivered curricula have been obtained. Assessment methods are formulated to accurately provide information to measure learning and to improve instruction and curriculum.

### *Curriculum Design Prototypes*

There are three representative prototypes of curriculum design: (a) subject-centered, (b) learner-centered, and (c) problem-centered. The relative strengths and limitations of three design prototypes are shown in Table 6. *Subject-centered curriculum design* is the oldest and most widely used. The scope and content of the curriculum are determined by the conventional range of subjects worthy of inclusion. The sequence of topics is largely a function of the logic of the subject matter.

*Learner-centered curriculum design.* It emphasizes individual development. This kind of curriculum design is more sensitive to learning needs, which makes it more effective than the traditional subject-centered design. The design is developed based on the needs, interests, and purposes of students. It is not "pre-planned" or "out-of-the-shelf." It evolves as teacher and students work together on content and tasks. The scope and content depend on what the learners need to learn. The sequence of topics is aligned with the absorptive capacity and even preferences of the learners.

*Problem-centered curriculum design.* It is similar to the learner-centered design as they are both rooted in individual-centered epistemological

**Table 6. Curriculum Design Prototypes**

<i>Prototype</i>	<i>Advantages</i>	<i>Disadvantages</i>
<b>Subject-Centered</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Teachers possess subject matter expertise</li> <li>• Materials to be learned are clearly laid out in textbooks/teaching references</li> <li>• Buttressed by tradition</li> <li>• Easy to administer</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tendency for fragmented knowledge</li> <li>• Detachment from concerns and events of the real world</li> <li>• Inadequate consideration of the needs, interests, and experiences of students</li> <li>• Curriculum is inefficiently arranged</li> <li>• Limited scope of goals</li> <li>• Passive concept of learning</li> <li>• Tendency of the curriculum to overexpand</li> </ul>
<b>Learner-Centered</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Curriculum determined by learner's need and interests</li> <li>• Espouses cooperative planning</li> <li>• Focuses on problem-solving procedures for learning</li> <li>• Intrinsic motivation</li> <li>• Provides for the individual differences of students</li> <li>• Emphasis on process skills that students need in order to cope with real needs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Questionable educative efficacy</li> <li>• Inherent lack of definitive horizontal structure</li> <li>• Lack of continuity</li> <li>• Extraordinary demand for competent teachers</li> <li>• Available textbooks and other teaching materials are not geared to the requirements of such design</li> </ul>
<b>Problem-Centered</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Subject matter presented in integrated form and in relevant form; content is in functional form</li> <li>• Encourages problem-solving procedures</li> <li>• Students are not prodded by extrinsically applied motivational devices</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Difficulties in determining the scope and sequence of essential areas of living</li> <li>• Possible lack of integration and continuity across subjects</li> </ul>

Source: Doll 1974, McNeil 1981.

assumptions. It is focused on building and strengthening competencies to enable the learner to function more effectively and productively in the community or society. The design aims to perform strongly in providing problem-analysis and problem-solving skills. Problem-centered design is nonetheless "pre-planned" in the sense that it is oriented to addressing pressing or common problems—which shape the scope, content, and sequence of instruction.

*Approaches to Curriculum Review and Development*

Academic review of high degree programs in United Kingdom is conducted using a phased approach (UK nd). First, necessary preparations for the review are undertaken. Scope and preference surveys are undertaken to gather information on the following: (a) range of subjects offered, (b) desired programs to be included under each subject heading, (c) estimated number of full-time equivalent students for each program, (d) institution's preferred timing for the review and any preferences for subjects to be reviewed. With the time schedule mapped out, initial profiles are prepared to commence a dialogue with the concerned educational institution on the overall approach to and intensity of the review. Self-evaluation documents and program specifications are prepared at this stage.

Second, the points of reference for the review are laid down. A framework of higher education qualifications is used to provide reference points to determine whether the intended outcomes for programs and actual student achievement are appropriate to the level of the qualification awarded. Subject benchmarks are likewise established which represent the general expectations about standards for the award of qualifications at a given level in a particular subject area.

Third, the review is conducted. One approach involves a peer review where judgments are made by those who understand the subject under scrutiny and who are familiar with the teaching and learning processes. The other approach is to review against the broad aims of the concerned educational institution.

Fourth, judgments are made on academic standards and quality of learning opportunities based on the results of the review. Reports are written, disseminated, and discussed to come up with decisions on what to do with the curriculum under review.

The University of British Columbia in Canada suggests a step-by-step circular procedure to design an effective curriculum: (a) convene faculty members, (b) develop the concept, (c) draft the content, (d) consider the learners, (e) prioritize the substance, (f) evaluate learning, and (g) organize for learning (<http://www.cstudies.ubc.ca/facdev/services/newsletter/90may90-2html>).

*Convene Faculty Members.* The idea of proposing a new curriculum/course or revising an existing one must be explored with colleagues. Questions which might be helpful in identifying who could join the dialogue include:

1. Who is willing to talk about teaching?

2. Who will be involved with the course?
3. Who should be part of the discussion?

*Develop the Concept.* Faculty members usually have a good grasp of the courses they teach and why they are taught. What is dear to them, nonetheless, may seem vague when made public to the students and to colleagues. When preparing a course, a series of courses, or university-wide curricular objectives, it is useful first to establish a clear understanding of the course. A very helpful way to do this is to ask and answer relevant questions about the important aspects of the "what" and "why" of any course. Some guide questions may include:

1. What is the critical idea, skill or attitude that students must learn from the course?
2. How will this course improve the present program?
3. What are the specific problem(s) this course is meant to address?
4. Why should this course be included in the departmental and program offerings?

*Draft the Content.* Having deliberated on the concept and how it will fit, the question now becomes, exactly what (a) knowledge, (b) skills, and (c) attitudes or beliefs the concerned educational institution wants its students to learn? Options may include wanting students to understand concepts or master ideas, to be able to critique established ideas and formulate something better, or to demonstrate the ability to follow a procedure. Attitudes or beliefs may focus on personal growth and the appreciation of certain ideas. Possible content may consist of all suggestions of individual faculty members, disciplinary strictures, degree program requirements, and university objectives. The end result is a pool of rich ideas from which the course will be structured.

*Consider the Students.* Courses/Subjects are taught to students who enroll/take them with both homogeneous and heterogeneous levels of knowledge, skills, and attitudes. Since the aim of the curriculum is to build on what they already know, thus making them reach new levels of competence, it is important to know what they know—which is helpful in determining course level and the necessity of prerequisites. Some useful questions to ask are:

1. Who should take the course/subject?;
2. What should they know, be able to do, and believe before they take the course/subject?;
3. Who else may take the course/subject?; and

4. What will they most likely know, be able to do and believe before they take the course/subject?

*Prioritize Topics.* After the possible substance has been gathered and the potential student identified, topics for inclusion in any course/subject must be prioritized. Establishing a ranking system does not only help in identifying the course/subject content, but it also provides areas of enrichment for students or possibilities of further course development. Useful questions are:

1. What must a student know, be able to do or believe as a result of this course?
2. What might be nice to know, but not as essential?
3. What is redundant?
4. What is less relevant? Or irrelevant?

*Evaluate Learning.* The evaluation—if properly designed—provides the operational definition of the course. As such, the “what,” “when” and “why” of course evaluations are essential in any type of assessment. Evaluations are the most powerful instrument for teaching and learning and it is necessary to begin immediately to determine how to know what students are learning.

Evaluations should be focused and specific. If the goal is to make students learn to think, then thinking is evaluated. Similarly, if the goal is for students to learn a skill, evaluation should require demonstration of the skill. Learning goals related to changes in attitudes and beliefs are, nonetheless, more difficult to evaluate. Evaluations of such nature are usually derived through feedback from their peers, colleagues, and co-workers.

Before structuring how a course is to be taught, it is best to decide if it is appropriate for students to compose a term paper, do a synopsis of a journal article, critique a chapter of a book or the entire book, make an oral report, answer a quiz or examination, prepare a role play, analyze a case, solve a problem, and/or answer ambiguous multiple choice questions. Other useful questions are:

1. How frequently should evaluation be conducted?
2. What should be the weighting of various evaluations?
3. How will fairness be monitored?

*Organize for Learning.* Once the content of learning has been formulated, it is imperative to think about how to make those knowledge, skills, attitudes, and beliefs accessible to students. Teaching methods should be selected on the basis of

how students can learn most effectively and efficiently what the concerned educational institution wants them to learn. Some questions to ask include:

1. How can the material be sequenced most effectively?
2. What will the students need to do to enable them to learn? (Will they need to talk, listen, argue, do experiments, write, compute, discuss, criticize, analyze, apply, synthesize or evaluate?)
3. Which teaching methods will work best for students to learn? (lecture, discussion, lab seminar, self study, cooperative learning group, problem session, etc.)
4. What additional material will facilitate student learning? (Would a course manual, a case study, a field trip, a laboratory exercise, a problem set, a question sheet, or a simulation be helpful?)
5. What needs to be included in the course outline?

### **Strengthening Public Administration Education**

In the light of the agenda set by the MDGs, how can schools of public administration make themselves more relevant? What must public administration students know? What should be taught? In sum, what is the appropriate program of instruction in support of the MDGs. Learning competencies in the study and practice of public administration need to emphasize the following:

1. Communicating MDGs to leaders, policymakers, service providers, and citizens;
2. Generating and sustaining policy and institutional commitment;
3. Building partnerships and networks;
4. Translating MDGs into specific actions that can be taken at the national, subnational, community, and family levels;
5. Identifying the process and implementation arrangements for achieving MDGs;
6. Benchmarking, monitoring, evaluating, and reporting progress on MDGs;
7. Generating and allocating resources for MDGs; and
8. Promoting and managing institutional and organizational development.

There are fundamental issues that need to be addressed in improving existing curriculum designs in public administration.

First, MDGs need to be integrated in academic curricula of public administration as expressed in a survey involving 102 participants of this Conference. The same survey reveals that participants had low levels of awareness of MDGs before attending the Conference and that they wanted to



learn tools and techniques for achieving MDGs. Table 7 shows the results of the said survey.

**Table 7. Survey Results on MDG and Curriculum**

Questions		Low	Scale				High	n
		1	2	3	4	5		
1. To what extent are MDGs integrated in your academic curriculum?	f	23	21	38	16	4	102	
	%	23	21	37	16	4	100	
2. How would you rate your level of awareness on MDGs before the conference?	f	14	22	35	22	9	102	
	%	14	22	34	22	9	100	
3. To what extent is your curriculum designed based on research and student learning needs?	f	3	14	42	39	4	102	
	%	3	14	41	38	4	100	
4. To what extent does your curriculum clearly identify the learning objectives?	f	5	8	35	43	10	101	
	%	5	8	34	42	10	99	
5. To what extent does your curriculum emphasize learning practical skills?	f	4	10	26	54	8	102	
	%	4	10	25	53	8	100	
6. How would you rate the readiness of your graduates to promote institutional/organizational change?	f	3	13	50	34	2	102	
	%	3	13	49	33	2	100	
7. Please rate your need to know tools and techniques to achieve MDGs?	f	1	4	24	41	32	102	
	%	1	4	24	40	31	100	

Source: Author's Research.

Second, curriculum development needs to be more systematic, research-based, and oriented towards addressing student learning needs. As a matter of practice and norm, the teacher has complete flexibility and discretion in what themes or topics to include in his/her course. The teaching methods, course references or readings list, and course requirements are likewise decided by the teacher. Previous course syllabi or study on the same subject may serve as guides in designing and delivering the course. There are no explicit guidelines or standards to follow in teaching the subjects. Institutional mechanisms for instructional supervision or peer review—which is key in ensuring quality and high academic standards—are lacking, if not non-existent. In the absence of written guidelines, newcomers may find it difficult to teach.

Academic curricula commonly lack efficient organization of subjects. In addition to the vague vertical and horizontal integration of subjects, the curriculum is unclear as to relative emphasis that needs to be given in an “agreed” set of topics (e.g., what topics should be discussed and how much time should be given in discussing each topic). The lack of clarity and specificity of learning objectives and outcomes can create problems in delivering instruction and assessing teaching/learning.

Third, most academic curricula in public administration tend to be subject-centered. The logical structure and sequence of courses and topics of academic curricula are greatly influenced by textbooks or references. Too often, curriculum designs have been oversimplified and reduced to a mere list of courses with the corresponding academic credits which must be taken over a prescribed period of time. Even worse, such list has been copied or drawn from schools perceived to be leaders in the field. Written and explicit curriculum guidelines are rather uncommon.

Being subject-centered, lessons tend to be fragmented to the extent that students find it difficult to appreciate the interconnectedness of the different subjects studied. The courses also generally tend to be detached from concerns and events of the real world. A study shows that graduates and students clamor for more practical examples (Mangahas 2004).

Degree programs are usually shaped by what the school wants to teach instead of what the students need to learn or what the larger community demands. Many programs of instruction favor passive concept of learning, which relies heavily on lectures and oral reports.

Fourth, curriculum objectives should be made more specific and measurable. Similarly, the learning objectives and outcomes should be clearly articulated. The contents and instructional strategies will, therefore, be organized around the desired learning objectives and outcomes. The statement of objectives and outcomes also serves as the reference points to measure

learning. The desired curriculum must be properly disseminated with adequate guidelines and standards to implement it.

In a recent curriculum study, content analysis of course syllabi indicates varying interpretations of public administration courses among the faculty members (Mangahas 2004). Course requirements for the same subjects vary according to the teacher. The study also points out wide variations in the number and emphasis of course topics or sessions for a course being taught by different teachers. Teaching and learning inputs similarly vary.

Issues have, therefore, been raised regarding the validity and fairness of exam questions during the examinations. Summative and formative forms of evaluating learning, such as examinations should be congruent with what has been taught to the students. The quality of current degree programs in public administration can be further strengthened by putting in place reasonable consistency and objective standards in providing teaching/learning inputs. Improving the curriculum is absolutely a step towards the right direction in aiming to provide quality education in public administration and governance.

Given the challenges facing public administration education in the country, the Association of Schools of Public Administration in the Philippines (ASPAP) should be able to provide leadership in standards setting, curriculum development, and measurement of learning outcomes.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>These reforms were undertaken during the administrations of Presidents Manuel Roxas, Elpidio Quirino, Ramon Magsaysay, Ferdinand Marcos, and Corazon Aquino.

<sup>2</sup>Although very often used interchangeably, the terms "institutions" and "organizations" are different. The former establishes the so-called "rules of the game" wherein the latter operate; organizations are situated within the broader institutional context.

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## **Community Organizing and Governance**

OSCAR P. FERRER\*

*The Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 paved the way for broader people's participation in local governance. It gave the local government units (LGUs) power to organize themselves to become self-reliant communities and to realize the essence of community governance. This article highlights the significance of community participation and governance in attaining genuine people-oriented development. It illustrates community governance as a critical element in effective Public Administration in contemporary period. This is shown through an analysis of selected communities where their experiences in community organizing are analyzed and their perceptions on the role of LGUs vis-à-vis LGC are presented. There are two study areas in this article, with two case samples per area: people-initiated (Aeta and KINIPAN's case) and LGU-initiated (Balanga City and General Nakar) community organizing efforts. A cross-comparison in terms of community leadership, ownership, and empowerment are also tackled to determine the general trends that can be gleaned from the cases.*

### **Introduction**

For decades, the varied experiences in community organizing work have shown that, given the necessary training and support, people belonging to the basic sectors do have the capacity to assume leadership and management responsibilities. They can develop both the technical skills and the organizational maturity to assume direct administration of their own governments. With the creation of an internal environment facilitating organized efforts to accomplish group goals, the "art of getting things done through people," has been refined through the years. Community organizing, especially in the countryside, has proven to be indispensable in rallying the people for community action.

The historical enactment of the 1991 *Local Government Code* (LGC) provided impetus for broader people's participation in community management and development processes. Under the LGC, local

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government units "shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals." The roles of the local government unit (LGU) as well as members of the local community take a bigger step forward. The LGC gives the communities, especially their LGUs, the power to generate their own resources, set their goals and actions, plan and manage their own development programs and services to help people become self-reliant, get organized and collectively pursue development. Since the LGU is closer to the people than the national government, it can best respond to the community needs and better deliver social services.

The advocacy for people's participation, amidst bureaucratic overlays and budgetary limitations, has encouraged more and more people to rely on their own local potential and resources. Community participation has since become the framework for national development. Based on people's experience, history has proven that cooperation, community-based, communal undertakings, and community participation are the key to real and authentic change and development process.

### **Community Governance in Practice**

*The joint use of professional outsiders' and rural people's knowledge, skills and resources may be the best way forward, combining the precise observations, measurements and experiments of modern science over a narrower and briefer range with the local knowledge and more extensive and continuous observations of rural informants and experimenters. There is reversal of attitudes towards the poor, a reversal of management styles and systems. Outsiders will rely on the knowledge of the poor and utilize such knowledge in joint problem-analysis and problem-solving, to become enablers rather than providers...enabling those who are variously poor, powerless and remote to control more of their lives, to have more choice, and to demand and use more services.*

Chambers, 1983

This article presents a case analysis of selected communities which involves two study areas with two case samples per area: one people-initiated and the other LGU-initiated. There are two cases which are people-initiated (Aeta and KINIPAN) and another two cases which are LGU-initiated efforts in community governance (Balanga City and General Nakar). This article aims to answer the following questions: (1) What are the experiences of selected community governance?; (2) what general trends can be gleaned from these different cases?; (3) what are the scope

and dynamics of community governance?; (4) how is it operationalized in terms of leadership, ownership and empowerment?; and (5) what theoretical constructs and recommendations can be derived from the research to strengthen the community-based approach in public administration and governance?

The article is both descriptive and analytical. The descriptive approach aims to generate trends and enrich existing theories. The experiences of the four case samples were examined in terms of principles, processes and methods in community governance. Variables were analyzed based on situation-specific data and on general trends or patterns from the four cases. Case analysis was the basic methodology used, combining different data gathering methods and processed through triangulation to generate maximum information.

The research used participatory approaches-cum-advocacy-learning methods: consultations/workshops, joint theorizing with key respondents, community integration, group discussions, semi-structured interviews, and review of documents. Data gathering was guided by non-traditional approach, not limited by set categories based on existing theories.

Principles of participatory action research (PAR) guided the whole research process. The PAR approach contends that the people "being researched on" should participate actively in defining the scope, methods and data for the research, including the community action, which can result from the research. The people are not mere objects, but also subjects of the research activity. In this context, the research becomes a learning process for both researcher and subject. This aims to be part of the empowering experience for those who are involved; and to enhance the quality of the data by viewing these from the "optics" of the majority (who are often marginalized in society).

Community development utilizes research tools for development and it has always meant participatory research (Sophie Laws 2003). Participatory tools in knowledge generation aim to transform and empower. The goal of knowledge generation is liberation and empowerment. Since women comprise the majority of the population, feminist research is always a departure from the positivist and male epistemological stance. The latter is defined as "men's power to create the world from their own point of view, and this creation becomes the truth, although it is gendered and partial" (Guerrero 1997); thus, community participation is obviously an important element in development work, in social movements and their sustainability.

Inasmuch as there will be a conscious effort to reflect the local "color" or "flavor" of the dynamics among the four case samples, the people's own words and articulations were noted so that their world view will be reflected in the study.

Participatory approach was used in this paper through:

- Consultations with local leaders prior to entry into the study areas;
- Refinement and operationalization of the research objectives, methods and instruments based on their suggestions;
- Actual data gathering with the assistance of key contact persons;
- Preliminary data analysis during validation workshops;
- Using the research results as basis of follow-up community action and consolidation of local core organizations of governance.

#### *Experience in Community Governance*


For this study, experiences of four communities in governance, which are synthesized, unified and woven through the use of Community Organizing, were selected based on the following criteria:

- Two cases were people-initiated (Aeta and KINIPAN) and two cases were LGU-initiated efforts in community governance (Balanga and Nakar).
- Presence of local members and community organizations that facilitated the conduct of the research.
- Interest and willingness of the local group to participate in the research.
- Availability of related documents and materials.
- The researcher was involved in specific aspects of the process and therefore gained familiarity with the case and the local prime movers.
- Accessibility of the area, physically or otherwise.



The two study areas model two case samples per area: people-initiated and LGU-initiated. The area profiles are discussed below.

**Figure 1. Study Area Maps**



**Study Area 1: Balanga and Vicinity.** Balanga is located at the eastern part of the province of Bataan and lies in the southwestern part of Central Luzon. It is bounded inland by the town of Pilar in the South, Abucay in the North, the town of Bagac and Morong in the West, and Manila Bay in the East. It is considered as a center of education and trade in the province. It shows a high literacy rate of about 89 percent. It is host to the majority of the educational institutions in Bataan, of all levels of education. Being the center of trade and commerce and seat of government in Bataan, is considered as the leading town and is expected to create job opportunities for the Balanga residents

The Congress, through the approval of its constituents in a referendum, created Balanga into a component city of the province of Bataan on 30 December 2000 by virtue of Republic Act No. 8984, known as the "Charter of the City of Balanga."

Through a multisectoral consultative process, the people of Balanga crafted the *Medium Term Development Plan* (MTDP) that serves as their blueprint of development for the years 2002 to 2007. With local autonomy and people's decisiveness as indicative norms for local governance, the people have been indispensably mobilized and encouraged to participate actively in the formulation of the city's vision. This is a totally new process, wherein the people and the city as a whole initiated organizing and mobilization process for their own governance; thus, it is chosen as a model case.

A general assembly of people's organizations (POs), nongovernment organizations (NGOs) together with the different department heads and key officials of the city, barangay officials, head of educational institutions, private sectors and representatives of business community have formulated the vision-mission statements of the city, identified programs and projects per sector, and recommended strategies on how these programs and projects would be implemented. The active participation of Balanguenos and the consultative process have evolved a new vision for the City:

*Isang Lungsod na Lubos ang Pananalig sa Diyos, Maunlad at Maipagmamalaki: Mapayapa, Nagkakaisa, May Sapat na Hanapbuhay at Edukasyon, Makakalikasan, May Mamamayang Aktibong Lumalahok Sa Pinagkakatiwalaang Pamahalaan at Handa sa Hamon ng Makabagong Panahon.*

(A City fully believing in God, Progressive and Esteemed: Peaceful, United, with Adequate Employment and Education, Environment-Friendly, with Citizens Actively Participating in A Trustworthy Government and Abreast with the Challenges of the Modern Times.)

The Camatchiles' Aetas were chosen for this study because of their proximity and similarity to the Bataan *sitz-im-leben* (situation in life). Moreover, their state of development through solid organizing and political development as a race is a very clear example of community governance, which largely contributes to this study. The Aetas live at the mountain boundaries of Floridablanca, Pampanga and Dinalupihan, Bataan. Moreover, they have achieved relative gains through their people's organization in advancing a genuine pro-Aeta development.

*Study Area 2: Municipality of General Nakar, Quezon.* General Nakar in Quezon has long been associated with active people's organizations with progressive thinking, high level of socio-political awareness and concern for their rich natural resources. It is often said that the town is an ideal breeding ground for leaders. This is one significant reason why it is a good case model.

From the 70s to the present, one could see the progression of people's movement in Gen. Nakar. The story of people's movement in Gen. Nakar is a historical journey of people organizing themselves for collective consciousness and strength to eventual mainstreaming into the political arena and seizing political power. In the beginning, the people were organized through the formation of Basic Christian Communities-Community Organizing (BCC-CO). This evolved later into community organizing for governance.

In the local election of 2001, the people's organization in Gen. Nakar was successful in installing into office one of their leaders in the mayoralty post. This milestone in the history of the people's movement in Gen. Nakar ushered a new phase in their organizing and political mainstreaming efforts. Their victory was full of optimism for they believed it would raise the ante in pro-people development of the municipality.

Against this backdrop, the new leadership embarked on a development planning capturing the true aspirations of the people of Gen. Nakar. With the assistance of the University of the Philippines Office of the Pahinungod, University of the Philippines Educational Research Program-Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP ERP-CIDS), and the University of the Philippines College of Social Work and Community Development (UP-CSWCD), and ushered by the Local Government Code of 1991 to create its own development plan, a comprehensive plan for the whole municipality was drawn and formulated and it came to be known as the *Five-Year Development Plan (FYDP)* of Gen. Nakar.

Moving around the theme *Sa Pag-unlad ng Bayan, Tayo ay Maghatuwang* (For the town's progress, we are partners), the municipality has envisioned an empowering governance; thus, it has encouraged active involvement of the people in a process-oriented plan. It has also involved a women's organization known as KINIPAN (Kilos ng Nagkakaisang Ina Para sa Kabuuang Pag-unlad ng Heneral Nakar) as an arm in community health care and welfare development. KINIPAN advocates alternative, inexpensive health and medical care for the people. It serves as an adjunct committee managing health services for the whole community.

The Five Year Development Plan (FYDP) can be considered as a symbolic zenith of the saga of revolutionaries as a result of a long arduous process of organizing that has superemphasized analysis of the objective situation of barangays and stakeholders leading to the three-day comprehensive planning. Through the local leadership, with a tradition of the revolutionary movement's methods and style of work, various stakeholders and institutions willingly participated and gave support to the FYDP processes. The local chief executive then sought to concretize the people's agenda and his vision of concerted action with the dynamic involvement of the people through the FYDP.

For each of the areas, 15 to 20 key informants were interviewed composed of municipal officials, leaders of communities and community organizations and NGO representatives who have worked with the local community, and other key persons from community institutions and agencies (e.g. schools, church, development agencies or line agencies).

*Focused Group Discussions* (FGDs) were conducted in each study area, with ten to twelve participants in each session. The FGDs were undertaken at different stages of the research: upon entry, for data gathering, and for data validation. All the participants were chosen based on: (1) knowledge about the research subject; (2) availability during data gathering period; (3) representation from different groups or stakeholders; and (4) willingness to be part of the research.

*Documents review* served as a written source which validated the information gathered through direct participant integration and participation, and from different respondents.

*Case studies* of the different life stories of stakeholders in relation to development endeavors and community organizing and mobilization, and their aspiration to be self-reliant and autonomous were utilized as illustrations of the age-old tradition of endogenous community governance.

*Triangulation method* is the most updated social science technique that abandons the search for a single perfect method in data gathering. It looks at things from a number of angles, using a variety of techniques (Sophie Laws 2003). In this research, triangulation established trends and common strategies and processes, which were summed up into basic principles in community governance.

#### *Research Procedures*

Multiple data gathering methods were used during the three research phases: (1) preparatory phase; (2) case study phase, and (3) data

analysis and validation phase. Both primary and secondary data sources were used.

*Preparatory Phase.* Consultations with groups from the study areas guided the operationalization of the methodology. Case profiles of these areas were made. This helped in developing the research instruments.

*Case Study Phase.* Prior to data gathering in the three remaining cases, research activities were pre-tested in the pilot case. Based on the case study outline, different data gathering methods were used to get the following information:

1. Documentary analysis (reports, minutes of meetings, action plan, evaluation results, etc.);
2. Interviews with key informants (community leaders, GO, NGO staff, representatives from local institutions);
3. Process observation: Data gathered from the researcher's interaction with local residents and observation of actual community activities;
4. Focused group discussion (FGD): Results of group discussions based on a defined agenda; and
5. Community stories and community integration methods: Informal methods used for data gathering during social gatherings, interpersonal interaction and other related activities.

*Data Analysis and Validation Phase.* Guided by the concepts outlined in the literature and the analytical framework, preliminary categorization and analysis were made. Refinements and deepening of the meanings, interpretations and relations were enhanced through FGDs with selected participants. Analyses of trends were validated through consultations.

#### *Research Variables, Methods and Instruments*

Research data were generally qualitative. Many of the questions were open-ended. The instruments for data gathering tended to overlap in terms of questions for two reasons: for internal validation and for more in-depth responses. Table 1 outlines the major variables and the research methods with the corresponding instruments.

**Table 1. Research Variables, Methods, and Instruments**

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Methods</i>	<i>Instruments</i>
1. Situational Context - Sociopolitical - Economic - History of the Community	Documents, Observations	Case Study Outline Observation Guide
2. Community Leadership - Shared Vision - Community Participation - Cooperative Behaviors - Community Advocacy	Interviews Integration Observation FGDs	Interview Schedule Case Study Outline Observation Guide Discussion Guide
3. Community Ownership - Sense of Belonging - Sense of Caring - Sense of Place - Value Diversity	Interviews Integration Observation FGDs	Interview Schedule Case Study Outline Observation Guide Discussion Guide
4. Community Empowerment - Access and Control - Power Sharing - Decisionmaking	Interviews FGDs Document	Interview Schedule Discussion Guide Case Study Outline

### **Encompassing Salient Elements: Trends and Some Finer Points**

Whether by human design or induced by concrete realities needing a sense of urgency, people or groups commonly manage their communities based on their aspirations for human security and prospects for a sustainable future. The four cases are drawn from two different local settings, with each having a unique and particular *sitz-im-leben* (situation in life). Within each area are case samples that are categorized as LGU-initiated and people-initiated. These are juxtaposed for better comparison, clearer analysis and greater understanding. Gleaned from the four cases, significant elements and dynamics stand out, which are very good principles and lessons in humanity's forward movement to higher civilization. This is shown here, in some detail, through a comparative matrix relating the cases two times in a row: (1) City of Balanga and the Camatchiles Aetas, (2) General Nakar and Women's KINIPAN, and (3) cross comparison among the four cases.

Table 2 shows, in a certain way, comparative key points, which clearly indicate different expressions of leadership, ownership and empowerment patterns in the selected communities. These key points also adhere to the common principle espoused in participatory governance: the centrality of people, their interest and agenda for change and development. The considerable attention given to them and their initiative in taking the cudgels in orchestrating community life and dynamics, adheres to the *a priori* aspect of human development—community power. This is one clear trend, despite the differences in the *sitz-im-leben*, level of civilization and social, political and economic order.

### Comparison between the City of Balanga and the Aeta Community

#### *On Leadership*

*Shared Vision.* Both the City of Balanga and the Aeta community share the vision of fostering, advancing and facilitating the development of the potentials of humans, a movement forward or progress for the entire community and its constituency; however, they may differ on who has initiated the act of leading and on the indicators of such progress. For the city, it is evidently the LGU since it is mandated to help enable the people chart their own destiny. On the Aeta side, the tradition handed down from generation to generation to care for and nurture the land, the life base, takes prime focus. In fact, neglect of such can be cause for alienation and discrimination in the community. It is often said that among Aetas and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) in general, no one has any right to own the land. It belongs to everybody. It long existed before humanity and will outlive humans. Further, the Council of the Wise or Elders desires that this wisdom of valuing the land (so called "ancestral land") be imbibed by the other members, and becomes the anchor point for everyone. It is immanent in the human design. It is more apt in theological terms, "from dust to dust we shall return," and celebrated consistently by the faithful on Ash Wednesday. This analytical trend is very profound which should really guide all humans on planet earth in governance or in managing resources.

*Community Participation.* Community mobilization and organizing are employed to encourage people's participation. Both lead groups, despite their differences on where they are coming from, involve the people in all possible creative avenues for participation. The Balanga City, whose leadership comes from the elite and mandated through the electoral system, organizes and mobilizes the people through a general assembly for

**Table 2. Community Governance in Balanga City and Camatchiles Aetas**

<i>Community Governance Indicators</i>	<i>Balanga City</i>	<i>Camatchiles Aetas</i>
<b>Leadership</b>		
Shared vision	Consensus about city's goals, future direction, and overall progress and development	Immanent indigenous nurture and care of ancestral domain
Community participation	Elected and mandated class leadership organizing for efficient community delivery mechanisms	Council of Elders/Wise Barangay Council People's Organization
Cooperative behaviors	LGU initiated community activities and planning for overall development	Collective action and organizing for community welfare and nurture of land
Community advocacy	Convergence to respond to citizens' need and promote Tech city vision	Focused on respect of cultural heritage, recognition and self-determination
<b>Ownership</b>		
Sense of Belonging	People are proud and identify with the city and its planned direction and vision	Strong kinship from band, clan to settlement. Communal and ethnic identity
Sense of Caring	LGU expresses foremost concern for the people	Utmost concern for ethnic or clannish interest – LAND
Sense of Place	The city as secured, progressive and uniting place to live in	Definite locus bound by culture; contrasted to lowland
Value Diversity	Mix of multistakeholders unites and willing to implement vision	Respect for identity, cultural tradition and other members
<b>Empowerment</b>		
Access and Control	LGU offers city benefits to stakeholders, access to welfare	Access to ancestral lands, land rights, protection of "gasak"
Power Sharing	Hierarchy involves people, encourages responsible citizenry	Coordination among Elders, Barangay Council and PO
Decisionmaking	LGU employs General Assembly of POs, NGOs, City officials, personnel, private sector, departments and agencies	Convene traditional and formal leadership, and people's representatives for concerted effort and action



collective deliberation. The Aetas, premised on the internalization and upholding of the cultural heritage and traditional wisdom as its social norm, implicitly allow the participation of the community members. It is upheld that the individual rights are justified by their involvement in care and nurture of land, i.e., "no one has any right to harvest unless they have tilled the land." Whichever form of organization exists (Council of the Wise, Barangay Council or PO), the bottom line is the involvement of the people themselves and the promotion of their agenda. Indeed, this trend is another substantive pattern that foreshadows how people govern and manage themselves as a race, and those that belong to it. Significantly, it employs a social technology to fulfill people's involvement, which is an inevitable requisite for development.

*Cooperative Behavior.* It is clear that the people, through the encouragement of their leaders or through ethnicity, willingly commit their time and contribute to promote the well being of the community. With the LGU enjoining the citizenry to plan and implement a development agenda, people have formulated a community vision, which they own, identify with and are proud of. It borders on ensuring meaningful progress for the City. They are one and united on the goal, which is based on their articulated needs gathered directly from them through a community survey. The enabling role of the LGU facilitates the unison behavior of the people.

On the other hand, the Aetas' uniform understanding of ethnic belonging and cultural heritage draws voluntary acts and well-meaning initiatives from the community members. Self-determination, anchored on the ancestral land, is so encompassing that it is almost always a social responsibility to do, even without inducement or pressure. That norm is irrevocable and inevitable, once one is within the parameter of the indigenous community. The cooperative behavior is quite intrinsic within the culture; thus, it is almost automatic and ordinary to live it. There apparently seems to be no other way.

*Community Advocacy.* Reinforcing the trends cited above, both case samples exemplify how people are mobilized for convergence's sake, in order to espouse the implementation of both agenda. The general perspective of achieving the people's agenda is common to both cases. They may only differ in the theoretical or ideological underpinning. While the City's citizens are encouraged to be involved so that their consensual agenda for progress and technological advancement would be accomplished, the Aetas are bonded by one objective: the respect, promotion and self-rule of their ancestral domain.

*On Ownership*

*Sense of Belonging.* There is a general pattern of consensus that bonds both communities. While the people proudly identify themselves with the City of Balanga and its vision-mission, the Aetas are bonded by a strong kinship from band clan to settlement and still rooted in their communal and ethnic identity. The people of Balanga support their government because they are involved in its planning. They feel a connectedness to the aspiration of the city, thus it is easy to mobilize them and make them agree on the *Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP)*. One decisive element that realizes this is the articulation of their needs, problems and aspiration. The act of verbalizing and raising the people's reality per se is already an opportunity that lets people identify with the initiative. On the other hand, the marginalization of the Aetas because of their ethnic aspiration, communal issues and their quest for ancestral domain already defines their identity and their belongingness. This predicament itself binds them as one community and their aspirations for emancipation and self-rule are founded on this. That serves now as their anchor point in life, and the clamor to achieve that aspiration is the bond that unites all of them. Obviously, this kind of bond and identity is needed to ensure the important element of unity and cooperation towards meaningful participation. It is obvious that people can not be moved to action if they do not identify with the activity and do not identify with the agenda. Meaningful participation prescribes that people identify with the activity.

*Sense of Caring.* Both the City of Balanga and the Aetas emerge as caring and nurturing communities. The LGU is primarily concerned with the welfare of its constituents. This is manifested in the articulation of their problems and the promotion of their well being. The LGU is concerned foremost with their needs and how to address them, thus the need to survey and collate them as baseline data for the City's MTDP. The resulting vision pays attention then to their community issues such as employment, health, education, peace and order among others. The LGU's concern for the people's welfare allows itself to express its nurturing and caring role vis-à-vis governance, thus getting people's acceptance. On the other hand, the Aetas, in whatever form of organization, are extra keen and quite particular about their clan or community's interest where each is expected to contribute his/her share to its welfare and development. They care about both their physical and social aspects. They share work and goods and help each other in times of needs. The Elders, known as wise and informed, help in collective resolution of disputes and bickering. They are normally expected to be fair, good natured, and hospitable. Their strife and tribulations are not just for aggrandizement nor for the special

elite, but for the whole community. There is an anecdote that says, "if one brings food to the community, everyone benefits from it; even with a small can of sardines, everybody should taste it. So pour more water into the pan, to benefit everyone: *sabaw ng magkakapit-bahay* (soup for the entire neighborhood)." This is even extended in tribal conflicts where the enemy of one is the enemy of every member of the community or clan. This illustrates the criterion for meaningful governance, which is the essence of egalitarian governance as contrasted to democratic governance.

*Value and Respect for Diversity.* It is important to note that both cases manifest acceptance and respect for the multistakeholders interest and the plurality of perspectives of the community members. It is one expression that communities are not monolithic; harmony and respect for their diversity are the treasures of the community.

In classical Marxist parlance, which is the dominant influence in community organizing, there is a contradiction between the grassroots class and the capitalist class. That system perpetuates the oppression of the masses by the landlord and business elites; however, the convergence effort that is introduced by the city harmonizes the diverse interests and the plurality of perspectives of the Balanguenos. It is an attempt to usher development through multistakeholder participation, respecting and upholding the idea that each has a contribution to make. How it can be sustained depends largely on the enabling role of the LGU. It strikes at the crux of governance, which is to manage diverse peoples and their contradictory systems. It offers the paradoxical paradigm that economic development is catalyzed by capital.

On the other hand, the Aetas are always diverse and too often pluralist, depending on their loyalties. Each group has particular loyalties or maintains its association depending on the prestige of the clan. This is quite understandable, especially with subsistence economies. People in a subsistence locus are easily swayed into other loyalties, depending on who offers the best benefit. During the Martial Law era, which almost eroded the IPs' indigenous governance, they maintained the Council of Elders. It is astounding how they kept the balance, with the *kapitan*<sup>1</sup> serving as the convenor of the Council of Elders. Oftentimes, the *barangay*<sup>2</sup> duplicated or overlapped with the council's role, but that was always resolved through dialogue or *areglo*<sup>3</sup>. If the *kapitan* is younger than the members of the Council, tensions often arise. But with respect for multi-diversity and value for the individual's place in the clan or community, everything can be resolved, even with the worst tensions. The advice and the wisdom of the Elders, which promote value and regard for the individual's life are often respected and upheld. Life is sacred for the IPs; thus, everyone is

accepted for whoever s/he is. This is one great trend that inspires how governance can be exercised in contemporary times.

### *On Empowerment*

*Access and Control.* Access and control to resources take central focus in both cases. Prevailing social order and system is wanting in this line. At most, the country's land in almost all the districts in our country allows access, but not control. This is thus the platform for the long-overdue agrarian reform. Balanga City is verbose about the goal of the *MTDP: May Sapat na Hanapbuhay at Edukasyon* (There is enough livelihood and education). The LGU identified programs and projects per sector, which will address the needs of the people. In other words, there is a relative sincerity on the part of the LGU to allow access and control, not only of resources, but also of the welfare and benefits to its people.

More enriching is the Aeta case where access to land and ancestral domain is a basic right of every member. The community respects the *gasak*<sup>4</sup>, since their connection to the land is their life's meaning; otherwise it will be a reason for alienation or discrimination. There are several ways of accessing and controlling the land. One example is if a family finds a piece of land and fences it with enduring trees, it is already considered a seal of their ownership of the land. This oral and unwritten tradition does not only allow access, it is a practice upheld and respected in their culture. Further, the system of planting is migratory and nomadic. Everyone transfers after harvest; however, there is a high respect for whosoever has any imprint on the land, by virtue of the unwritten law of immanent right by "first plant, first serve policy." Whatever the mode of planting, it is inherent and non-negotiable that only the ones that planted have the sole right of harvest from the land they have tilled. This practice is entirely inconsistent with the prevailing system of democratic governance, which allows access and control only through land titles. This system has only allowed the moneyed-class and the powerful elite to take control of the resources, particularly of the land.

*Power Sharing.* In both cases, the adage that "power emanates from the people" is lucidly proven. The LGU of Balanga City, despite its hierarchical order, opts to delegate great responsibility to the people. It convenes a general assembly of stakeholders, consults the community to articulate their needs, and enjoins all of them to formulate the vision of the City and decide on how the City can be managed. In the context of bureaucratic management, the executive department takes charge of the execution and implementation. This situation is unlike in POs where

committees are mandated to implement; thus, it is guided by what the people have formed as the City Development Plan. Power, which is a task and a responsibility, is referred to the people, so that they confirm it in return through the City Plan.

The Aeta case is simpler. Power is not a monopoly. Since the Aetas are flexible to any new influence, they often accommodate almost all new introductions. It does not bring any harm anyway. They only resist the negative influences, especially if they are disadvantageous to the community and its culture. This is the reason why there are all sorts of organizations in the Aeta community: the Council of Elders, the Barangay Council, and the POs influenced by the NGOs and civil society. The community power is not a failure, instead it is strengthened because all of these three centers seek consensus and unanimously take one direction for the community. Their coordinative effort is a landmark expression of power sharing and delegation. The target stakeholders for the exercise of power do not suffer, but instead benefit from the dialogue and coordination. It symbolizes multiagency or interdepartmental convergence. It is power exercised and delegated, not centralized or constricted in the hands of one, thus, contributing to the broader scope of handling problems and realities.

The LGC appeared to be providential because it apparently affirmed the Aetas' value for participation and collectivity. There are two main realization points which affirm the theme of this study: (1) that the Aetas have really practiced egalitarian governance and thus it is being affirmed with the LGC and (2) that there is a standard for community management in any given space and time to facilitate social harmony and order, and this is the LGU-prescribed powers; thus, it is a great challenge to constantly rethink and renew such LGU-prescribed powers in order to be attuned and sensitive to the needs of the time and of the people. This would make the latter at par with the ideal and would reinforce that sense of caring aspect of community governance; hence, theorizing and continuous theory-construct are demanded. This is the attempt of this study, thus a juxtaposition—to draw lessons from the people and their community praxis and add to the existing governance praxis.

The synthesis would be a meaningful and relevant learning for contemporary governance. This is very appropriate because there are no static things, and static praxis is very disempowering and alienating. Perhaps what prompted Senátor Aquilino Q. Pimentel in drafting the *Local Government Code* of 1991 was his disenchantment with the way the government worked during his time; for instance, he had to wait or go to Manila just to secure permits. He drafted the *Code* to respond to the

needs of the contemporary society and make it more relevant to any governance endeavors. There are many ways of being creative and innovative, rather than just live in stasis or fixation. That is how power sharing operates. It is very creative and innovative.

*Decisionmaking.* Concerted efforts at legislation, policy decisions and program development characterize participatory decisionmaking. Both of the cases express these participatory characteristics. They differ in process and form, but the nature of decisionmaking is very much focused on achieving the people's agenda. The decisionmaking activity gravitates around the community's agenda and interest. Needless to mention, the effort to have multilateral decision approach is to arrive at a concerted effort, unified analysis, and coordinated action. These objective variables are, incidentally, the general objectives of Community Organizing (CO). In effect, the decisionmaking process is a CO element, and thus leads to upholding and promotion of community's welfare and development. CO is a problem-solving process and strategy geared at addressing community issues and needs. This is excellently pictured in the City's experience in organizing and mobilizing the people for concerted effort and unified community action as expressed in their City Vision.

With the Aeta experience, convening the Elders, the Barangay Council and the PO representative is often focused on a concerted effort. It therefore diffuses any chance of division. Indeed, it is living up to the truest sense of community organizing aimed at unity. This latter act is common and widespread in a centralized authority and elite decisionmaking. It is, therefore, a very good lesson that can be integrated later into our new construct for governance and community management.

Table 3 shows a comparison between General Nakar and the Women's KINIPAN. It presents detailed processes and recurrent philosophical themes that symbolize the fundamental principles of community organizing. It vividly illustrates what is community organizing for community governance, including the niche of the integrators and rightful managers of community resources, the women. It puts the latter in proper place, not only in the development of families and communities, but it also fits their design and role in the development of the human race. Their community management role is so important that its absence can definitely dissipate the total development of the human potential and the flourishing of planet earth as a whole.

**Table 3. Community Governance in General Nakar and Women's KINIPAN**

<i>Community Governance Indicators</i>	<i>General Nakar</i>	<i>Women's KINIPAN</i>
<b>Leadership</b>		
Shared Vision	Oneness of all constituents, sectors and stakeholders on vision	Unity of the women on the goal of family and community nurturing and care
Community Participation	General Assembly of all sectors, stakeholders, formulating medium term plan and implementation by committee	Women's involvement in productive roles and community management aside from reproductive role
Cooperative Behaviors	Sectoral initiative and responsibility addressing community needs, organizing for effective welfare delivery, LGU leadership handling political need	Women's thrust on production and marketing of health needs, gender-responsive livelihood and organizing for community welfare and health services
Community Advocacy	Multisectoral action on implementation of municipal development program	Gender-specific role of women in community management
<b>Ownership</b>		
Sense of Belonging	People promote and uphold their concern for the town as their commitment to the community	Advancement of strategic women's niche in community life and processes
Sense of Caring	Organizing people to care and be concerned about natural base and protection of natural resources which are their life and meaning	Strong concern for unbiased community role, place and responsibility of women especially in community well-being
Sense of Place	Their symbolic anchor is the town, thus the need to develop it	The community is the realm and definite space of women
Value Diversity	Multisectoral commitment to general welfare of town's people	Women's equal support and protection for community life
<b>Empowerment</b>		
Access and Control	Attempts at egalitarian access to community and LGU resources, protection against intruders	Development and protection of community resources and provision of welfare resources
Power Sharing	Organizing multisectoral participation in policy formulation, through the GA	Promotion of equal power and sharing of responsibility
Decisionmaking	Attempts at egalitarian ways of policy decisionmaking	Fosters everybody's contribution and participation

## Comparison Between General Nakar LGU and KINIPAN

### *On Leadership*

*Shared Vision.* Organized groups are always systematic and very particular about their basis of unity and their unity of vision. Both the LGU and the Women's KINIPAN in General Nakar show, in the clearest possible way, their perspective and vision. This is anticipated since the locality is a bulwark of progressive organizations and a stronghold of the armed revolutionaries resisting incursions by the States' Armed Forces. It is a place where activists may have stayed before their disappearances. In other words, organized action and unity in vision are ordinary and common traits among stakeholders in this community. The classic vision-mission-goal (VMG) cliché has become a daily turf and indispensable in their community actions. VMG guides all their mobilizations and programs of action. The shared vision of the LGU of General Nakar is epitomized in the *MTDP*. The strategies and programs, including their organizational structure for implementation, are well guided by the vision *Sa Pag-unlad ng Bayan, Tayo ay Magkatuwang* (For the Development of the Community, We are Partners). This vision serves as the platform of governance.

The Women's KINIPAN is even more strategic in its vision, *Kilos ng Nagkakaisang Ina Para sa Kabuuang Pag-unlad ng Heneral Nakar*. (Unified Action of Concerned Women for the Overall Development of General Nakar). The acronym's definition is the articulation of the vision which already firmed up their role and position in the overall development of the community. They are also clear and unified on the concrete indicators of such perspective, the unity of the women on the goal for family and community nurturing and care. Moreover, they also wish to promote more liberating strategies in health and medical care. This is noteworthy because it unfolds the women's place and defines perfectly their role on planet earth. In other words, life is akin to their potentials, thus humans' life base is intimately referred to as "Mother Nature." Mindful of this, the perspective for community management and governance is encompassing, and not just limited to one section of the human race. Gendered participation in community management illumines how development should be undertaken, i.e., nurturing and caring.

*Community Participation.* The successes of programs are dependent on the stakeholders; the active involvement of the community relies very much on strategic planning of the implementation. Both LGU and the Women's KINIPAN use this as standard operating procedure. The LGU



made sure that all the different sectors and multistakeholders are present during the general assembly to formulate the *MTDP*. Prior to that, a community appraisal had been conducted with the different sectors to establish the baseline data on the needs and issues of the community and to ensure that the stakeholders' agenda and perspectives are captured in the platform of governance of the town.

The Women's KINIPAN is more particular, singular of its niche in community processes. It is specifically involved in the primary concern of the community, which is health and medical care. The members promote available local materials that are affordable yet effective, as against foreign multinational pharmaceuticals that are more expensive. This endeavor is found to be very effective since the community patronizes it.

Unfortunately, the scale of production is smaller for many reasons. To offset this, medical care and health education provide practical and alternative ways of addressing needs and problems that can be done at home. It is one step in decentralizing production. It allows the households to be more proactive in applying preventive health care, rather than be dependent on health centers and be limited to curative medicine.

So the women, the real integrators of community resources, are encouraged to involve themselves not only in reproductive roles, but more strategically in productive roles and community management activities. Participation in policy assemblies like the Barangay Council is a responsibility they value and prioritize. In this way, they are able to create opportunities for strategic and gender-responsive policies.

*Cooperative Behaviors.* It is easy to undertake collective endeavors among those who have been socialized or accustomed to organized action and concerted efforts. In fact, mobilizing the different sectors of the town in a communal or *bayanihan*<sup>5</sup> way is common nature. The LGU has enjoined sectoral initiatives and social responsibility to address community needs. It has organized the different sectors for effective service delivery. In that way, the LGU leadership is freed from many technical and menial tasks, and thus is able to primarily handle political needs.

The women have tried to balance all their other multiple burdens at home and in the community. Aside from economic production activities to augment family income, they are able to work as an organization for the production of organic and herbal medicines, thus shooting two birds with one stone: caring for the community and at the same time generating economic opportunity from the sale of herbal and organic medicines. It is

in a way a very good approach in gender-responsive livelihood cum organizing for community welfare and health services.

In other words, the people have not failed in collectivity for community welfare. This was very evident in the November 2004 disaster.<sup>6</sup> They were on their own to fend for their families and relatives, until external aid came several days later; but they had no qualms. Instead, they immediately picked shovels and materials to clean up and rise from the mud. It is evident how everyone, particularly the women, were fully involved in the relief and eventually in the rehabilitation efforts. It clearly illustrated gender participation in rebuilding lives in the disaster communities. This is a recurring theme especially during times of disaster.

Who are most displaced when disaster strikes, the women, the children or the men? Disaster preparedness and management, and especially community governance, stand to benefit from discourses on women in disaster areas.

*Community Advocacy.* At the onset, the people in General Nakar are jubilant because their ideological agenda have finally been mainstreamed. Women are provided access to municipal politics. So, the implementation of the municipality's development agenda is itself the crux of their social advocacy: a government responding to the basic needs of the different sectors, contrary to red tapes and bureaucratic layers that are inefficient. This has served as an inspiration, creating vibrant involvement of the different sectors. In fact, they boast of walking long hours and miles on the road including foot and hanging bridges to reach far-flung *sitios*<sup>7</sup> just to deliver medicines and other community needs. The multisectoral involvement in the implementation of municipal development programs has provided the ground for their long-drawn clamor for social reforms. The Women's KINIPAN is also serious and committed to appropriate health care programs. They conduct regular meetings, production sessions, and community-based health care programs. This is how they advanced gender-specific role of women in community management.

#### *On Ownership*

*Sense of Belonging.* The LGU of General Nakar has involved the people to promote and uphold their concern and commitment to the community. Their long years of struggles in the mountains have found a comparably easier venue for waging social reforms and people's agenda in the development programs of the town. Also, the electoral victory makes them proud as their town was the only one that came closer to controlling government and promoting land rights for the people. It felt like a

honeymoon. People had a sense of belonging and participating in the governance process. People could freely visit the municipal hall to transact business with the Local Chief Executive (LCE) or seek consultation with the multisectoral desk coordinator.

The municipal hall is essentially a people's center. The canteen becomes busy everyday and the constituents would swarm the corridors of the center to transact business with the LGU—a larger scenario that shows they identify with the government.

On the other hand, the women's place also, apart from the home, is the community, where they could fulfill their role in establishing their niche in community life and processes. It is an opportunity to demythologize the age-old stereotype views of women as the weaker sex to be treated with many biases. Their participation realizes and enriches community leadership and good governance.

*Sense of Caring.* It is amazing how people could really get so involved in community processes neither for personal nor for political reasons. One important contribution to the present administration's attitude is mobilizing and organizing people to care and be concerned about natural base and the protection of natural resources. In General Nakar, it impresses upon authorities and those in power that there is more to just being politically savvy. It is caring and nurturing especially for the disenfranchised and powerless. The women are absolutely focused on that dimension of managing communities. It impresses upon leaders that care and nurturance are essential elements of orchestrating community life. The women's nurturing health and medical care are expressions of the strong concern for unbiased community role, place and responsibility of women, especially in the community's well being. With their clamor to respond to community health, the women are able to convey that their nurturing capacity is indispensable in community development. Indeed, they serve to remind those in authority and responsible for society to strike a balance between sheer politicking and serious caring for the total welfare of the people.

*Sense of Place.* The people's symbolic anchor is the LGU; thus, the MTDP embodies the need to develop it. There is no other source of rootedness. It comes out so naturally that the platform of governance is the development of the local community and its people; thus, the MTDP also symbolizes a sense of place. For the women, the community is their realm and definite space. Since it is their niche, nurturing and caring for it and ensuring its sustainability are integral parts of women's concerns. Their programs say as much. This is reminiscent of the setup before the

Spaniards arrived in the country. The women orchestrated life in the communities, that is why it was called "matriarchal." The community was their realm. Anyone entering it, as in marriage, needed to prove his trustworthiness, i.e., *manilbihan*<sup>5</sup>. In effect, the women's program "Caring for and Nurturing the Community" can be considered taking care of the place as their domicile.

*Value and Respect for Diversity.* Both the LGU of General Nakar and the Women's KINIPAN value and respect diversity. The MTDP is a reflection of the diverse interests of the people rolled into one aspiration, the town's general welfare. Integrating it into the development agenda of the town proves that the LGU has high regard for the different sectors and the diverse interests each one pursues. Women's equal support and protection for community life, regardless of gender or ethnicity, are the general foundation of women's health and safe motherhood. It offers services to the community of diverse interests through its health and medical care programs. Moreover, it is service-oriented and not profit-oriented in its sale of liniments and herbal concoctions, in tablet or capsule forms. The scope of service is not limited to their members but extends to the community, composed of diverse people and interests. It is non-discriminating and unbiased.

#### *On Empowerment*

*Access and Control.* Attempts at egalitarian access to community and LGU resources and protection of all biodiversity against intruders preoccupy the LGU. The LGU's cadastral survey project is the nucleus of the multisectoral desk's program. It is practically the land that is in the minds especially of those living at the foot of the mountain. Moreover, the program and committee for resource management speak of the agenda of the people. They plan and conceptualize the committee's activities. It is proof of how people can manage the resources, especially the land. Land has been a recurring issue. On the other end, the women are resolute about developing and protecting community resources, and the delivery of welfare services. The resources are not readily available for use by the community; but the women's program on production and processing makes it easy for the community to avail of the resources, particularly the herbal resources.

*Power Sharing.* The gesture of the LGU to allow community participation in development planning is a good indicator of how power and responsibility are shared collectively by the people of the town. Organizing multisectoral participation in policy formulation, through the

GA is a way to make the people take responsibility for their own development. It is a testimony to shared responsibility and collective power.

On the other hand, organizing women drives at two points: first, it is a promotion of equal power and sharing of responsibility within the community; second, the organization itself is a body for sharing collective power because it aspires for cooperation and unity geared to community nurturing and care. People's organizations are alternative organs or structures of power. They are a countervailing structure for community power; hence, power sharing is intrinsic in the effort to draw women of the community to become members of the organization, especially in its chapter-building program.

*Decisionmaking.* The LGU's municipal general assembly provides an avenue for collective decisions. Egalitarian ways of policy decisionmaking inspire the LGU to solicit people's participation in the crafting of the MTDP. In addition, as old vanguards of the liberation movement they are accustomed to the collective decision method and style of work. The setup for implementation is an expression of the delegated decisionmaking process. Inspiration is also drawn from the decentralization provision of the LGC which takes the nuance of "a government with a PO-orientation."

The women are also very consistent in their advocacy of women's participation and in performing a significant role in the whole process of community development. They fundamentally foster everybody's contribution and participation, not only in decisionmaking but in all spheres of their community nurturing and care. These are salient points, whether learned in the liberation movement or in the BCC-CO, which have good implications for the present community management and governance. It is a carryover legacy of the grassroots initiatives to establish a government that truly works for and serves the people. It is a living witness to the "serve the revolution, serve the people" catch phrase of the movement. In a new parlance, "if you are a taxpayer; you want your government to work."

In an attempt to draw points of departures or convergence in community management and governance, the comparative table on the next page tries to cross-relate the four cases. Based on the three variables illustrating community governance: leadership, ownership and empowerment, the trend is very much inclined to the role of people actively orchestrating their own development. The people are easily mobilized and encouraged to actively contribute their share in managing their communities if their agenda is addressed and promoted and if the program of action is sealed with trust. So the credit for successful

endeavors does not always go to those in authority, just like what can be observed in billboards for infrastructure, e.g., "this road project is through the effort of Congressman \_\_\_\_, through Mayor \_\_\_\_, and the barangay council \_\_\_\_."

### **Cross Comparison of the Four Cases**

#### *Community Leadership*

The four cases discussed previously elicit people-centered leadership and rely on people's active role for the success and sustainability of their development programs. Perhaps, they may only differ in the class origin of the leadership and the process of mandating them officially. Class origin is important because it socializes and remolds any potential leader into the class interest. Relatively, it is class interest which is decisive in governance platform and it is for now "the people's agenda." It connotes the poor majority who are clamoring for change and development. That is why this study values their optics; thus, the social technology to bring about such innovation is through community organizing, a social tool culled from the poor. In other words, the three cases, namely, Aeta, General Nakar and Women's KINIPAN manifest lower class origins of leaders. The Balanga City leadership emanates from traditional politician origin, as if only to continue the tradition of the family or sustain the political clout of the dynasty in patronage politics and personalized bureaucracy.

Furthermore, the three cases cited rest on a platform of people's advocacy, advancing an unfulfilled cause waged during the last decades or centuries, people's liberation, ancestral domain, and participation of women. The City of Balanga banks on transforming the community towards progress, predominantly supported by the private sector. This last item is important because it is an innovation in convergence.

Lastly, community organizing plays a key role in the leadership of the three and, in fact, it is by such means that their leadership stature is earned. It illustrates that CO is a process and a solution. While in the city, community organizing is employed as a technique to mobilize the active participation of the community. That is one example illustrating how CO is a social technology. In community governance, CO is very important and necessary for it weaves the people into all the processes of action. As cited earlier, there is no governance without organizing, and there is no organizing without governance. They are mutually dependent in effecting social change and development.

### *Community Ownership*

All of the four cases express the desire for change and development. The people identify and support the goal because it touches their very being. They internalize the endeavor and contribute their share in its implementation because it redounds to their welfare. The three cases propagate a common development goal that is expressive of the long-sought people's agenda.

General Nakar promotes multistakeholders/sectoral agenda, which is comprehensive, integrated, sustainable development via LGU channels. People are implementers thru multisectoral desk. The Aeta development agenda is a historical advocacy for self-rule and ancestral domain, and respect for cultural heritage. This is the ethnic and cultural identity of the members. This is their belonging. The Women's KINIPAN espouses issues and realities of women in reproductive, productive, and community management roles that serve as key to gender-responsive development. It is the core of their involvement and belonging.

On the other hand, the Balanga City's goal is the general community's progress, without any bias for anyone since it is prone to suspicion that it will only benefit the elite, especially since it is private sector-driven progress. The LGU development agenda is the City's progress and convergence is the strategy. People are considered stakeholders and inevitable contributors to the community's progress.

### *Community Empowerment*

The two LGU cases are one in their outlook on resources, their access and control, and the process of enabling the people to avail them. The resources are always in the hands of the few. The enabling role of the LGU facilitates access to limited resources through government channels and policies. The formulated MTDPs of both General Nakar and Balanga City are strategies to this effect. The City perceives that the community resources are still in the hands of the few; thus, the LGU facilitates access to all, and motivates everyone to be involved and benefit from development. In General Nakar, access, control and protection of community resources, are the people's agenda via LGU dynamics. Both LGUs put emphasis, moreover, on the people's involvement in working this out, by letting them articulate their needs and formulate a platform of governance to address it; then it taps the private sector to jumpstart the momentum.

On the other hand, the two cases picture empowerment as a process in history through a strategic methodology. Both rely on the transformation

**Table 4. Cross Comparison of the Four Cases**

<i>Community Governance Indicators</i>	<i>Balanga City</i>	<i>General Nakar</i>	<i>Aetas</i>	<i>Women's KINIPAN</i>
Leadership	LGU leadership is officially chosen from affluent class through the usual electoral process.	LGU leadership earned role through community organizing and people's liberation movement.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Council of elders traditionally got role due to wisdom, age, and descent.</li> <li>• Barangay council leadership through the assimilated lowland politics.</li> <li>• PO leadership through community organizing.</li> </ul>	Gendered leadership through women's advocacy and women's organizing.
Ownership	LGU development agenda is the city's progress; convergence is the strategy. People are inevitable contributors; they are also stakeholders.	Multistakeholders/sectoral agenda is comprehensive, integrated, sustainable development via LGU channels. People are implementers through multisectoral desk.	Development agenda is the historical advocacy for self-rule and ancestral domain and respect for cultural heritage. This is the ethnic and cultural identity of the members.	Realities of women in reproductive, productive and community management roles are key in gender-responsive development. It is the core of their involvement and belonging.
Empowerment	The community resources are still in the hands of the few, but LGU facilitates access to all and motivates everyone to be involved and benefit from development.	Access and control and protection of community resources is the people's agenda via LGU dynamics. This is their key to development.	Self-determination anchored on control of ancestral land is the key to development.	Recognition of and support for their participation in family and community development, and in policy assemblies.



of established order and take cue from decisive endeavors to usher the needed change and social development. Only then, can people claim power and liberation from the bondage of poverty and marginalization. The Aetas perceive self-determination as anchored on control of ancestral land. It is the key to their development. The Women's KINIPAN promotes recognition and support of their participation in family and community development, and in policy assemblies to fulfill their role in community management. That is their strategic step to a gender-fair society.

### Conclusion

As the human race moves in its journey to a higher civilization and Golden Age, ushered by the information age, an age of knowledge and wisdom is readily accessible to all of creation. This is stupendous and a significant phenomenon, especially for those entrusted with the responsibility, the concerned global citizen, and the ones that wield authority to nurture planet earth. This noble task seeks creative and innovative ways in handling and ensuring the total development of its innate potentials. One indispensable segment in this continuum is the science and art of managing planet earth and all its constituent biodiversity, so-called "governance." With the surge of wisdom and knowledge, renewed approaches and rethinking processes upon age-old archaic methods invoke a relevant response.

In effect, enrichment and learning from traditions and experiences motivate people in discerning effective and sustainable approaches to change and development, vis-à-vis the *raison d'être* of human existence. Gleaned from people's collective experience as a race, being entrusted with the stewardship of this planet, there are fundamental principles ready and beneficial in orchestrating life in its entirety. These serve as guideposts in managing this world, from the infinitely small to the infinitely large, towards its fullness and amplified ramifications devoid of any loss, damage or destruction.

Organizations and institutions continuously renew their perspective towards refined ways and better social order, except perchance for the feudal church that frequently contents itself with stasis. This human endeavor for creating new ways and better systems is the philosophical underpinning of governance, likewise understood in this article as the act of managing people, their resources, its system and the many components that comprise it. Luckily, in the case samples studied, there are very amazing principles, lucid or needing unearthing, that are recurrent pointing to a comprehensive, integrated and sustainable mindset. Without

feign or sham, the conclusions derived herein cannot be divorced from their macro implications, despite the micro nature of the case studies.

Indeed, that is the rationale for the principles, because, as such, they can be applied in small or larger realities. The principles are constant, but the form and expression may vary. The essence is infinitely there, and these are the constantly recurrent principles. By and large, these principles are vividly manifested in the four given cases, in view of community management and governance. The following explanations will attempt to clarify these principles.

Community governance acknowledges and values the contributions made to the community and its citizens by the people themselves. They ask government to work for them. In so doing, they are proud and feel committed to its vision and programs.

Community governance provides a framework for community and stakeholders' roles. It articulates the importance of people and their community and identifies ways of acting on their values and principles. Community governance, in all its processes, is likely to help strengthen rather than weaken or alienate communities

Community governance captures the following key elements of a strong community: community leadership; meaningful participation; cooperative and collaborative behavior; access to resources; and community connectedness or "sense of belonging."

#### *Community Leadership*

Community leadership reflects the concept of people and groups working together to achieve common goals and visions. This concept necessitates an acknowledgment of the differences that exist within the community while recognizing that despite these differences, people can find commonalities and work towards shared goals. These ideas are of particular importance to local governance, which not only has participation and citizenship at its core but is given the mandate to promote community governance.

#### *Community Empowerment*

Empowered communities are the ones which either have or are able to access resources. Community's exercise of power often makes it

necessary to devolve decisionmaking. Empowered communities, therefore, are also people, organizations and agencies that have power are willing to share that power and to devolve decisionmaking down to the lowest, most appropriate level.

### *Community Ownership*

This component encompasses the way in which people are connected to their communities so they feel they belong and they want to look after their communities.

The sense of caring about one's community includes caring for both its physical and social aspects. Community ownership, therefore, captures the notion of community sustainability: protecting the community for current and future generations.

Community governance implies that power should be exercised as close as possible to citizens and local communities. Community governance recognizes that the local government is not the sole provider of services. There are other important players in delivering a community vision. Governments need to be concerned about the best form of achieving that vision.

### *Old and New Wineskins: Participatory vs. Prevalent Dominant Governance*

Community governance, as an innovation to existing dominant practice, allows the stakeholders to identify and address their needs and manage their own resources and locale. The dominant type of governance is based on what government thinks the people need. Community governance is tantamount to people's participation. It provides opportunities that enable the community and its people to have a hand in all levels of their development. Diverse stakeholders are converged and animated in committees to contribute their cooperative behaviors to accomplish consensual goals. Stakeholders are represented in a general assembly for collective decisionmaking. This is an innovation vis-à-vis the dominant prevailing system. The juxtaposition between the established bureaucracy and the unattached sectoral members produces friction, when regular or career employees and their own organizational culture, perceive the community governance dynamics as an additional task and a burden. The old wineskin holds that bureaucracy is infused with a new governance method that threatens their workload compared to the people who serve

as volunteers. Also, unpaid job in government, which is rendered by sectoral members, is considered less important. The special bodies of the local bureaucracy provide leeway to make the balance, to optimize and sustain people's active efforts.

In effect, participation of the people is an essential element of community governance. While the prevailing traditional governance is dominant, community governance necessitates that the people are active in program planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation processes. This would ensure that development is focused on addressing their needs by using their indigenous knowledge and resources.

#### *Condescension vs. People's Initiative*

Compared to the condescending top-down approach that stresses government initiative, the bottom-up people's initiative depends on people's participation that forms the basis and foundation of programs. The people's initiative and participation determine the success of governance programs. This opportunity is edifying for the community because it makes people realize that development does not solely rely on the local government, but on their active participation.

A considerably high level of participation in the formulation of programs and projects is anchored directly on the initiative of program implementers to mobilize the community. The true strength and effectiveness of community governance lies in its ability to draw initiative and active involvement of the community, both in determining exactly what programs and projects are most beneficial to all sectors or stakeholders and in the actual implementation of these programs. It is, thus, imperative that education strategies towards raising the level of people's consciousness are introduced to support community actions.

#### *Patronage Politics vs. Good Governance*

Patronage politics happens when people passively allow the abuse of government's role as supplier of basic services. When people support the government/officials only because their immediate needs are satisfied, they become dependent on dole-outs.

People must not be totally dependent on the local government for their development. This development should, in fact, be holistic and beneficial to most people, not just a few. People sometimes treat local

government as "good" only if it can give what they want, even if such benefit is counterproductive in the long run. People's agenda is primary in addressing their needs and benefits. A good example of this is the medical care offered by the local health services; but until and unless people are educated to prevent and cure simple illnesses, they will always rely on the free medical services of the community. In that way, dependency is reinforced. Health in the hands of the people can be inculcated in the people to create opportunity for initiative and sustainability. The best move, as an enabling role, is to let the people take initiative.

Community governance allows for effective and good governance, where opportunities for participation, common agenda for mobilization, concerted action in the delivery of social services, transparency in local government transactions, accountability for results and mechanisms for sustainability are provided.

#### *Participatory Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation*

It is primordial that stakeholders of development are collectively involved in decisionmaking and in planning for their own development. The monitoring and evaluation task is expected of all the implementing committees. The documentation of accomplishments and updates through the use of monitoring and evaluation forms are helpful in improving service delivery mechanisms.

#### *Enabling Mechanisms for Sustainability*

Vital to the assessment of impacts of programs on the community is their sustainability. Community governance prides itself in anticipating sustainable endeavors, where program success is embedded with sustainability mechanisms. This can be influenced by several enabling factors. One, there is an incessant encouragement of the stakeholders at the institutional level (LGU personnel). Training and education, apropos the changing times and needs of the people, have to reinforce the initial knowledge and skills in project implementation and community governance. People have to understand and appreciate the process-oriented, people-centered framework in cooperative behavior and community advocacy. Finally, consistent monitoring and evaluation of all community programs plays a very important role in sustaining all development efforts in the community.

*Capacity Building and Institutional Development*

In community governance, the levels of skills and capacities are uneven among stakeholders and implementers. On the part of the mandated LGU, personnel need a degree of leveling off in perspective and programs. Bureaucratic stagnation is challenged by informed and enlightened choices, thus a transition to a more people-centered government is at hand. Then, there is the systematic approach induced through community organizing processes. Henceforth, capability-building program is an integral component of community governance. It is also a mechanism to sustain all development efforts. It ensures a high level of consciousness and critical thinking about social realities. It is a way to remold the attitudes of the people and a key to the sense of caring and nurturing because people are ready and able to understand each other.

People are educated throughout the process of development and community governance. Capability building facilitates awareness of needed competence to implement projects or programs such as in agriculture, environment, infrastructure, etc. Functional literacy is provided to equip people with basic skills in reading, computing and writing in aid of their daily activities. Functional literacy in farming, for instance, emphasizes skills to be used in designing their farm plans, recording their field observations, computing their expenses against their income—skills that will lead to a more scientific means of addressing farm productivity. Continuing education will reinforce the indigenous knowledge of people regarding specific realities in the community. Formal education assures that the children's curriculum is designed on the basis of the local needs and community situation since school children will be the next generation to take on community governance and development.

*Convergence for Integrative Development and Governance*

Veering from line agency compartmentalized delivery system, convergence endeavors among all stakeholders are a major breakthrough in development work. The community, partners and support institutions are like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle forming a picture. Each one has its own capacities and limitations; but partners will strengthen each other and fill the need.

The cooperative behavior and shared vision among all those involved in the community provide an atmosphere for egalitarian governance and an effective check and balance mechanism. Furthermore, convergence largely promotes a sharing and optimization of human, technical and material resources. The latter idea is a vital strategy towards the

achievement of a vision. Community governance is a collaborative endeavor which integrates all sectoral concerns and corresponding plans of action.

It is safe to conclude that community governance is good governance. The convergence of all interest groups ensures egalitarian welfare and benefits. The merging of local government functions and structures with people's cultural and ethnic community factors assures fidelity of governance praxis to its citizenry. It also ensures non-partisanship and unbiased checks and balances in power. The oft-quoted phrase from workers illustrates it lucidly, *sa sama-samang pagkilos lamang natatamo ang tagumpay*. (Only with concerted effort, victory is possible.)

Table 5 shows that the ideal community governance is a synthesis of the many elements and variables of both LGU and people's initiative. In other words, each system of management may not elicit effective governance; but combining all the many elements of both sides makes for an effective system of community management.

In the same fashion, as regards *community leadership, shared vision* is the combination of LGU programs and PO values. It means that the government programs are permeated with people's unity of vision and collective purpose. *Community participation* is the mix between LGU Human Resource Management (HRM) and PO values and organizations. It means that the LGU constituents are actively involved in an organized manner. *Cooperative behavior* is the mix between HRM and organization. It means that the citizens are one and committed in implementing the agreed upon programs. *Community advocacy* is the mix between LGU programs and PO values. It means that the aspiration and agenda of the people are those that benefit them and promote their welfare.

On *community ownership, sense of belonging* is the combination of LGU HRM and PO organization. It means that the people are comfortably reflected in the endeavors. *Sense of caring* is the mix between LGU HRM and PO values. It means that the people's welfare and agenda are always central and upheld in all undertakings. *Sense of place* is the mix between LGU HRM and PO organization. It means that all the people identify with and own the development endeavors, it reflects their interests and does not alienate them. *Value diversity* is the mix between LGU HRM and PO values. It means that people's differences are accepted and respected, and they are not marginalized, but supported in the development effort.

*Community empowerment, access and control* is the mix of LGU fiscal and PO resources. It means that people are given free access to and

**Table 5. Comparison of LGU and People Initiative = Ideal Community Governance**

<i>People's Initiative</i>	<i>Community Governance</i>	<i>LGU Initiative</i>
<p><b>AETA</b></p> <p>Resource: Land</p> <p>Programs: collective, bayanihan, communal, self-rule/determination, primacy of life and wellbeing, promotion of social norms</p> <p>Organization: kinship, ancestors, ethnic belonging, Council of Elders/Wise</p>	<p>Community Leadership</p> <p>Shared Vision Community Participation Cooperative Behavior Community Advocacy</p> <p>Community Ownership</p> <p>Sense of Belonging Sense of Caring Sense of Place Value Diversity</p> <p>Community Empowerment</p>	<p><b>Balanga</b></p> <p>Resources: IRA, private sector, HR, investor, local revenues</p> <p>Programs: medium term development plan, staff development program, citizen participation</p> <p>Organization: citizens, city staff, sectoral representatives, leadership</p>
<p><b>KINIPAN</b></p> <p>Resources: Community and family resources, gender resources, health, herbal plants</p> <p>Programs: equal support for women's role, nurturer, family and community wellbeing, women's participation, reproductive/productive roles</p> <p>Organization: barangay, local policy, assembly, women's organization, family, community,</p>	<p>Access and Control Power Sharing Decisionmaking</p>	<p><b>General Nakar</b></p> <p>Resources: IRA, natural resources, local revenues, coastal resources</p> <p>Programs: FYDP, land rights, infrastructure, agriculture, women and health, water, education, eco-tourism, CO</p> <p>Organization: sectoral organizations, communities, leadership, town staff, POs, NGOs, support organization</p>

control of the community resources or that these resources benefit their welfare and well-being. *Powersharing* is the combination of all LGU and PO variables. It means that the collective power resides in the people, and they are involved in an organized manner in its dispensation, from which all equitably benefit. *Decisionmaking* is the mix of LGU HRM/programs and PO organization/values. It means that in all development endeavors and programs, the people are actively involved in a concerted and



coordinated manner. Decisions become communal and not monopolized by a few. In that way, the people would feel that, since this is their undertaking, they will implement such a program together. With such decisionmaking, sustainability is ensured.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>Chairman of the barangay. Chief executive in the barangay unit.

<sup>2</sup>The smallest local government unit, with a population of at least 2000 in the rural and 5000 in the metropolitan areas (*Local Government Code of 1991*).

<sup>3</sup>Amicable settlement; a way of settling disputes among neighbors.

<sup>4</sup>Akin to *kaingin*, it is a form of slash and burn agriculture practiced by the Actas for many generations.

<sup>5</sup>The essence or spirit of cooperation and camaraderie that moves Filipinos when they set to complete a task with their fellows. It is manifested symbolically in community participation when one member moves his nipa and bamboo house from one place to another, showing the willingness of every Filipino to offer a shoulder to help ease the load or burden of a fellow Filipino under whatever circumstance.

<sup>6</sup>Many typhoons hit the Southern Tagalog in 2004. Typhoon "Unding" occurred on 14-21 November 2004, Tropical Storm "Violeta" on 22-26 November 2004, Tropical Depression (TD) "Winnie" on 28-30 November 2004 and Typhoon "Yoyong" on 30 November 2004. Major landslides took place in General Nakar, Real and Infanta, Quezon. There were 731,730 families or 3,717,499 persons affected in 3,186 barangays of 332 municipalities and 31 cities in 35 provinces of Regions I, II, III, IV, V, VIII, NCR and CAR. Three regions (Regions III, IV and V) were repeatedly and severely affected by "Unding," "Violeta," "Winnie" and "Yoyong," with TD Winnie causing the most number of casualties, missing and injured persons, as a result of massive landslides in General Nakar, Real and Infanta, Quezon. Typhoon "Yoyong" was widespread throughout entire Luzon and although there were less casualties, it aggravated the already devastating effects of "Violeta" and "Winnie" in Regions III and IV. Out of the total population affected, 53,037 families or 265,003 persons were displaced. The reported casualties caused by the four cyclones are: 1,068 dead, 1,163 injured and 553 still missing to date. Most of the casualties were caused by TD "Winnie": 893 dead, 648 injured and 443 still missing, coming from the Municipalities of Gen. Nakar, Real and Infanta, all of Quezon Province. (<http://www.ndec.gov.ph>)

<sup>7</sup>A territorial enclave that forms part of a barangay, the location of which may be distant from the center of the *barangay* itself.

<sup>8</sup>It is a Filipino wedding tradition wherein a man renders service for the family of the bride to show his worth, fortitude and responsibility.

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## **Reinventing Philippine Governance for Globalization**

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*Globalization is the "buzzword" in today's world and it has brought unprecedented impacts to the Asia Pacific region including the Philippines. The Philippines, although politically unequipped, has optimistically joined the "bandwagon" and is now struggling to reinvent its governance to cope with international and national pressures on globalization. Among these are the complexities and challenges in managing national affairs, institutionalization issues on globalization and the difficulties in reaping the fruits of participation and accountability. This article centers on two themes: the public sector capacity of the country to manage globalization, and participation and accountability in globalization. The role of the private sector and civil society in coming up with innovations and new approaches to deal with the changed situation is given emphasis. The article also tackles the policy implications of globalization and the lessons learned in the Philippines and in Asia at large.*

### **Introduction**

The Philippines has always been a player in the global stage, albeit a minor one, predating even the colonial period. While still separate kingdoms and communities, the islands had a flourishing trade with China, which became legendary for its honesty and fairness, although recordless and lacking in inspectors and formal rules. Other boats brought in traders from other parts of Asia and bearers of Islam. Spain brought Roman Catholic Christianity, considered the archipelago as one colony and made it part of its mercantilist network. When sovereignty passed on to the United States in 1898, the new colonial master brought through its missionaries Protestantism and through its government both free enterprise and a system of quotas that determined the role of the country that became independent in 1946.

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Philippine paper prepared for the Regional Forum on Reinventing Government in East and Southeast Asia sponsored by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme with the Universiti Sains Malaysia, 21-24 August 2004.

American manufacturers flooded the country with their products and the US government brought the Philippines into normal tariff barriers. These stunted the growth of the country's domestic industries and led to dependency on agricultural export to the US. A precondition of independence was a provision that gave Americans equal rights to Filipinos in the exploitation of its natural resources and certain areas of trade. This requirement of parity required an amendment of a nationalistic constitution that reserved to its citizens these areas of economic action.

This stark historical summary provides a background to the Philippine experience in globalization and the role of its successive governments in directing its international economic and political relations. Except for a glimpse of the pre-colonial Filipino traders, it does not speak of the behavior of the people; thus, it does not talk about the numerous rebellions that culminated in the Philippine Revolution of 1896, the first war of liberation in Asia, whose victory was erased by Spain's transfer of the colony to the United States. It also glosses over the fact that organizations that the people created as mechanisms to sustain solidarity and vehicles against abuse which are the precursors of civil society attempts to participate in governance in the contemporary period.

This study attempts to flesh out the Philippine experience in dealing with the current phase of globalization. It has chosen as its special themes (1) the public sector capacity to manage globalization, and (2) participation and accountability in globalization. These two topics in a sense show the continuity of the problems and challenges that globalization brings in its wings. At the same time, they show new attempts to deal with the changed situation, such innovations and endeavors coming not only from the State, but from the private sector and civil society as well. In addition, the problems of the country despite, or, with these approaches are candidly discussed in this article. At the end, main lessons learned were drawn from a study of the Philippine situation, and the implications these have for the Philippines itself, and for Asia as a whole.

## **Embracing Globalization**

### *Changing Understandings*

The idea of globalization has changed over time. Colonial Philippines was among those regarded as "sawyers of wood and hewers of water," and was content to provide agricultural products for the "mother country." Then it engaged in import-substitution, which made the economy grow, accompanied by high levels of education and English literacy, adequate savings rates, and an agricultural sector that generated sufficient foreign exchange (NSO 2001:

60). From the 1950s up to the 1960s, the Philippines had an economy that was ranked second only to Japan's in the whole of Asia.

However, protecting the small domestic sector through the three decades of import substitution could not sustain growth (Medalla 1995). The escalation of the external debt in the late 1970s led to a massive balance of payments crisis in 1983. On top of that, a rampaging dictatorship of cronyism, corruption and human rights abuses siphoned off what little the country had in its coffers (NSO 2001: 61). Seeking relief, the Philippines accepted a structural adjustment package as conditionalities for loans from multilateral financial institutions. Structural adjustment included trade liberalization, financial sector reforms, privatization and restructuring of the central bank. On the one hand, it facilitated the reentry of the Philippines to the global economy and its economic recovery. On the other, it entailed enormous social costs in terms of income distribution, education, health and other social indicators. The often bitter debates that structural adjustment started have since translated into a continuing debate on the merits of what is now called "globalization" (Briones 1997).

From the 1990s onward, the focus of globalization has shifted from relief and structural adjustment to competition with other countries on supposedly equal terms, as a member of global and regional associations voluntarily entered into by the Philippine State.

#### *Globalization vs. the Nationalism of the Philippine Constitution*

The Philippines entered globalization under the Constitution of 1987 that requires the State "to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos" (Art. II, Sec. 19). This philosophy of nationalism is further articulated in other provisions requiring the State: to protect Filipino enterprises from unfair foreign competition and trade practices (Art. XII, Sec. 1); to protect the abundant natural resources of the country for the benefit of the Filipinos and to reserve their exploitation to the State or to corporations at least 60 percent owned by Filipinos (Art. XII, Sec. 2); to reserve to citizens certain areas of investments (Art. XII, Sec. 10); to grant franchises for the operation of a public utility only to Filipinos (Art. XII, Sec. 11); to give preferential treatment to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and make them competitive (Art. XII, Sec. 12); and to limit the practice of professions to Filipinos, except in cases prescribed by law (Art. XII, Sec.14). The Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 had articulated the same nationalistic philosophy despite different political and economic conditions.



These provisions aside, the Constitution of 1987 advocates free enterprise which is the basis of globalization. Among its guiding principles and state policies is a provision recognizing the indispensable role of the private sector, the encouragement of private enterprise and the provision of incentives to needed investments (Art. II, Sec. 20). It encourages private firms to broaden the base of their ownership (Art. XII, Sec. 1). It expressly prohibits combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition (Art. XII, Sec. 19). The Constitution also makes an exception to the nationalistic environment provision by allowing the State to enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations for technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, as long as these promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources (Art. XII, Sec. 2).

### **Globalization and the Philippine Actors in Governance**

The State recognizes the private sector and civil society as partners in good governance and the country's bid to become globally competitive and to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (NEDA 2001: 256). The business sector is expected to create wealth and employment (NEDA 2001: 256). Moreover, some companies, as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR), have volunteered to assist the government in its poverty alleviation efforts. Some business executives are also actively engaged in a "public-private partnership" with the government through the Governance Advisory Council, an all-private sector group that provides policy advice and capacity building services to public sector executives. Created by an Executive Order, it is a State body that receives no State resources.

Civil society participation in governance is constitutionally ordained. Specifically, Article XIII, Section 16 provides that "the right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms."

### **Globalization and the Philippines**

#### *International and Internal Pressures for Globalization*

While international pressure for globalization had been relentless since the 1960s, structural adjustment at the height of the global debt crisis hastened the process for the Philippines. During the last years of his regime, President Marcos was pressured to restructure the financial sector,

particularly the government financial institutions. Because of the fiscal crisis, multilateral institutions were insisting on structural adjustment as conditionality for more loans. The Marcos government was starting the restructuring of the government corporate sector when the economy collapsed in 1983 under the weight of the massive debt. Under the presidency of President Aquino, structural adjustment programs were put in place under the direction of a committee composed of creditor institutions. As a consequence of brutal expenditure cuts in social and economic development programs, poverty levels intensified.

The restructuring of the government corporate sector was capped by the policy on privatization, Proclamation No. 50, which mandated the resale of corporations acquired by the government at the height of the debt crisis, as well as the sale of government corporations perceived to be competing with the private sector. The premier banking institution at that time, the Philippine National Bank, was declared open to private investors. The "crown jewel" of government corporations, PETRON, the national oil company, considered one of the top corporations in the Philippines in terms of assets and income, was likewise privatized. Dozens of other public enterprises were disposed of; thus, structural adjustment opened the gates for accelerated globalization.

The Ramos administration brought globalization to its pinnacle with the Philippine entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In support of these economic policies and to make the bureaucracy respond to the challenges of globalization with dispatch, Ramos sought to implement a sweeping reorganization through a "reinventing government" bill. It never got past Congress (Morales 1998). President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo revived the bill but was similarly unsuccessful.

#### *Philippine Initiatives Toward Globalization*

The Philippines is a member of several multilateral economic institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area-Comprehensive Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Siazon 1998: 222). Philippine entry to the WTO was particularly bitterly contested in the Senate in 1994-1995. A coalition of civil society organizations mounted a massive protest campaign through large-scale rallies and intense debates on television, radio, and print. Ratification won on a one-vote margin. The sponsor of the ratification at that time was then Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who painted "a very rosy picture of the future of the country under the WTO" (Focus on the Global South 2003); however, under her presidency, the Philippines has joined the WTO Group of 20 which demands "better market access, dismantling of trade barriers, abolition of all forms of

export subsidies and unjustifiable export prohibitions and restrictions" from the WTO (Domingo-Albert 2004: 213).

The Ramos government was active in promoting Philippine interests in APEC which was established in 1989. In 1996, the Philippines hosted the meeting of APEC where several of its initiatives were adopted.<sup>1</sup>

In September 2003, the Arroyo government was able to convince its co-members to locate the regional office of the International Maritime Organization in the country (Domingo-Albert 2004: 213).

The ASEAN, established in 1967, is the one closest to the heart of the Philippines because it is there where it could consolidate its economic future (Siazon 1998: 222). It has taken an active part in the ASEAN's greater economic integration through the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO), the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), and growth zones such as the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East Asia Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) (Siazon 1998: 222). In 2002, it participated actively to eliminate intraregional tariffs and non-tariff barriers in the ASEAN region (Domingo-Albert 2004: 212).

### **The Philippines in a Globalized World: The Record So Far**


From 1983 to 1991, importation was the predominant trade transaction with an average annual trade deficit at around P2.302 billion (Table 1). From 1992 to 2000<sup>2</sup> with importation still dominant, the average growth rate of exports became much higher. In Figure 1, it is evident that the export and import gap began to narrow in 1998. This could be the effect of government initiatives to reduce the trade deficit by targeting to reach US\$30 billion to US\$50 billion by the year 2000 through the so-called "export winners."<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, an irregular pattern of "direct investment" (as BOP account)<sup>4</sup> occurred in the 1983-91 period, with an annual growth rate of -15.30 percent (Table 2). This shows that to invest in the Philippines then was unstable and unattractive; however, foreign investments picked up in 1992 to 2000, with a 9.1 percent growth rate (from the previous high negative growth). This suggests that the liberalization laws have started to facilitate the entry of foreign investments. Figure 2 graphically shows that direct investments started to increase in 1986, the year of the first People Power Revolution. This shows the rise of investor confidence in the Philippines even before the liberalization laws were enacted. It was then helped along by the facilitative role of the State in the economy, not only through laws but also the direction of investments to infrastructure and public utilities.<sup>5</sup>

**Table 1. Trade Data, 1983-2000 (in US\$ Million)**

Year	Total Trade	Trade Balance	Export	Import	Growth Rate		
					Export	Import	Trade Balance
1983	12984.00	-2974.00	5005.00	7979.00			
1984	11460.25	-1037.00	5391.00	6428.00	7.16	-24.13	-186.79
1985	9739.62	-816.00	4629.00	5445.00	-16.46	-18.05	-27.08
1986	9885.38	-552.00	4842.00	5394.00	4.40	-0.95	-47.83
1987	14457.21	-1467.00	5720.00	7187.00	15.35	24.95	62.37
1988	15233.57	-1657.00	7074.00	8731.00	19.14	17.68	11.47
1989	18230.53	-3350.00	7621.00	11171.00	9.56	21.84	50.84
1990	20592.19	-4856.00	8186.00	13042.00	4.46	14.35	31.01
1991	20890.88	-4916.00	8840.00	12866.00	7.40	-1.45	-20.92
Average	14809.18	-2362.78	6389.78	8692.56	6.37	4.28	-15.50
1992	24343.24	-5641.00	9824.00	15465.00	10.02	16.87	38.81
1993	28972.21	-7398.00	11375.00	18773.00	13.04	17.62	23.75
1994	34815.46	-9155.00	13483.00	22638.00	15.63	17.07	19.19
1995	43984.81	-11041.00	17447.00	28488.00	22.72	20.53	17.08
1996	53969.48	-14158.00	20543.00	34701.00	15.07	17.90	22.02
1997	61161.52	-13863.00	25228.00	38581.00	18.57	10.06	-6.03
1998	59156.24	-2034.00	29496.00	31539.00	14.47	-22.36	-556.49
1999	65779.35	2409.00	35037.00	32568.00	15.91	3.19	182.38
2000	72569.13	4271.00	38078.00	33907.00	7.99	3.66	42.19
Average	49305.72	-6226.67	22279.00	28505.67	14.88	9.39	-25.23

Source: ADB 2001: 213.


**Figure 1. Foreign Trade of the Philippines, 1983-2000**

Source: ADB 2001.

**Table 2. Direct Investment, 1983-2000**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Direct Investment</i>	<i>Growth Rate</i>
1983	221	
1984	122	-81.15
1985	49	-148.98
1986	146	66.44
1987	362	59.67
1988	983	63.17
1989	559	-75.85
1990	528	-5.87
1991	529	0.19
<i>Average</i>	<i>389</i>	<i>-15.30</i>
1992	675	21.63
1993	864	21.88
1994	1289	32.97
1995	1361	5.29
1996	1338	-1.72
1997	1113	-20.22
1998	1592	30.09
1999	1228	-29.64
2000	1584	22.47
<i>Average</i>	<i>1237</i>	<i>9.19</i>

Source: ADB 2001: 315.

**Figure 2. Direct Investments in the Philippines**

Source: ADB 2001.

Note: Direct investment data were obtained following the method prescribed in IMF 1996: 109-114.

Many transnational corporations have taken advantage of this liberal investment climate.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the Philippines has gradually become the hub of job "outsourcing," especially for call centers.<sup>7</sup> It is projected that by 2005, there will be 100,000 available outsourcing jobs (Rocks and Lina 2004: 22).

The labor sector, on the other hand, has been helping to keep the Philippine economy afloat through the foreign exchange remittances of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs).<sup>8</sup> Over 700,000 OFWs are deployed every year, and they remit foreign exchange to the country at approximately US\$4 to US\$6 billion annually (NEDA 2001: 34). The rising unemployment rate in the Philippines seems to be the compelling reason for this movement.

There is a critical side to the globalization boon. First, Filipino agricultural producers and exporters face stronger pressures from cheap imported rival products and from the protective subsidies of rich countries to their export products (Habito 2003). Besides, the entry of new foreign corporations might have led to labor dislocation in industries (Lim quoted from Gonzales 1998a), sluggish work opportunities, discriminatory and precarious employment, and labor market exclusions among women, the youth, and rural poor (Gonzales 1998b). Globalization has even encouraged the exodus of more Filipinos to work or stay abroad. Of the deployed OFWs, half are Filipinas who are vulnerable to gender-related violence like rape, sexual harassment, and physical abuse (Hefti 1997). These do not bode well for the highly anticipated positive effects of globalization to the ailing Philippine economy.

### *Strengths and Capacity Gaps*

At the systemic level, the Philippines has the potential of attracting more foreign investments and being globally competitive based on its human resource potentials (Abueva 1998: 56). The country's educational system regularly churns out skilled English-speaking Filipinos (e.g., engineers, IT workers, nurses, caregivers, doctors, seamen) who are sought after as workers abroad. Workers from the Philippines rank second to those from India for their IT skills (Limlingan 2000) and are preferred over other nationalities for their English proficiency (Arroyo 2001: G12).

However, the country's image is tarnished by news about the volatile peace and order situation, ballooning budget deficit, huge foreign debt, poor infrastructure and telecommunication facilities, slow capital mobilization in the banking sector, high power cost, and systemic corruption (Neri 2004: 14-16). In fact, the Philippines ranked as the fourth most corrupt country in Southeast Asia in the 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2003).

The Competitiveness Ranking of the International Management Development (IMD) aptly captures the systemic problems of the Philippine public sector mentioned above. Using economic performance, government efficiency, business efficiency, and infrastructure as factors of competitiveness, the Philippines ranked 52<sup>nd</sup> in the IMD 2004 survey of 60 countries. The Philippines has been slipping since 2000 when it placed 35<sup>th</sup>. In 2001, it ranked 39<sup>th</sup>, then 40<sup>th</sup> in 2002, and 49<sup>th</sup> in 2003 (International Management Development (IMD) 2004).

### **Theme 1: Public Sector Capacity to Manage Globalization**


#### *Institutional Assessment*

To systematically assess the capacity of the Philippine public sector to respond to the challenges of globalization and achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), an input-output model of the Philippine Administrative System to map out the *formal* interactions of government agencies involved in strategy assessment, policy analysis, and consultation and negotiation at national and international levels is created<sup>9</sup> (Alfiler 1999: 66) (see Figure 3). The analysis would proceed from evaluating the mandates and capabilities of those agencies which are at the forefront of responding to the national inputs and demands (shown as Stage I), to those which are in charge of coordinating or harmonizing government concerted actions (Stage II), then to those which are tasked to issue policy statements or strategic assessment (Stage III), and, finally, up to the advocacy through consultations and negotiations of these policies and strategic assessments from the national to the international levels (Stage IV).<sup>10</sup>

#### *Assessment of Knowledge and Skills to Conduct International Consultations and Negotiations*

*Advancing National Interests Through Economic Diplomacy.* "Economic diplomacy" is one of the cornerstones of Philippine foreign policy. Its essence is echoed in the key development strategies of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), which aims to harness foreign relations in the active pursuit of sustainable development and growth with social equity. DFA's Economic Diplomacy Unit (EDU) serves as the central implementation arm of the Economic Diplomacy Program (EDP).<sup>11</sup> The Bureau of International Trade Relations (BITR) and the Foreign Trade Service Corps (FTSC), both of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), are also involved in negotiations and promotion of trade and investment opportunities in the Philippines (DTI website). They have no mandate for policy coordination with the EDU and vice versa. Only the International Finance Group of the Finance Department has

**Figure 3. Philippine Public Sector's Mechanism to Manage Globalization**



an explicit mandate to coordinate with other agencies regarding international agreements on trade, investment, tax treaties and other international arrangements (DTI website).

*Diplomats and Negotiators' Training Institutions and Programs.* The DFA's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) undertakes the development and professionalization of the career foreign service corps (R.A. 7157, *The Foreign Service Act of 1991*). Its Carlos P. Romulo School of Diplomacy (CPRSD) is specifically in charge of preparing diplomatic personnel through its in-house training programs and joint graduate studies programs with the University of the Philippines (CPRSD-DFA website). These programs are not made available to non-diplomats and personnel from other government agencies who are also involved in international negotiations<sup>12</sup>.

*Assessment of Capacity.* There is need for closer policy coordination between and among the Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry, and Finance Departments especially when negotiating about trade and investment matters. Furthermore, a strong well-trained team of economic negotiators who are technically and diplomatically proficient should be developed. The



government should also start making available training and academic programs to other international negotiators from other agencies.

### *Strategic Assessment and Policy Analysis*

*Strategic Assessment and/or Just Policy Analysis?* The agencies involved in managing globalization include: the Office of Policy Planning (OPP) of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI); the International Finance Group (IFG) of the Department of Finance (DoF); Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) and Investment Coordination Committee (ICC) of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and the Presidential Management Staff (PMS) of the Office of the President (OP). Their mandates (see Annex 1) show a surprising lack of mention of the function of strategic assessment. Yet, the Philippines has a well-written *Medium-Term Philippine Development Plans* (MTPDPs) where "strategy assessment" is an integral part.<sup>13</sup> One plausible explanation is that "strategic assessment" is made part and parcel of every "policy analysis" conducted but is not reported separately.

*Policy Coordination.* In policy harmonization and synchronization, the Philippine public sector seems to be strong, judging from the formal organizational system. Policy coordination among executive agencies is achieved through the meetings of the Board of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA Board), the central socioeconomic planning agency.<sup>14</sup>

In Congress, the Committees on Trade and Industry, on Banks and Financial Intermediaries, and on Economic Affairs and the Congressional Planning and Budget Office are the arms of the House of Representatives in dealing with globalization-related issues. Their counterparts in the Senate are the Committees on Economic Affairs, on Trade and Commerce, on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, and on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises.

The Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council (LEDAC) was created by Republic Act (RA) 7640 for policy coordination. A brainchild of President Ramos, LEDAC is chaired by the President and acts as an advisory and consultative body to him/her and the legislature to ensure consistency in agenda priorities and coordination of executive and legislative development planning and budgeting. Aside from leaders of the two branches, LEDAC includes the National President of the League of Provinces, and representatives from the private and youth sectors.<sup>15</sup> When LEDAC is active, investment and trade-related bills pass more swiftly (Claudio 2004: 63, 65 and Lumauig 1998: 72-73). The impressive output shows the importance of policy coordination between the two branches.

This formal mechanism, however, does not stop groups from going directly to the President for policy decisions in their favor. Frequently, the latter entertains them without consulting the government's technical experts. This leads to policies which do not have the benefit of thorough evaluation; for example, under President Estrada who did not convene LEDAC, lobbyists took shortcuts through the "midnight cabinet" to reach him. To counteract this, the Economic Coordinating Council (ECC), headed by the Secretary of Finance, was created on 6 January 2000. ECC was supposed to review proposals brought directly to the President so that he would have the benefit of expert advice; however, ECC was created too late to affect Estrada's economic decisions.

*Assessment of Capacity.* While the organizational arrangements for managing globalization are in place, they may not be fully utilized because of the absence of a clear mandate for strategic assessment and coordination among the civil service units involved. The executive and legislative branches seem armed to deal with the geo-economic issues with such innovations as the LEDAC and the ECC along with the regular government agencies; however, the tendency of certain interests to circumvent the ordained route does not contribute to policy coherence and accountability.

#### *Assessment of Investment and Regulatory Regimes for Managing Globalization*

*Institutional Mechanisms and Laws.* The Philippines has institutional mechanisms and laws that aim to make the country investor-friendly. Promotional and regulatory agencies in investment-related activities are the DTT's Investment Promotions Group (IPG), the Board of Investments (BOI), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), NEDA's Investment Coordination Committee (ICC), and the economic zone agencies, i.e., Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), and Clark Development Corporation (CDC).

All post-Marcos administrations have further liberalized and strengthened the regulatory regime to attain the twin goals of economic development and poverty alleviation within the constraints of globalization. New laws may be divided into three types:

- Six laws to further liberalize the entry of foreign investments and goods into the country<sup>16</sup>
- Three laws to mitigate the effects of globalization<sup>17</sup>
- Seven laws to strengthen the regulated sectors of government procurement, banking, capital market, electronic commerce, and intellectual property. (See Annex 1.)

*Regulatory Capture in the Philippine Public Sector: A Case Study on the Controversial CBK-IMPSPA Contract*<sup>18</sup>. The dynamics of the State's management of globalization may be seen through a case which highlights how formal institutional mechanisms could be subject to "regulatory capture."<sup>19</sup> It involves a 25-year BROT<sup>20</sup> Contract between Argentine-based *Industrias Metalurgicas Pescarmona Sociedad Anonima* (IMPSPA) and the Philippine government through its National Power Corporation (NPC). The Contract entails the rehabilitation of three hydropower plants to double their current capacity. The case has involved, from the Philippines, Presidents Ramos, Estrada and Macapagal-Arroyo, three sets of cabinet officials, three sets of NPC officials, two Congressmen, four Senators, five Ambassadors, and hundreds of minor officials. The international actors are: two Argentinian Presidents,<sup>21</sup> one Argentine firm (i.e., IMPSPA), one American firm (i.e., Edison Mission Energy), and the governments of Argentina, Switzerland, United States, and Japan.

The story started when then President Ramos promised the project, an "unsolicited proposal," to IMPSPA in his visit to Argentina in 1993 as a *quid pro quo* for the port privatization project of that country which was won by a Philippine firm. NPC and IMPSPA signed two Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) to that effect in October 1995 which were witnessed by Ramos and Argentine President Carlos Menem.

Ramos endorsed the IMPSPA deal to his successor, Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Estrada personally witnessed the signing of the BROT Contract between the NPC and IMPSPA in November 1998; his Finance Secretary reluctantly signed a performance undertaking (PU) in July 1999. The PU's legality was upheld by a legal opinion issued by Estrada's Justice Secretary in June 2000 which also led to the reluctant signing of the Government Acknowledgment and Consent Agreement (GACA) by an incoming Finance Secretary in June 2000. The IMPSPA project commenced on 7 February 2000.

The case became a controversy when Japan's Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) wrote the Secretary of Finance in March 2000 asking if the PU he signed carried a government guarantee for the project. The issue was brought to the attention of the public by separate privilege speeches in the Senate and in the House from 2000 to 2003. The legislators aired different charges - that the contract was overpriced, and that bribes in the millions of dollars had been paid to Arroyo's Justice Secretary Hernando Perez and the staff of the Department during Estrada's time. Later, the Swiss government requested the Philippines for legal aid in its investigation of Arroyo's Justice Secretary, among others. The project is still ongoing; however, it is not yet resolved whether Perez's opinion gave a direct government guarantee to IMPSPA or not.

What went wrong? The regular process begins with a technical review at the Investment Coordination Committee level before the NEDA Board approves an unsolicited project.<sup>22</sup> In the IMPSA case,

- The project pushed through even though, according to testimonies of engineers, the NPC itself could have undertaken the rehabilitation at a lower cost with Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Official Development Assistance financial backing (Canlas 1998 and Alonzo 1998).
- There was intervention of presidents of both countries for the benefit of a favored foreign firm (Alonzo 1998).
- That firm was awarded the project even though there were serious questions about its qualifications and serious flaws in the contract signed.<sup>23</sup>
- IMPSA itself drafted the BROT Contract and the Supplemental Agreement between the NPC and IMPSA and wrote into it provisions favorable to itself.<sup>24</sup>
- The pressure to sign the IMPSA-drafted BROT Contract came from the Office of the President; the NPC signatory did not even have the authorization from the NPC Board at that time to sign the contract. The Board ratified the contract *ex post facto* (Gonzaga and Pangcoc 1999).

At every step of the review, NEDA stood firm on the BOT Law provision that the unsolicited project was not entitled to a PU from the Philippine government. Unfortunately, it did not have the power to review and approve the final contract signed by the NPC and IMPSA (Canlas 1998).

This regulatory capture has shown that well-planned strategies designed to level the playing field could be circumvented to suit the interests of a few. Such capture could be seen as a sign of "internal weakness" and "bad governance." It is against the interest of the country in two ways, i.e., either by scaring away potential investors or by inviting those who would only exploit the vulnerability of the Philippine public sector for greater financial gains.

*Judicial Review of Investment and Regulatory Policies.* Nine laws on trade and investments enacted since the Constitution of 1987 have been challenged for their constitutionality. In 1997, the Supreme Court struck down RA 8180, the first Oil Deregulation Law, on the grounds that it violated

the prohibition against monopolies and unfair trade practices, however, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Omnibus Investment Code, foreign equity participation in preferred areas of investment, agrarian reform, Foreign Investments Act, Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, value added tax, and the second Oil Deregulation Law (Carmona 2003: 99-100).

The Court's position on nationalism issues has met with more controversy. It reversed in 1999 a decision of the Board of Investments to allow a foreign-owned company to relocate to another site within the country, citing the duty of the State "to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments" (Sereno 2002). It stopped the award of the Manila Hotel, as part of the national patrimony, to the winning bidder, a Malaysian group, by invoking the Filipino First Policy (Carmona 2003: 124-125). It also awarded the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation to a losing Filipino bidder, invoking another provision that public utilities should be 60 percent owned by Filipinos (Sereno 2002). The Court charged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the regulators. These decisions have raised questions about the government's sincerity in inviting foreign investments and fears about the inviolability of contracts (Carmona 2003: 125). The Luzon Petrochemical decision resulted in the pullout of the Taiwanese investor from the Philippines (Vanzi 2001).

*Assessment of Capacity.* One endearing but confusing value of Philippine democracy is that contrasting ideologies seem to have equal chances of being adopted as part of the law of the land; thus, the Constitution promotes free enterprise and nationalism when the two values do not clash. When, however, national patrimony is invoked, the Court has tended to side with the Filipino investor. Because of this situation, there is a growing perception that the Supreme Court may be becoming too interventionist in economic policy formulation and its decisions could discourage foreign investors from doing business in the country (Carmona 2003: 100).

#### *Assessment of Transformation at Local Levels*

*Promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs): Local Response to Globalization*<sup>26</sup>. Taking their cue from the promises of globalization, SMEs have sprouted like mushrooms all over the country. The SME sector now contributes 32 percent of sales, employs 70 percent of the labor force, and comprises about 99.6 percent of all registered firms nationwide (DTI website).

To promote SMEs, the government enacted Republic Act No. 9178 (the *Barangay Micro-Business Enterprise Act of 2000*) and formulated the *National SME Development Agenda*. Agencies of the DTI and other

government agencies provide assistance in marketing, product development/ technological intervention, training, and advocacy. Government financial institutions provide loans under a unified lending program.

Entrepreneurial training programs<sup>26</sup> of the SME Agenda seek to provide existing and potential entrepreneurs with the necessary skills and knowledge to become competitive players in the local or global market. The advocacy component<sup>27</sup> seeks to inform the SMEs, business community, media, and other stakeholders about the availability of the various programs; raise the consciousness of the general public about the economic roles of entrepreneurs in the country's growth and development; and work for the continuous growth of the SME sector. Finally, the Agenda established 25 SME Centers nationwide to provide assistance to existing or potential entrepreneurs on government and private sector programs and services.

*Transformation at the Local Level and Impacts on Culture.* Filipinos creatively and effectively deal with the exigencies of globalization (Pimentel 2002: 9). First, many SMEs have opened businesses in new areas, notably in food processing<sup>28</sup> and furniture manufacturing, backed by the SME Agenda (Pimentel 2002: 9).

Second, Filipino students have taken advantage of the opportunities in the Information Technology (IT) industry. In 2001, about 200,000 students enrolled in computer-related courses. Those who graduate are easily recruited to the US. The Philippines is reportedly the second largest exporter of software in Asia, after India (Arroyo 2001: G12).

Culturally speaking, globalization has its positive and negative effects on the Philippine society. The internet, cable channels, e-mails, cellular phones, and similar technologies have allowed for communications that would have been inconceivable just a few years ago; however, the possession of these technologies has amplified the gap between the poor and the rich in the country. The poor become poorer because they do not have access to the technologies that would soon be the lifeblood of their societies and industries. (Tipton 2002: 83-99).

Being connected to worldwide media exposes everyone to foreign cultures without leaving home. Nowadays, Filipinos may watch dramas in cable channels from other countries. The most popular programs, after Hollywood's, are those from Mexico, China, and Korea (see Cruz 2003 and Torre 2003). Unfortunately, whether Western or not, this would still promote colonial mentality which the Filipinos have, in excess; however, communications are two-way: a local broadcasting company, i.e., ABS-CBN, has decided to mass-produce programs to be sold and broadcasted from Malaysia to Argentina with projected viewers of about 78 million people (Hookway 2002).

*Assessment of Capacity.* The Philippine public sector has shown the capacity to promote opportunities to SMEs through law and a national agenda. Enterprising Filipinos have responded by taking advantage of the government offer for financial assistance and services; however, it remains to be seen whether the consuming public will patronize goods and services that local SMEs will produce, given colonial mentality among Filipinos and difficult competition abroad. With the technologies and access to other cultures that come with globalization, such mentality may be further encouraged, thereby reducing all the more the Filipinos' interest to patronize locally-produced goods and services. Lastly, the digital divide may further enlarge the gap between the rich and the poor.

#### *Overall Assessment of the Capacity to Manage Globalization*

Analysis shows that there is no dearth of government programs that are supposed to help the country respond to globalization. Moreover, there are admirable qualities that can be seen in the way the Philippine public sector has responded:

- The government and individual citizens have challenged the deluge of imported goods and transnational corporations into the country by recognizing, promoting, and establishing SMEs.
- The judiciary is zealously exercising its Constitutional mandate to protect the country's economy and patrimony by repudiating economic policies that are heavily against the national interest.
- The Philippine government is able to accelerate the legislation of economic laws through the LEDAC. The Council, perhaps the only one of its kind in the world, brings together leaders of the executive and legislative branches to discuss economic measures that need to be enacted immediately.

Certain problems, however, in the country's mechanisms to cope with the challenges of globalization are observed. These include the following:

- Strategic assessment has not been given the importance it deserves.
- Coordination of both economic policy and implementation has not been adequately done. There is the problem of the formulation and implementation of "economic diplomacy" which needs the synchronized approach of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Trade and Industry. There is also the uneven use of LEDAC as a policy coordination mechanism.

- Non-DFA technical personnel sent abroad should not only be well-grounded on their areas of specialization but also on the methods and techniques of cross-cultural communication, diplomacy, and negotiation so as to become effective advocates of the country's interests. At the moment, these training programs are only available to diplomats.
- Except in LEDAC and the various local development councils, the participation of the civil society in formal economic policy assessment, formulation and implementation is still "by invitation" of government agencies. Civil society organizations complain that their positions on trade issues are largely ignored.
- There is a perception in the business community that the Supreme Court has become an arrogant interventionist on the formulation and implementation of economic policies. This is a controversy where both sides can garner strong support.

As shown in the IMPSA case study, well-meant and well-planned responses to globalization could be jeopardized if relevant government agencies are captured by a few. If not controlled, regulatory capture would send the wrong signal to domestic and foreign investors that the rules of economic engagement in the country could be circumvented for the benefit of powers-that-be. Unswerving adherence to "good governance" of strong-willed and public-interested heads of State is the only antidote seen to rescue government agencies from the binds of regulatory capture.

## **Theme 2: Participation and Accountability**

### *Participation and Globalization*

#### *1. The Philippine Record in Citizen Participation*

*The People Power Revolutions.* The Philippines has been known for its People Power Revolutions during which, in 1986 and 2001, both lasting only four days, millions of demonstrating citizens succeeded in toppling the government of the day. The first Revolution, in fact, served as a model for the toppling of authoritarian regimes by the collective force of their peoples throughout the world (Villanueva 1999).<sup>29</sup> Also called the EDSAs for the avenue where they happened,<sup>30</sup> these peaceful revolutions showed the strength and magnitude of civil society in the Philippines. Both involved individuals, families, and, more importantly, groups of various kinds—crossing income, occupation, education, religion and ideological lines—staring down the might of a government, united in insisting that it be accountable to



the people. For many organizations, the EDSAs marked the culmination of years of organizing, conscientization and training to empower the people.<sup>31</sup>

Yet the Revolutions, only fifteen years apart, also show the fragility of the country's institutions. The supposedly accountable mechanisms in place could not function.<sup>32</sup> The people had lost patience with legalistic niceties because the gap between the formal and the effective processes of democracy was just too wide. A third People Power Revolution was attempted just four months later, supported by a different set of organizations and less disinclined to violence than the first two. Moreover, since 1986, aggrieved citizens would "people-power" at the slightest excuse: dissatisfaction with an agency head, frustration at not receiving benefits, anger at law enforcement affecting them adversely, and the like, attempting to short-circuit legal processes, seeking immediate gratification and short-term gains, asking government to answer to only a few rather than the general public that guided the two EDSAs. It is against this backdrop that the Philippine record of participation and accountability shall be discussed.

*Legal and Policy Frameworks for Participation.* The participation of citizens in governance has been marked by an ever-increasing scope of suffrage from the election of local officials by a very limited set of elite voters during Spanish colonization, to the universal suffrage sought by the short-lived Malolos Constitution of the Philippine Revolutionary Government (1898). The American colonial government instituted popular elections for national offices by 1907, and extended the vote to women by the 1930s. Election of local officials was enacted again soon after Filipinos took over the helm of government in 1946; however, participation of citizens beyond the electoral process was not recognized until the Decentralization Movement of the 1960s which sought to bring government closer to the people. The Barrio Charter recognized the village (later called *barangay*, the pre-colonial indigenous term) as the basic unit of government and created barangay councils through which the people may undertake community planning and development. Election to the council is on a non-partisan basis to highlight community solidarity. Its officials are not paid salaries nor considered government functionaries to show that they are of the citizenry rather than of the State.

The Barrio Charter combined the two elements of citizen participation in a democracy: election of the people's representatives to public office and direct community involvement; however, the authoritarian regime of President Ferdinand Marcos called elections a Western democratic notion and used the barangay only as a venue to showcase popular consultation on policy and program decisions made by the President and other top administrators (de Guzman 1977) This top-down, token notion of participation was rejected by various citizen groups, called "non-governmental" or "civil society

organizations" (NGOs/CSOs), which fanned out to the countryside to conscientize the masses not only to oppose the dictatorship but also to take control of the direction of their lives and that of their communities.

NGOs, which mediate between the State and the grassroots, are only the most overtly political of citizen organizations. A recent estimate of the nonprofit sector and civil society in the Philippines sees NGOs as accounting for only 14 percent of a total of from a quarter to half a million organizations. They are joined by people's or community organizations (63-64 percent), cooperatives (8-10 percent), and other non-stock corporations (like hospitals and schools) (8-15 percent). The proliferation of organizations springs from the society's ethos of *kapwa* (shared inner self), Filipinos being more communitarian than individualistic; the effect of a Catholic Christianity preaching both charity and liberation theology; a history of oppression under both colonial and home-grown leaders; and an increasing proportion of people middle-class by education and poor by income standards (Cariño 2002).

Following the restoration of democracy in 1986, the State has formally encouraged direct citizen participation in governance. The 1987 Philippine Constitution not only gives citizens the right to vote, but also allows them powers of initiative and referendum in lawmaking and recall of local officials. It requires the socioeconomic planning agency to consult "various private sectors" before recommending development policies to Congress (Art. XII, Sec. 9). Moreover, it declares citizen participation in governance as a major State policy.<sup>33</sup> Accordingly, several laws<sup>34</sup> mandate consultation with affected citizens prior to the promulgation of decisions. In the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), chaired by no less than the President of the Philippines, representatives of fourteen "basic sectors"<sup>35</sup> sit across cabinet officials and the presidents of leagues of local government units (RA 8425). In addition, the 1991 *Local Government Code* requires the participation of citizen organizations in local special bodies. It also allows local government units to enter into joint ventures with people's and nongovernmental organizations for service delivery, capacity building and livelihood projects. In what may be the ultimate in citizen participation, the local government of Naga City, adapting an idea from the local civil society groups, passed an Empowerment Ordinance which provides for citizens' representatives in all decisionmaking bodies. Naga's experiment has withstood the test of time and changes in local administration, with both the government and civil society committed to maintain their critical collaboration.

Government line agencies have opened NGO liaison offices or desks. The government gives organizations grants for development projects and allows them to bid for State contracts on a ten percent premium.<sup>36</sup> It even allows NGOs to negotiate directly with other governments for funding even as some Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds stipulate NGO and PO participation in project implementation.

It should be noted, however, that legal mandates and constitutionality do not guarantee true participatory governance. Areas of fiscal and economic policy, although they affect the daily lives of citizens, have not been opened to public participation. According to the Chairperson of Transparency International (TI)-Philippines, in instances like the privatization program and conditionalities tied to foreign loans, government denies participation to the citizens (Español 2001). Indeed, the government has sold its assets, deregulated major industries, liberalized trade and investment, and entered into international trade agreements without prior consultation with the people, and, indeed, often amidst loud protests from the citizenry.

Even representation in governance in bodies as mandated by law has not been truly attained. Statistics from the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) show that only a small percentage of local governments have actually convened the local special bodies with citizen-participants. Meanwhile, political officials have intervened in the choice of representatives of basic sectors, particularly during President Estrada's time, instead of allowing the sectoral organizations to pick their representatives democratically (Bennagen n.d. and CODE-NGO 2001).

*Political Parties and Political Skill Building.* Political parties in the Philippines are vehicles for people to be elected to public office, but they do not present voters with a coherent platform of government for their informed choice. Rather they are centered around personalities, expand exponentially when these leaders win, and are quickly abandoned when they lose (Olivares n.d. and Cruz 2002).<sup>37</sup> As a partial remedy to the personality-based party system, the Constitution of 1987 provided that as much as twenty percent of seats in the House of Representatives may be filled by "party-list" organizations. These are organizations representing marginalized sectors who would otherwise not have a chance to be elected to Congress.<sup>38</sup> Associations in the party-list, more than the regular parties, train their members and recruits on their stand on causes and other political skills.

Of the regular parties, it is probably only the Liberal Party (LP) that conducts a program of political skill-building between elections. LP is the second oldest party in the country and has somehow maintained its presence<sup>39</sup> through the vagaries of Philippine politics. Its active youth arm, the *Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas* (KALUPI, Liberal Youth of the Philippines) trains young leaders in liberalism and nationalism and hopes to transform the nature of Philippine politics. It is a member of the International Federation of Liberal and Radical Youth (IFLRY) – the world's largest organization of young liberals and is also a founding member of the Young Liberals and Democrats of Asia (YLDA).

## *2. Participation in Support of Globalization*

Citizen participation covers all fields of endeavor. In relation to globalization, there are groups for, as well as against it. Among the organizations that support globalization is the Employers Confederation of the Philippines (ECOP), with a membership of over 500 of the biggest corporations and 50 industry associations. Established in 1975, it was recognized soon after by the government as the representative of employers in labor, management and State discussions. ECOP now represents business in many government boards.<sup>40</sup> It conducts annual surveys on compensation and benefits and on collective bargaining agreements.

At present, the promotion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is at the heart of its agenda<sup>41</sup>; thus, ECOP promotes the Global Compact led by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.<sup>42</sup> In 2003, ECOP focused its national conference on the Global Compact, and published its first Global Compact casebook.<sup>43</sup> ECOP also circulates the Employers' Compendium on Corporate Social Responsibility. With the International Labor Organization (ILO) as co-sponsor, it supports the Child Friendly Movement.<sup>44</sup>

CSR is incorporated into business strategies through the work of at least three other civil society organizations: the League of Corporate Foundations (LCF), the Makati Business Club (MBC), and the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP).<sup>45</sup>

More directly aiming at global competitiveness are organizations involved in raising the level of product standards. In this connection, local chambers of commerce and industry have joined the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) through the country's national standards body, the Bureau of Product Standards (BPS) of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).<sup>46</sup> About 1,200 ISO-certified companies operate in the Philippines.

Other organizations focus on individual industries like the Social Accountability International (SAI) that is largely confined to the garment, textile and leather industry. SAI, a global civil society organization, grants the Social Accountability (SA) 8000 certification to companies that uphold core labor standards and have been so verified by an independent group of social auditors. SAI works as a tripartite organization. In the Philippines, it consists of the Garments and Textiles Export Board, the lead agency of the Philippine government responsible for the regulation, promotion, expansion and development of garments and textile exports, the ECOP, and the Philippine affiliate of the International Textile, Garment, and Leather Workers Federation (ITGLWF). The Filipino General Secretary of that union sits in the SAI board in New York. Because of its very stringent requirements, only about 20 firms have so far received SA 8000 certification (Adviento 2004).

The state of different certification programs shows up a globalization problem. Despite support from business and civil society groups, only a few corporations – usually the biggest ones – have managed to pass certification standards. Moreover, there is the possibility that with strict enforcement of the core standards for SMEs and rural enterprises, these may close down, leaving the communities with more unemployment and poverty than ever.

### 3. *Participation as Critique of Globalization*

At the other side of the spectrum is the participation of citizens against what they decry as imperialist globalization, the collective action of “a handful of imperialist states, headed by the U.S., and concentrated in the Group of Seven, (to) control and use an array of the most powerful multilateral agencies, ... to determine the pattern of investments and trade in the client states and thereby dominate the world, economically and consequently in all other respects” (Sison 1999). Various labor groups, peasant and urban poor organizations, middle-class activists, and party-list groups, among others, contend that globalization has resulted in “greater suffering and exploitation of people” and “attacks workers’ rights and livelihood” (Labog 2003). These organizations have mounted sizable rallies against the Asia Pacific Economic Coalition, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, WTO, the US Embassy and Filipino policy makers for their espousal of trade and investment liberalization. Of these groups, only two are cited: Focus on the Global South and the Freedom from Debt Coalition, which have been at the forefront of “principled opposition” against globalization.

Focus on the Global South is based in Bangkok but with many Filipino members.<sup>47</sup> Along with other civil society groups in the parliament of the streets of those cities, Focus was able to abort the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999 and to disrupt the WTO’s fifth ministerial meeting in Cancun in September 2003. The group aims to lead in an international campaign which includes: lobbying governments in Geneva; providing good and timely research and analysis; coordinating with national social movements, particularly in Asia; and helping organize mass demonstrations globally (Focus on the Global South 2003).

In support of the worldwide campaign to cancel the debts of the poorest countries, the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) has been steadfast in its demand for the State to retract its “honor the debt above all” policy. FDC has member-organizations spanning the entire ideological spectrum, united only in their struggle against unjust debts and their debilitating effects on the poor. It has unsuccessfully called for the repeal of the Automatic Appropriations Law, the placement of a 10 percent cap in debt servicing and the prevention of the imposition of a regressive tax system (E-VAT). Among

its victories are the "*Kilusang* (Movement for) Rollback," which pressured the government to suspend the oil levy and lower oil prices. The debate finally gave way to the Comprehensive Tax Reform Package (FDC 1998).

Efforts against globalization have also focused on local events. For instance, in 1996, a tunnel of the Marcopper Mining Corporation broke, releasing tons of mine waste to the Boac River. It caused the destruction and contamination of the local environment, and displaced people from their homes and their livelihood. The villagers' outcry<sup>45</sup> eventually led to a cease and desist order from the government. Scrutiny of international organizations like the United Nations, Canadian NGOs and the media, and the criminal indictment in the Philippines of Marcopper's President and Resident Manager put further pressure on Placer Dome, the owner of MMC, to rehabilitate the river and other areas affected by the spill and to compensate the community for the damages (Marinduque Council for Environmental Concerns (MACCEC) and Coumans 2002 and Coumans 2002). The organizations awakened by the MMC disaster continue their activities on behalf of the environment, and have succeeded in scrapping the passage of the National Mining Policy, a priority of the Arroyo administration (Mines and Communities 2003) and the opening of a Placer Dome mine in Latin America.

#### *4. Participation to Support Victims of Globalization*

The government assures the public that it will provide safety nets for eventual losers of globalization; however, the country's low level of competitiveness is exacerbated by continuing high poverty, a huge gap between the rich and the poor, high unemployment, and low scores in the Human Development Index; thus, safety nets are writ large, embracing social development as a whole rather than safeguarding measures specific to a particular liberalization law. Civil society has filled in many gaps left by government. They have provided alternative social services.<sup>49</sup> In some instances, they have managed not only to directly help the poor but also to push for policies that will enable them to lift themselves out of poverty. In others, they have successes only in specific small communities. They have had problems in scaling up their programs, or in getting the State to enact the policies they desire. Laws enacted following supposedly popular consultations do not bear the mark of NGOs' policy influence (Quizon 1989). Nevertheless the gap between official and actual policy is not to the same extent and level of hostility as during the dictatorship.

#### *5. Summary: Participation and Globalization*

Citizen participation on issues of globalization has many exemplars in the Philippines. Participation to support globalization is shown

preponderantly by associations of business groups. They seek to improve quality and the firms' adherence to corporate citizenship, and therefore their global competitiveness. In doing so, they act as self-regulatory mechanisms of the private sector and work closely with the government regulatory body for that aspect of business performance; however, only a very small percentage of firms are actually engaged in the CSR and certification techniques these groups have been advocating.

At the same time, globalization has aroused the ire of many organizations; it has been noted that participation has not been opened for policymaking on privatization, liberalization and tax reform. The organizations have had some successes, but many more demands for policy reform and government action have not been heard. At the same time, it should be cautioned that the divide between critic and supporter is not an impermeable one since organizations like PBSP and LCF, if not actually mouthing anti-imperialist slogans, are involved in social development activities. In this context, social development may serve as a synonym for the safety nets required by globalization.

### *Accountability and Globalization*

#### *1. The Philippine Record in Accountability*

*Institutional Mechanisms in Place.* The Philippines has many anti-corruption laws dating back to the colonial period. Laws, such as the Forfeiture Law and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were enacted during the Independence period while Martial Law produced summary dismissals (Presidential Decree or PD No. 6), the Civil Service Act (PD 807),<sup>50</sup> Anti-Gift Giving and Receiving Act (PD 46), Statement of Assets and Liabilities, and Immunity for witnesses in bribery. The post-Marcos period saw the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards Act (RA 6713), the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Act Against Plunder, and the Sandiganbayan Act.

The 1987 Constitution upheld the principle of public office as public trust (like earlier constitutions), maintained the Commission on Audit, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Elections to combat corruption and hold public officials accountable to the people. It elevated the Commission on Human Rights, the Sandiganbayan<sup>51</sup> and the Ombudsman to constitutional status. The constitutional commissions and the Sandiganbayan practically constitute a fourth branch of government, being independent of both the executive and the legislature, and subject to review only by the Supreme Court.

The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) was created to act as protector of the people and to investigate any illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient act or omission of any public official. It has installed Resident Ombudsmen in graft-prone departments and government corporations. Through its Corruption Prevention Units and Junior Graftwatch Units, the Ombudsman works with nongovernmental organizations, people's organizations, and specifically youth organizations to ensure broad community-based fight against graft and corruption. It also joins forces with the Department of Education in developing instructional materials and monitoring instruments that will help students understand the ills of corruption and the means to deter it. OMB has also developed a partnership with the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) to instill graft prevention awareness among the viewing public. Other projects of OMB are research or thesis assistance for students doing research on graft and corruption. As part of the Moral Recovery Program, it conducts values orientation workshops and seminars on public accountability for new government employees.

Anti-corruption agencies under the President include the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which play supportive roles to the main anti-graft and corruption bodies. In addition, all presidents since Elpidio Quirino in the 1950s have created their own anti-graft commissions. Created under the first Executive Order of President Corazon Aquino, the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) was tasked to recover the ill-gotten wealth of President Marcos. President Ramos' Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAG) was abolished and replaced by the National Anti-Corruption Commission, created by President Estrada, but was never activated. In April 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo resurrected the PCAG, and renamed it the Philippine Anti-Graft Commission (Executive Order (EO) No. 12 2001). It is mandated to investigate and hear administrative cases and complaints against personnel in the Executive Department, including presidential appointees.

*Poor Record in Combating Corruption.* Despite this arsenal against corruption, the Philippines remains a corruption-infested country. In the 1995-2002 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, the Philippines ranked fifty-fifth (55<sup>th</sup>), compared to Singapore, which ranked sixth (6<sup>th</sup>) despite having only one agency to enforce its comprehensive anti-corruption laws. Quah's (2003) comparative study of six nations shows that it is not the number of agencies but strong political will that marks success in anti-corruption efforts. In fact, the multiplicity of agencies may detract from a strong anti-corruption program through competition and division of resources.

Besides, a study on corruption in the Philippines conducted by the World Bank in 1999 showed that corruption does not reside only in the public sphere (Bhargava 1999). Similarly, a local enterprise survey revealed that broad



corruptive practices were present not just in government, but also in the business sector. Only a low percentage of firms said that they issue receipts, keep only one set of accounts, and pay their taxes honestly. Moreover, a high percentage of managers and firms admitted they use bribes to get public and private sector contracts, and they seldom or never punish their corrupt executives. Indeed, the business community recognizes that in its effort to fight corruption in the government, it must first clean up its ranks (Mangahas 2004).

*Record in Sensitivity Towards and Respect for Citizens' Needs including Right to Information.* The Constitution guarantees freedom of the press and the people's right to information. (Art. III, Sec. 4 and 7). Transparency is government policy. It is under such favorable conditions that Philippine media assert their role as the public's watchdog. Media and public attention and pressure force government to act on corruption complaints. On any given day, print and broadcast media bring out presumptive cases of corruption. Reports of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) were used as bases for the Articles of Impeachment against President Estrada in 2000.

The media, however, are not immune to the claws of corruption either. In a PCIJ survey (2002) of beat reporters, 70 percent said they have been offered money by their sources. Of these, 30 percent said they took the money. Furthermore, 46 percent of the public interviewed said there is "some corruption" in the media, while 14 percent said there is "a great deal."

## 2. *New Frameworks and Tools to Combat Corruption*

Aside from the accountability laws and mechanisms already in place, the government has enacted several new laws to attack corruption. There have also been agency-level initiatives as well as programs and proposals from the private sector and civil society.

*The Anti-Money Laundering Law.* Because of loose controls, the Philippines is becoming known as a center of operations of those who receive funds through illegal means thus, the Financial Action Task Force (established by the G-7 Paris Summit in 1989) told the country that an Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) should be passed by September 30, 2001 or it will face an international boycott. RA No. 9160 met the deadline but did not pass its standards, whereupon FATF demanded that it be amended. The country complied: AMLA's amended version, RA No. 9194 passed in 2003 though not without loud protests from legislators and civil society organizations criticizing the State's subservience to global interests (Cariño 2004). They were joined by apprehensions voiced by business leaders and

ordinary citizens (like the overseas contract workers) regarding the possible violation of their human rights and bank secrecy laws.

*ICT-based Policies.* Congress has enacted the e-Commerce law, aimed both to promote and give safeguards to corporations transacting business by electronic media. For government itself, Congress has changed the antiquated system of government purchases by allowing electronic procurement. A companion measure is the Government Procurement Reform Law (RA 9184), which is administered by the Procurement Policy Board. Interestingly, the Board has designated a civil society arm, the Procurement Watch, to monitor its activities.

#### *Other National-Level Innovations*

*Government.* Other innovations have been contributed by government, as well as the private sector and civil society. Government initiatives include reforms at the agency level, such as, the Revenue Integrity Protection Service (RIPS) of the Department of Finance and the Internal Affairs Service of the Philippine National Police, where, instead of waiting for the regular anti-corruption agencies, these corruption-ridden offices introduce structures and processes to police their own ranks. These are supplemented by lifestyle checks and voluntary vulnerability assessments of agencies which have been devised by the President's Committee for Effective Governance (Boncodin 2004). Other mechanisms focus on increasing the transparency of government operations. Government websites vary in quality and up-to-dateness, but are useful for keeping people abreast of how they perform.

*Business.* Transparency and Accountable Governance (TAG) is a collaborative project of the private sector and the government. It presents the profile of corruption in the country, engages in public opinion surveys, investigative reports, case studies, and briefings to engage the public in a discussion on corruption. It also carries on capacity-building efforts in selected cities and municipalities of Mindanao.

In one of its surveys, it found that most businesses are willing to give three percent of their net income to support an Anti-Corruption Program if this would halve corruption within ten years. According to the firms, even a five percent contribution is a good investment for they are expecting that a reduced level of corruption would consequently bring a 20 percent increase in their income. They propose that the fund be used to conduct lifestyle checks, prosecute corrupt officials, and protect whistleblowers (Mangahas 2004).

*Media.* There is a growing tradition of investigative reporting led by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) and such television

programs as "Imbestigador" and "The Probe Team." Media initiate their own investigations on unreported or under-reported issues, and even look into cases that law enforcers have investigated and declared as closed. Media have also become public educators, showing citizens what they can do about corruption. PCIJ has developed manuals, publications and videos on corruption and governance. It also put research data online like the asset declarations of public officials (<http://www.pcij.org>). Some of its cases are instances of cross-border transactions exposing real estate transactions, telecommunications and the like (Coronel 2000).

*Civil Society.* Various groups of citizens have focused efforts on fighting corruption. They have different manifestations: CIBAC (a party-list organization associated with a religious sect); the Transparency and Accountability Network, a loose network to coordinate anti-corruption initiatives by civil society; and e-groups like *Talsik* (Oust them!). A few civil service unions have gone beyond self-interested demands for better working conditions, monitored the accountability of their officials and managed to oust their corrupt superiors (Gaffud 1994).

Civil society participation, particularly by the Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government and the National Urban Poor Assembly, received a boost when the Commission on Audit trained and accredited them to take part in participatory audit activities, but was let down when within the year it decided to discontinue the program (Sumangil 2004). Organizations have also resorted to the use of cell phones to report thefts, smoke belching of vehicles and other visible flaunting of law. Cell phones were credited for a large part of the success of EDSA II, although a social science study later showed that the importance of electronic communication was greatly exaggerated (Pertierra 2002).

### **Prospects for Enhancing Participation and Accountability for Globalization**

As State and market accelerate Philippine involvement in globalization, citizens have followed suit with various activities for and against its policies and its effects. Whatever their stand, citizen groups have tried to contribute to the realization of the public interest although they may not have heard each other's views well enough to recognize that. All sides espouse values that the other would appreciate, and the critique of Transparency International about putting important economic policies outside the participation agenda needs to be heard. This would require setting up mechanisms for participation developed in other sectors to globalization issues also.

The initiatives to enhance accountability have generally been focused on improving governance and economic conditions of Philippine society. Accountability as regards globalization has started to be pursued in only a limited number of instances, such as, in money laundering, e-commerce, and the new government procurement system. What is noteworthy is the number of initiatives where the globalization process may profit from the combination of participation and accountability; for instance, the globalization of civil society organizations is already apparent in the presence of Philippine branches of Transparency International and international environmental groups, as well as Focus on the Global South, on the one hand, and the Financial Action Task Force, on the other. Though not espousing the same side of globalization, these organizations show that many problems faced by a country have implications beyond it, and need to be tackled internationally. Governments have long recognized these and have bilateral and multilateral treaties and universal covenants for these purposes. The citizens are now awakening to the fact that these problems are also their concerns and there are like-minded people outside their nation's boundaries that share their preoccupation. The combination of citizen participation, accountability and globalization is the emerging force that this study has only begun to uncover.

### **Conclusions and Policy Implications**

#### *Summary of Main Conclusions*

The Philippines provides a rich case to mine for lessons in government reinvention toward globalization. Among these are the complexities brought by globalization to the management of national affairs, institutionalization issues, and difficulties in reaping the benefits of participation; thus, for every virtue and advantage there seems to be an equal set of problems and areas for improvement. This is not due primarily to an attempt at balance, but because indeed the Philippines presents models for emulation while having also an abundance of sources of frustration.

*Globalization and National Affairs.* Philippine colonial history and its recent (neo-colonial) past has made it wary of international economic relationships in which it has seldom emerged victorious and able to protect its national interest. It continues to try to maintain its rightful place in the community of nations but has to manage contradictions and dilemmas at every turn.

The Philippines has embraced democracy as the system within which it will work toward global competitiveness and sustainable human development; thus it allows free discussion of issues through political institutions, mass media and street protests. The democratic choice is not always efficient and

effective, nor has it been allowed to function to the extent desired by some of its citizens.

The Philippines was among the first to enter WTO and even made promises to cut tariff ahead of global requirements; however, reacting to sustained citizen protests and recognizing the inequity of some global policies, it has shifted from staunch to wary support.

Its successive Constitutions, even the 1987 one which it promulgated at the cusp of the present globalization movement, are nationalistic and supportive of judicial intervention in economic affairs. Although approving of free enterprise, the Philippine Constitution provides an added protection for Filipino firms, reserving to them strategic areas of the economy. Cases invoking these nationalistic provisions also show a country where the playing field is not level and signed contracts are not final, which may drive much needed foreign investments away; thus, this nationalistic judicial activism puts the country in a real dilemma.

SMEs constitute the bulk of the economy. Some have responded well to globalization but many more are less able to compete globally. They are also more prone to suffer from the fallout of Filipino colonial mentality which equates foreignness with superior products; thus, their survival even within the local market is imperiled, affecting the livelihood of both labor and management.

The IMPSA case shows that globalization exacerbates the problems of liberalization and accountability. Regulatory capture is writ large as it crosses several national boundaries and involves not bureaucrats or regulators but the highest political officials. It is an abject lesson that adherence to ethics and the rule of law is even more significant when dealing with global relationships.

*Institutionalization Issues.* On paper, the Philippines seems quite equipped to handle the vagaries of international trade and the struggle against corruption since it has made many organizational innovations, has passed many laws, and created offices for practically every eventuality; however, this formal readiness does not always translate into institutional effectiveness.

The Philippines has shown the world the ultimate in participation by the ouster of presidents in a bloodless non-violent process participated in by volunteers numbering in the millions. Yet, the People Power Revolutions also manifest the tendency toward quick fixes, an emotional approach to difficult issues, and weak institutions that keep the country from a slow but sure accumulation and building up of good laws and best practices. Persistent

issues about the constitutionality and sustainability of these quick fixes linger and continue to divide the country, presenting threats that contribute to instability.

The Philippines has crafted innovations in law and practice that may help other nations deal with issues of globalization, participation and accountability.

The Philippines offers models in people's participation in governance, such as, the Empowerment Ordinance of Naga City, the mandated citizen representation in various local policy making councils, a premium for community-based organizations competing for government contracts, the creation of NGO desks in government and the access of organizations to ODA funds. Many other new ideas come from NGOs, such as their various community-based programs and micro-finance projects.

The Philippines has crafted an innovation for presidential systems in its creation of LEDAC through which the State, business and civil society join hands at the highest policy level. When utilized and allowed to work, especially during the time of its creator President Ramos, it manifested the superiority of policy coordination between the co-equal branches and produced substantive outputs in law that helped prepare the country for globalization.

The Philippines has enacted several innovative laws to promote ethics and accountability in governance, such as, the Forfeiture Law, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Ethical Standards Act and the Act against Plunder. It has also started agency self-assessments of vulnerability to corruption, participatory audits, and corruption prevention units. These are model laws and practices that have been followed by other countries in their own campaigns against corruption.

The Philippines has also shown that good ideas need to be implemented and institutionalized to become springboards for genuine public sector reform. While formal systems, mechanisms, processes, and procedures are in place, down to the last detail, informal practice frequently dominates. Lobbyists, contractors, etc. still go directly to the highest official of the land as the IMPSA case exemplifies. The experience of LEDAC shows the failure to institutionalize an innovation of a previous administration, and to capitalize on its gains. In other cases, the culprit may not be the change from one administration to the next, but the institutionalization of a good idea from NGOs to the bureaucracy.

Globalization is a movement that tends to permeate every nook and cranny of the government, if not of the whole society. This may explain why each cabinet department has created a policy planning group of some kind. Unnecessary competition among departments and the redundancy of work by

people with skills in short supply have arisen directly from this proliferation. More significantly, it was also found out that it is not clear how much strategic assessment actually takes place. Strategic assessment is necessary, however, if the country is to seriously harness its resources to succeed as a player in the globalization arena.

The Philippines has correctly put economic diplomacy at the heart of its foreign relations. The problem again is in coordination across agencies, whether it be in the conduct of actual international negotiations (which is the task of the Department of Trade and Industry, not the Department of Foreign Affairs which handles economic diplomacy) or the building of capacity of diplomats and other negotiators.

The Philippines, in pursuit of both poverty reduction and economic liberalization, has created a regime of regulatory governance in which practically every industry has its corresponding regulator. This situation allows the regulators to specialize in a particular issue and reverses the previous approach where the Public Services Commission handled all industries; however, it can make them too close to the players in the regulated industry and facilitate regulatory capture. It is not yet clear which approach would serve the public interest better.

Elections are periods of contestation between various groups called political parties; however, these groups remain oriented to personalities and each election is marred by charges and countercharges of cheating and violence. Orientation to policies is an exception, and is exemplified by some of the associations in the party-list, a constitutional innovation to give marginalized groups representation in Congress.

The lack of genuine political parties contributes to the instability of institutions, which even in the bureaucracy, is centered on the personality of the leader and not on the programs mandated by law. This focus on the person is shown in the problems of IMPSA and LEDAC where questions are brought directly to and are solved by a president, making access to the leader the prime factor in policy making.

*The Role of the Private Sector and Civil Society.* The Philippines has accepted the new concept of governance as an effort where the State allows market and civil society a role in managing societal affairs. The delicate balance such participation entails is shown in the issue of globalization. Although an NGO-friendly State, Philippine organizations pull State policies from the pro to the anti and all points in between. This leaves the State free to claim any policy as the voice of the people. In the process, civil society participation may hardly leave a mark in policy.

Citizens have participated in defining the public interest with their freedom to voice out their perspective on any issue, and to criticize the State and other groups for their differing views. Advocacy of one's position is healthy for any democratic system, as long as there is tolerance and a recognition that the other groups are also sincerely claiming to embody the public interest. Globalization has been one of those critical issues that divide the populace and citizen groups line up on all points of the spectrum. Creative and critical collaboration would be essential since the country is at the low end of the competitiveness scale, accountability, and the efforts at poverty reduction.

Globalization has been supported by groups allied with or composed of private sector firms. They are mainly concerned with labor, human rights, and environmental standards as well as issues of corporate social responsibility. This admirable concern is vitiated only by the fact that only a small percentage of business firms take up the challenges of these organizations.

Anti-globalization advocates have been more visible and have managed to win some but not most of their demands. They have enlightened the public on globalization issues; however, they tend to have stronger critiques than alternative programs and to that extent may be less effective in the long run.

While many laws have allowed for citizen involvement in decision-making, many economic issues are outside the pale of these mandates; thus, some of the most contentious issues of globalization are discussed by NGOs not in government boards but in street demonstrations and occasional consultations. This may redound to laws providing for NGO participation degenerating to tokenism. NGOs may not be represented in the decisions that really matter. The best example is the decision to ratify WTO. Government ignored civil society voices until actual experience and *realpolitik* pressured it to backtrack.

Civil society is filling the gap left by the State by providing alternative delivery mechanisms and services to the poor and other victims of globalization. Some of these organizations provide models for later state delivery but their lessons have not been picked up by the State, or are not scaled up to reach all the deserving nationwide.

The Philippines' long list of laws and organizations to deal with accountability has not managed to reverse its poor performance and corrupt image; rather, this huge arsenal may have weakened enforcement through competition among the agencies, in the midst of few resources, and a re-enforcement of legalistic means of fighting corruption.

The State has not fully harnessed the strength and willingness of many organizations to join the struggle for greater accountability. They are



important allies if the government is serious in wiping out corruption. Specifically, the private firms' offer to donate a percentage of their income to the anti-corruption fight must be seized by the horns. This is a sterling example of private-public partnership that must not be allowed to fall into tokenism.

Technological developments have been harnessed in the struggle for accountability with such innovations as e-governance, e-procurement and e-commerce. The use of cell phones to report thefts, smoke belching, and other visible flaunting of law shows the possibilities of popular participation in making the State accountable.

*Policy Implications for the Philippines.* Faced with the dilemma of nationalism versus liberalization, one should not fall into the temptation of impugning judicial review. Judicial review of all decisions, including economic policies, is a facet of democracy and protects both the society and the individual. Instead, what may be needed is development of the judiciary that would train the court on global economics and geo-politics, so that their judgment would be based on law while cognizant also of economic and social realities.

There is no shortage of ideas in the Philippines about how to make the country more competitive, while also not forgetting the need for poverty reduction and continued employment. It must now learn to harness its innovations, technical capacity for reform and public participatory processes to craft a vision and a strategy that can rally State, market and civil society to this national purpose.

The Philippines is a signatory to the MDGs. Capacity to fund the huge funding requirements to meet these commitments is constrained partly by difficulties in managing globalization in the matter of debt, trade and foreign investment.

*Policy Implications for the Region.* As has already been mentioned, the Philippines has presented lessons for emulation as well as examples to avoid for other countries wishing to embark along the same path it has taken. For international policy and discussions, the following policy implications may be considered.

With due regard for internal Philippine shortcomings in leadership, resource generation and institutionalization, the international policy on debt, credit and subsidies takes into larger account the interests of more developed rather than the struggling nations; thus, strengthening the planning and strategic assessments and negotiating capacities of the Group of 20 and its individual country members would be welcome.

Global civil society has made its presence felt not only in WTO international meetings but also in local problems like the Marinduque mining disaster. The development of people's participation as global citizens has not been well-recognized and should be the subject of further promotion as well as study.

The development of international standards for both global competitiveness and universal core values in the areas of human rights, labor rights, gender equity, and the environment is a welcome development even in the poorer countries; however, only the biggest corporations appear to be able to afford them. Moreover, their strict implementation, though desirable, may decrease employment opportunities in the poorer countries. This is a dilemma that requires special international studies and discussions.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>These were: the Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA) which consolidated all Individual Action Plans, Collective Action Plans, and joint activities of the member-countries; APEC-private sector partnership through the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC); Holding of the first APEC Ministerial Meeting on Sustainable Development; and Inauguration of the APEC Center for Technological Exchange and Training for Small and Medium Enterprises (ACTETSME) (Siazon 1998: 221).

<sup>2</sup> In this study, 1992 is regarded as the starting period of the globalization of the Philippine economy because it was in that year that several liberalization laws were passed (see Annex1E). These included laws allowing the long-term lease of private lands by foreign investors, establishing the Export Development Council, amending the Omnibus Investment Code; creating the Philippine Economic Zone Authority and the Cagayan Special Economic Zone Authority; further liberalizing foreign investments.

<sup>3</sup> These "export winners" are: electronics, garments, metal products, processed foods, furniture, marine products, jewelry, holiday decors, seaweeds and carageenan, ceramics, marble products, footwear, leather goods, fresh fruits, oleochemical products, fertilizers, copper products, petrochemical products, motor vehicle components, iron and steel products and specialties, industrial tree plantation products, and livestock products (see Bautista 1998: 630-632).

<sup>4</sup> "Direct investment" (DI) figures are used here instead of those of the foreign direct investment (FDI) figures because it implies a long-term relationship. DI "is a category of international investment in which a resident entity in one economy (the direct investor) acquires a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy (the direct investment enterprise)." An investor should have 10% or more of the ordinary shares or voting power or the equivalent power. For the purposes of the balance of payments and national accounts, DI covers land, structures, direct investment capital, equity capital, intercompany debt transactions, debt securities, and trade credits. DI figures allow for international investment comparison. (See International Monetary Fund 1996: 109-116)

<sup>5</sup> Most of the investments in the Ramos period (1992-1998) were for public utilities, energy-related projects, infrastructure and industrial services, manufacturing, and mining (see Bautista 1998: 633).

<sup>4</sup> Carrier, Toshiba, Matsushita, Intel, Texas Instruments, Motorola, Amkor-Anam, Accenture, Delta Airlines, Flour, and Procter and Gamble have recently established their branches in the country (Lopez 2003).

<sup>5</sup>America On Line (AOL) has around 500 Filipinos answering customer e-mails at the Clark's Special Economic Zone near Manila; Andersen Consulting employs 515 Filipinos to develop and customize software in downtown Manila; and Caltex hires accountants for the oil company in Manila to process transactions and authorize payments for Southeast Asia and Hong Kong (quoted in Limlingan 2000 *Far Eastern Economic Review*).

<sup>6</sup>Aside from the OFWs, there has been massive migration of about 1.023 million registered Filipino emigrants from 1981-1999 to the USA (72%), Canada (13%), Australia (7.5%), Japan (4%), Germany (0.7%), the United Kingdom (0.5%), and the rest of the world (1.8%). The presence of pockets of Filipinos diasporas around the world, together with OFWs, has made it imperative for the country to hop onto the global bandwagon to protect their job security and welfare and the Philippine's economic interests (i.e., continuous remittances of foreign exchange currencies).

<sup>7</sup>The researchers conducted a rapid appraisal of the mandates, powers, and functions of relevant government agencies: Do they have the mandates, powers, and functions to manage globalization? How are these articulated? Is there coordination and coherence in their strategic assessments and policies? What are their accomplishments? Are they effective?

<sup>8</sup>The researchers wrote the major responsibilities, mandates, and functions of the government agencies featured in this section in Annex 1.

<sup>9</sup>Its main functions and responsibilities are to: develop strategies, concepts, and tools for the EDP; develop its standards and procedures; organize EDP attachment programs and supervise the conduct of training courses; develop EDP briefs, updates and supplementary promotional materials; and provide advisory service to geographic offices and foreign service posts (1987 Administrative Code, Book IV, Title 1, Chapter 8, Section 2).

<sup>10</sup>Aside from the traditional training courses on foreign languages, DFA diplomatic personnel are trained on Philippine economic diplomacy, e.g., tourism, investment, trade, macro- and micro-economics, trade law. They could also enroll in the graduate programs on International Studies, Asian Studies, Philippine Studies, Economics, Public Administration, and Political Science at the University of the Philippines. Some U.P. units also provide academic offerings about international finance and political economy, e.g., School of Economics (SE), College of Business Administration (CBA), and the Third World Studies Center (TWSC).

<sup>11</sup>A typical chapter of a *Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan* normally contains a section about "Assessment and Challenges" aside from "Policy Framework" and "Targets and Strategies."

<sup>12</sup>NEDA is the central socioeconomic planning agency of the government. The meetings of the NEDA Board are chaired by the President with technical assistance provided by the NEDA Secretariat headed by the Secretary of Socioeconomic Planning who is its Director-General and concurrent Board Vice-Chairman. Its members are the heads of 15 cabinet departments and the Deputy Governor of the *Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas* (Central Bank of the Philippines). Aside from the Secretariat, the Board is assisted by five cabinet-level interagency committees, namely: Development Budget Coordination Committee, Infrastructure Committee, Investment Coordination Committee, Social Development Committee, and Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (NEDA n.d.: 1-4). The NEDA Secretariat conducts studies and formulation of policy measures and other recommendations on the various aspects of development planning and policy formulation, and coordination, evaluation, and monitoring of plan implementation through its various offices like the National Planning and Policy Staff, Trade, Industry and Utilities Staff, Infrastructure Staff, Public Investment Staff. (NEDA n.d.: 4).

<sup>15</sup>LEDAC has the following members: the Vice-President, Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, seven Cabinet members, three Senators, three Congressmen, the president of the National League of Provinces and representatives from the private and youth sectors.

<sup>16</sup>Foreigners are now allowed 100 percent equity in all sectors including retail trade and banking which had been closed to them before (RA 7042 Foreign Investments Act of 1991; RA 8179 Further Liberalizing Foreign Investments, RA 8762, Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000; RA 7721: Foreign Banking Act). Only those in a negative list are not open to them. They are further allowed to lease land up to 75 years (RA 7652: Foreign Investors' Long-Term Lease Act). A new law expanded the Build-Operate-Transfer Act as new opportunities for the private sector (RA 7718: The Expanded Build-Operate-and-Transfer Act).

<sup>17</sup>RA 8751 strengthens the mechanisms for the imposition of WTO-consistent countervailing duties on imported subsidized products; RA 8752 protects domestic industries through an anti-dumping duty; and RA 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act, allows the government to temporarily raise tariffs or impose quantitative restrictions under certain conditions.

<sup>18</sup>Unless otherwise indicated, this case study is based on Briones and Gamboa 2003.

<sup>19</sup>McMahon (2002:1) defines "regulatory capture" as "meant behaviors, active and passive, by responsible authorities, which behavior acts to protect the same illegal, unethical, immoral or anti-public interest practices that those authorities are charged of policing."

<sup>20</sup>Build-operate-transfer-rehabilitate, one of the schemes under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law (RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718.) The BOT Law is the government's response to make local industries more globally competitive through the development of infrastructure.

<sup>21</sup>Former Presidents Carlos Menem (1989-1999) and Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001).

<sup>22</sup>The procedures are as follows:

- BOT company submits unsolicited project proposal to the NEDA Investment Coordination Committee (ICC) Secretariat.
- NEDA-ICC Technical Board reviews and recommends approval of the proposal to the NEDA-ICC Cabinet.
- NEDA-ICC Cabinet reviews and recommends the proposal to the NEDA Board
- NEDA Board approves proposal.
- BOT company and government agency prepare the contract and submit draft contract to NEDA-ICC Technical Board.
- NEDA-ICC Technical Board assesses the draft contract and recommends for consideration by the NEDA Board.
- NEDA Board approves draft contract.
- BOT company and government agency sign the contract and implement it (Inocentes III 1999).

<sup>23</sup> The NPC Board overruled the conclusion of its NPC Price and Non-Price Group (PNPEG) that the bids of IMPSA and its rival, First Philippine Power Corporation, Inc. (FPPC), did not meet the requirements of the Terms of Reference; hence, nobody won the bid. The NPC Board qualified IMPSA although there were questions on its track record, technical competence, and the technical aspects of its bid (Sedilla 1998).

<sup>24</sup>A section in the BROT Contract implies that the Republic of the Philippines would assume the financial costs if there will be project failure, a violation of the BOT Law (Enrile 1999). Moreover, IMPSA was no longer required to provide 100% equity as provided for by the BOT Law (Alonzo 1998).

<sup>25</sup>Unless otherwise indicated, data for this section were derived from the website about the *SME Agenda* posted in the website of the Department of Trade and Industry.

<sup>26</sup>The training agencies are: Philippine Trade Training Center (of the Department of Trade and Industry), Institute for Small-Scale Industries (of the University of the Philippines), Technology Training Center, Technology Application and Promotion Institute (of the Department of Science and Technology), Cottage Industry Technology Center, Technology Livelihood and Resource Center, and Technical Education and Skills Development Authority.

<sup>27</sup>The Department of Trade and Industry can tap the cooperation of various government agencies, e.g., Department of the Interior and Local Government for the 2001 "National Anti-Red Tape Program," to simplify business transactions in local government units.

<sup>28</sup>For example, Zamboanga and Dipolog (bottling Spanish-style sardines vice bottling of poor man's fish *galunggong*); Guimaras, Cebu, Zambales, and Pangasinan (second-stage processing of mango puree, mango juice, and dried mango and even entered profitable partnerships with large-scale producers such as Magnolia, Dole, Del Monte, and Drysdale); upland areas in Luzon and Mindanao (food processing ventures of other Philippine fruits such as guayabano, pineapple, guava, and pomelo, herbs and spices such as asparagus, broccoli, different types of lettuce, and various types of herbs and spices) (Pimentel 2002: 9).

<sup>29</sup>EDSA II also attracted worldwide attention. On 25 February 2001, the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates Foundation presented the country its own version of the Nobel, "for the wonderful gift of the spirit... to the world in the form of People Power 2" (Perlas 2001).

<sup>30</sup>This refers to the rallies in Metro Manila. People congregated in city centers throughout the archipelago.

<sup>31</sup>For a discussion of the group composition of EDSA I, and of EDSA II, see Bautista 1986 and Reyes 2001, respectively.

<sup>32</sup>Ferdinand E. Marcos called his dictatorship "constitutional authoritarianism" and conducted various referenda and electoral exercises to clothe his regime with the trappings of democracy. However, the electoral system failed in the case of EDSA I, and there was a breakdown in all three branches of government in the case of EDSA II.

<sup>33</sup>The Constitution of 1987, Article II Section 23 provides that "The State shall encourage nongovernmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation. It also devotes an entire article to the roles and rights of people's organizations.

<sup>34</sup>They include the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Urban Development and Housing Act, Women in Development and Nation Building Act, and the Indigenous People's Rights Act.

<sup>35</sup>The "basic sectors" are farmers, indigenous peoples, fisher folk, urban poor, women, persons with disabilities, youth and students, children, informal workers, organized labor, disaster victims, senior citizens, nongovernmental organizations and business sector.

<sup>36</sup>That is, they could offer a bid higher than up to 10 percent of the lowest for-profit bidder and still bag a contract.

<sup>37</sup>At present, Lakas is the dominant party in the country, being the nominal party of President Arroyo, who however campaigned under the banner of 4-K, a new coalition. Lakas-CMD is affiliated with the Christian Democrat and People's Parties International, of which House Speaker Jose de Venecia is Vice-President. It is a global Christian-Moslem coalition that seeks to seize the opportunities of globalization and use them to the full. LDP or *Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino* (Struggle of Democratic Filipinos), along with the Nationalist People's Coalition led by a well-heeled Marcos crony, is the opposition party. *Laban* was Corazon Aquino's party when she ran against Marcos in 1986, but it lost its leadership when President Aquino supported Fidel V. Ramos who ran under the *Lakas* banner instead.

<sup>38</sup>An organization will be entitled to a seat if it garners two percent of the total number of votes to the party-list section of the ballot and can have up to three seats. Activist groups, such as *Bayan Muna* (Nation First) and *Akbayan* have regularly won seats since the party list was started. Identified with the Left, they have stood "against the onslaught of globalization," as their websites proclaim, and maintain their leadership in the parliament of the streets as well. Women, labor, veterans cooperatives and indigenous Filipinos as well as the poorer geographic regions are represented through this system. An anti-corruption group, Citizen's Battle against Corruption (CIBAC), associated with a religious sect, has also won seats in the last two Congresses.

<sup>39</sup>It accounts for no more than ten percent of Congress at any given time.

<sup>40</sup>This includes the National Wages and Productivity Commission, its regional counterparts, the Social Securities System, the Employees Compensation Commission, the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, the Tripartite Industrial Peace Council, and the National Labor Relations Commission.

<sup>41</sup>This is a logical development since its original focus on labor-management relations is a big component of CSR (Moya 2004).

<sup>42</sup>Firms adhering to the Global Compact pledge to conform to ten universally accepted core values in the areas of human rights, labor standards, the environment, and anti-corruption.

<sup>43</sup>The casebook highlights the experience of six of the 150 Philippine subscribers, reportedly the biggest GC groups internationally (Moya 2004).

<sup>44</sup>It conducts an annual recognition of child-friendly and child-labor-free firms, and provides self-assessment tools and orientation sessions towards stopping child exploitation.

<sup>45</sup>LCF consists of the social development and philanthropy arms of the country's biggest corporations, and promotes corporate citizenship among its members. MBC, on the other hand, is composed of the corporations headquartered in Makati, the country's commercial center. It supports and operates projects centered on children and education (Children's Hour, Invest in Education Program and connectEd.ph), the judiciary, environment and disaster preparedness and relief (Corporate Network for Disaster Response). Its other programs include the MBC-Visa credit card, where Bankard will donate 1% of all charges to the charitable fund managed by MBC, the Habitat for Humanity and the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) (<http://www.mbc.com>). PBSP meanwhile was formed in 1970 by the top 50 corporations which pledged a certain percentage of their pre-tax income to social development. It now has 160 members, have some 2,500 partner-organizations, and has provided over PhP4.6 billion to support 5,000 social development projects benefiting around 2.5 million poor households. This private, non-profit foundation has also established the Center for Corporate Citizenship which tests, evaluates, documents and promotes practices in social investment, corporate-community partnership, environmental stewardship and managing workplace concerns (<http://www.pbsp.org.ph>).

<sup>46</sup>ISO is a network of national standards institutes of 148 countries that develops, coordinates and publishes finished standards for fields ranging from mathematics and electronics to agriculture and domestic and commercial equipment. Its most widely known and successful standards are ISO 9000 concerned with quality management and ISO 14000 (environmental management).

<sup>47</sup>Its Executive Director is Walden Bello, who was granted what had been dubbed as an alternative Nobel for his books and active presence in anti-globalization efforts.

<sup>48</sup>The protest was led by the Roman Catholic Church, through its Social Action Network, and local NGOs like the local chapter of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM).

<sup>49</sup>For examples of these organizations and their activities see, for example, Aldaba 1993, Alegre 1996, Cariño 2002, Ferrer 1997.

<sup>50</sup>These first two PDs were repealed by President Aquino.

<sup>51</sup>Literally the nation's pillar, *Sandiganbayan* is a court exclusively for offenses of public officials and their cohorts.

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*Annex I**A. Agencies Involved in Managing Globalization*

- Office of Policy Planning (OPP) of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) provides coherent, consistent and clear trade and industry policies in support of national economic development agenda (DTI website).
- International Finance Group (IFG) of the Department of Finance (DoF) participates in policy formulation regarding external resource mobilization; coordinates with other government agencies regarding international agreement on trade, investment, tax treaties and other international arrangements (DOF website).
- Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) recommends to the President, among others, the national government's medium-term fiscal program, borrowing and debt strategy to support the fiscal program, and policies and programs to achieve the fiscal target (NEDA website).
- Investment Coordination Committee (ICC) of the NEDA evaluates the fiscal, monetary, and balance of payments (BOPs) implications of major national projects; advises the President on domestic and foreign borrowings program matters; and submits a status of the fiscal, monetary, and BOP implications of major national projects (NEDA website).
- Presidential Management Staff (PMS) of the Office of the President (OP) conducts policy researches and analyses on the overall management of the development process; and provides advisory and consultative services on specific policy issues (DBM n.d.: 484-485).

*B. House of Representatives Committees Having Jurisdiction Over Economic Laws*

- Committee on Trade and Industry has jurisdiction over all matters relating to domestic and foreign trade; intellectual property rights, patents, trade names and trademarks; standards, weights and measures; designs; quality control; consumer protection; prices and marketing of commodities; handicrafts and cottage industries; and the development, coordination, regulation and diversification of industry and investments.



- Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries has jurisdiction over all matters relating to banking and currency generally; government-owned or controlled financial institutions; private corporations; and insurance, securities and securities exchange.
- Committee on Economic Affairs has jurisdiction over all matters relating to economic or socioeconomic studies, planning, programming and development (House of Representatives website).

In addition to these committees, the House of Representatives has a Congressional Planning and Budget Office (CPBO) which provides technical assistance to Congress in the formulation of national economic policies and fiscal measures affecting government expenditures, revenue, and debt (all from the House of Representatives website).

#### *C. Senate Economic-Related Committees*

- Committee on Economic Affairs has jurisdiction over all matters relating to economic planning and programming; the planning of domestic and foreign indebtedness; general economic development; and coordination, regulation, and diversification of industry and investments.
- Committee on Trade and Commerce deals with matters relating to domestic and foreign trade and private corporations; patents, copyrights, trade names, and trademarks; standards, weights, measures and designs; quality control; control and stabilization of prices of commodities; consumer protection; handicraft and cottage industries; and marketing of commodities.
- Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions, and Currencies has jurisdiction over all matters relating to banks, financial institutions, government and private currencies, capital markets, mutual funds, securitization, coinage, and circulation of money.
- Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises deals with all matters affecting government corporations; the interests of the government in the different industrial and commercial enterprises; and privatization (all from the Senate website).

#### *D. Promotional And Regulatory Agencies In Investment-Related Activities*

- The Investment Promotions Group of the Department of Trade and Industry is tasked to generate investments and improve the image of

the country as a viable investment destination through the formulation and implementation of investment promotion strategy for synchronized investment promotion efforts (DTI website).

- The Board of Investments is the lead government agency responsible for the promotion of investments in the Philippines (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title X, Chapter 7, Section 15 [5]). The BOI assists Filipino and foreign investors to venture and prosper in desirable areas of economic activities, i.e., food processing, construction, metal products, telecommunications, power and infrastructure projects among others (BOI website).
- The Securities and Exchange Commission, under the Office of the President, has the mandate to formulate policies and recommendations on issues concerning the securities market, advises Congress and other government agencies on all aspects of the securities market, and proposes legislation and amendments (DBM n.d.: 67).

Under the supervision of NEDA, the Investment Coordination Committee is tasked, among others, to evaluate the fiscal, monetary, and balance of payments (BOPs) implications of major national projects, and submits a status of the fiscal, monetary, and BOP implications of these projects (NEDA n.d.: 2).

- Investors are invited to set up business in the country's economic zones by Philippine Economic Zone Authority. At present, it administers and manages the incentives of 114 approved special economic zones in various parts of the country.
- On the other hand, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority and the Clark Development Corporation are in charge of supervising their economic zones, i.e., Subic and Clark Freeports, respectively, which used to be the sites of the former US' military bases in the Philippines.

#### *E. Liberalization Laws\**

- Republic Act (RA) No. 7042: Foreign Investments Act of 1991 allowed foreigners 100% equity in almost all sectors except in areas included in a negative list.
- RA 8179: Further Liberalizing Foreign Investments, Amending the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 allows non-Philippine nationals to

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\*Description from the Republic Acts from Carmona (2003) and the DTI website.

own up to 100% of domestic market enterprises unless foreign ownership is prohibited or limited by the Constitution and existing laws or the Foreign Investment Negative List

- RA 7652: Foreign Investors' Long-Term Lease Act allows foreign investors to lease land for until 75 years.
- RA 7718: The Expanded Build-Operate-and-Transfer Act authorizes the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of infrastructure projects by the private sector through the BOT schemes.
- RA 8762: Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 opened up the local market to certain types of foreign retailers.
- RA 7721: Foreign Banking Act allows additional foreign banks to establish full commercial operations thru two options: (a) purchase up to 60% of the voting stock of an existing bank, or (b) invest 100% in a new banking industry incorporated in the Philippines.
- RA 8751: Strengthening the Mechanisms for the Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imported Subsidized Products, Commodities, or Articles in Commerce, seeks to strengthen the mechanisms for the imposition of a World Trade Organization-consistent countervailing measure to protect Philippine domestic enterprises from subsidized imports.
- RA 8752: Anti-Dumping Act of 1999 protects domestic industries against unfair competition and trade practices through the imposition of an anti-dumping duty.
- RA 8800: Safeguard Measures Act allows the Philippines to temporarily raise tariffs, or impose quantitative restrictions, without necessarily deviating from the original objective of liberalizing the conduct of international trade.

#### *F. Laws Strengthening Regulated Areas of the Economy*

- RA 7721: Foreign Banking Act liberalizes the entry and scope of operations of foreign banks in the Philippines.
- RA 7653: General Banking Law provides for the regulation of the organization and operations of banks, quasi-banks, and trust entities; enhances the supervisory capability and enforcement powers of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP or Central Bank of the Philippines).

- RA 8293: Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines prescribes the Intellectual Property Code and established the Intellectual Property Office.
- RA 8792: Electronic Commerce Act paves the way for the legal acceptance of electronic documents to facilitate processing and to enable international businesses to pursue business ventures by engaging in contractual agreements over electronic mail or the Internet.
- RA 8799: Securities Regulation Code of 2000 seeks to develop the Philippine capital market, promotes self-regulation in the securities industry, ensures protection for all investors, encourages full and fair disclosure, and eliminates fraud and manipulation which create market distortion.
- RA 9160: Anti-Money Laundering Act created the Anti-Money Laundering Council; criminalizes money laundering to ensure that the Philippines will not be used as a laundering site for proceeds of any unlawful activity.
- RA 9184: Government Procurement Law provides for the modernization, standardization, and regulation of the procurement activities of the government.

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ISSN 977-0031-7675-2